Advanced mathematics and deductive reasoning skills: testing the Theory of Formal Discipline by Nina Attridge (433622)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough University as a PhD thesis by the 
author and is made available in the Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) under the following Creative Commons Licence 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
Advanced Mathematics and
Deductive Reasoning Skills:
Testing the Theory of Formal Discipline
Nina Attridge
A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Loughborough University
January 2013
c©Nina Attridge
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Literature Review 4
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Defining reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Rationality – what is ‘better’ reasoning? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 A brief history of the Theory of Formal Discipline . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Research into thinking skills and their relation to mathematics . 18
2.6 The psychology of reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.7 Current status of the Theory of Formal Discipline . . . . . . . . 47
3 Methodology 49
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Overview of longitudinal study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3 Research Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.1 Science and society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3.2 Welfare of participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 The Experimental Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5 The Quasi-Experimental Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.6 Reliability and Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6.1 Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.6.2 Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4 Measures of reasoning 64
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2 Judgment and Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2.1 Heuristics and Biases tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3 Deductive Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3.1 Disjunction tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3.2 Conditional tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3.3 Syllogisms tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
ii
4.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5 The development of reasoning skills in AS level mathematics
students 84
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.1.1 Testing the Theory of Formal Discipline . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.1.2 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2 Pilot Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2.1 Pilot 1: Splitting the syllogisms task . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2.2 Pilot 2: Disguising the Cognitive Reflection Test . . . . . 91
5.2.3 Pilot 3: Duration and difficulty of measures . . . . . . . . 94
5.2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.3 Main study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.4.1 Development of reasoning skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.4.2 Competency and biases in the Conditional Inference Task 119
5.4.3 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.4.4 Revised status of the Theory of Formal Discipline . . . . 120
5.4.5 Summary of novel findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6 The development of reasoning skills in undergraduate mathem-
atics students 122
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.1.1 Testing the Theory of Formal Discipline . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.1.2 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.2 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.2.1 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.2.2 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.2.3 Mathematics Syllabus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.2.4 Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.2.5 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.3.1 Preliminary analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.3.2 Development of reasoning skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.4.1 Summary of novel findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
iii
7 Linguistic factors in mathematics students’ conditional reason-
ing: ‘if then’ versus ‘only if ’ 142
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
7.2 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.2.1 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.2.2 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.2.3 Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.2.4 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.3.1 Endorsement rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.3.2 Interpretations of the conditional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7.4.1 Summary of novel findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
8 The role of the heuristic level in mathematics students’ condi-
tional reasoning 153
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
8.2 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
8.2.1 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
8.2.2 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
8.2.3 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
8.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
8.3.1 Manipulation check and covariate assessment . . . . . . . 156
8.3.2 Main analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
8.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
8.4.1 Summary of novel findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
9 The role of executive functions in conditional reasoning ability 169
9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
9.2 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
9.2.1 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
9.2.2 Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
9.2.3 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
9.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
9.3.1 Data cleaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
9.3.2 Task performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
9.3.3 Relationships between executive functions . . . . . . . . . 177
9.3.4 Executive functions and Conditional Reasoning . . . . . . 178
9.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
9.4.1 Summary of novel findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
iv
10 Conclusions 183
10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
10.2 Overview of findings and interpretations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
10.3 Future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
10.4 The Theory of Formal Discipline revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Publications List 189
A Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices 203
B Conditional Inference Task 204
C Belief Bias Syllogisms Task 211
D Need for Cognition Scale 219
E AS level Mathematics Test 221
F Thematic Conditional Inference Task 224
G Undergraduate Mathematics Test 232
List of Abbreviations 235
Author Index 237
v
List of Figures
2.1 The basic structure of the four inferences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 The three positions on human rationality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 The Wason Selection Task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 An example of a reasoning task used by Owen et al (2010). . . . 19
2.5 An example of each type of item from the Belief Bias Syllogisms
task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6 The disjunctive Knights and Knaves problem used by Toplak and
Stanovich (2002), adapted from Shafir (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7 The causal schema conditional problem used in Lehman and Nis-
bett (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.8 A valid and unbelievable syllogism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.9 Evans’s (2006) default-interventionist model. . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.10 Frederick’s (2005) three item Cognitive Reflection Test. . . . . . 37
2.11 An example of a) a congruent and b) an incongruent trial of the
denominator neglect task used by Gillard (2009). . . . . . . . . . 39
2.12 An illustration of g as the shared variance between cognitive abil-
ities, such as school subjects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.13 An example item from Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices. . 43
2.14 The Need for Cognition Scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.1 Possible quasi-experimental design outcome 1. . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2 Possible quasi-experimental design outcome 2. . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3 Possible quasi-experimental design outcome 3. . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4 Possible quasi-experimental design outcome 4. . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.1 Wason’s abstract THOG problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2 The Pub problem, a contextualised version of the THOG task. . 71
4.3 Euler diagrams to represent ‘if p then q’ under the material con-
ditional and biconditional interpretations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.4 A Wason Selection Task example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5 Example Modus Ponens item from the Conditional Inference task. 78
vi
4.6 Example items from the Conditional Inference task showing a)
a Modus Tollens inference and b) a Denial of the Antecedent
inference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.7 Example items from the Belief Bias Syllogisms task. . . . . . . . 81
5.1 Example items from the Belief Bias Syllogisms task. . . . . . . . 88
5.2 Believability ratings for each problem type by test half. . . . . . 90
5.3 The three items from the Woodcock Johnson III Applied Prob-
lems subtest that were used in Pilot Study 2. . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.4 Number of intuitive responses in the mixed and non-mixed con-
ditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.5 Example item from the Conditional Inference Task. . . . . . . . . 101
5.6 Interaction between Group and Time on mathematics test scores. 105
5.7 Mean endorsement rates for each of the four inferences in each
group at Time 1 and Time 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.8 Mean interpretation index scores for each group at Time 1 and
Time 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.9 Proposed relationship between overall score and a bias index on
a reasoning task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.10 Relationship between the Material Conditional Index and Neg-
ative Conclusion Index on the Conditional Inference Task when
collating data from five studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.11 Relationship between the Defective Conditional Index and Neg-
ative Conclusion Index on the Conditional Inference Task when
collating data from five studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.12 Mean syllogisms scores for each group at Time 1 and Time 2. . . 113
5.13 Mean belief bias index scores for each group and Time 1 and
Time 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.1 Example item from the Abstract Conditional Inference task. . . . 126
6.2 Example item from the Thematic Conditional Inference task. . . 126
6.3 Interaction between Group and Time on CRT scores . . . . . . . 130
6.4 Interaction between Group and Time on mathematics test scores 131
6.5 Endorsement rates for each of the four inferences in each group
at Time 1 and Time 2 on the Abstract Conditional Inference Task132
6.6 Interaction between Group and Time on Abstract Conditional
Inference indices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.7 Endorsement rates for each of the four inferences in each group
at Time 1 and Time 2 on the Thematic Conditional Inference Task.136
vii
6.8 Interaction between Group and Time on Thematic Conditional
Inference interpretation indices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.1 Endorsement rates for each inference type in the IT and OI con-
ditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7.2 Mean interpretation indices in the IT and OI conditions. . . . . . 149
8.1 Endorsement rates for each inference type in the fast and slow
conditions for non-mathematics participants. . . . . . . . . . . . 159
8.2 Endorsement rates for valid and invalid inferences in the fast and
slow conditions for the non-mathematics group. . . . . . . . . . . 160
8.3 Mean interpretation indices in each group in the slow condition. . 161
8.4 Consistency with each of the four interpretations for the math-
ematics and control group under the fast and slow conditions. . . 163
9.1 Example sequence of trials from the 2-back task . . . . . . . . . . 174
9.2 Distribution of scores on the shifting task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
9.3 Distribution of scores on the inhibition (Stroop) task. . . . . . . 176
9.4 Distribution of scores on the working memory (2-back) task. . . . 177
9.5 Correlation between MCI and working memory scores. . . . . . . 179
viii
List of Tables
2.1 The four inferences and conditional statement types with and
without negated premises and conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Truth table for the four interpretations of ‘if p then q ’. . . . . . . 7
2.3 Validity of the four inferences under each interpretation of the
conditional. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Truth table for ‘if it rains then I take an umbrella’ assuming the
material conditional. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1 Demonstration of complete and Latin Square counterbalancing
for a set of three tasks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.1 Truth Table for the exclusive disjunction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2 Truth Table for the inclusive disjunction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 Truth Table for the disjunction rule ‘I’ll order wine or water’. . . 73
4.4 Truth Table for ‘if p then q ’ where t = true and f = false. . . . . 74
4.5 Truth Table for ‘if p then q ’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.6 Truth Table for the conditional rule ‘if it rains then I take an
umbrella’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.7 The four inferences and conditional statement types with and
without negated premises. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.1 Duration information for each measure used in the test book. . . 96
5.2 Score information for measures in test book. . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.3 The four inferences and conditional statement types with and
without negated premises and conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.4 Mean number items endorsed by Inference type, Group and Time
point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.5 A hierarchical regression analysis predicting Time 2 Defective
Conditional Index scores. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.1 Number of participants in each group who completed each task
at Time 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
ix
6.2 Mean scores on each task at Time for those who did and did not
take part at Time 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.3 Number items endorsed on the Abstract Conditional Inference
Task by Inference type, Group and Time point. . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.4 Index scores for each interpretation of the abstract conditional
statement at Time 1 and Time 2 in each group. . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.5 Endorsement rates on the Thematic Conditional Inference Task
by Inference type, Group and Time point . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.6 Index scores for each interpretation of the thematic conditional
statement at Time 1 and Time 2 in each group. . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.7 Mean belief bias index scores for each group at Time 1 and Time 2.138
7.1 Truth table for the conditional statements ‘p only if q ’ and ‘if p
then q ’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
7.2 Percentage endorsement rates for each IT inference and the equi-
valent converted OI inference in Evans’s (1977) study. . . . . . . 144
7.3 Mean number of items endorsed for each of the four inferences
by condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.4 Mean endorsement rates for each IT inference and the equivalent
converted OI inference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7.5 Percentage of items endorsed for each inference type across par-
ticipants in four groups: the current maths IT group, the current
maths OI group, Evans’s (1977) IT non-maths group and Evans’s
OI non-maths group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
8.1 Mean index scores for each interpretation of the conditional state-
ment in the fast and slow condition for the mathematics and
non-mathematics group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
9.1 Correlations between Executive Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
9.2 Correlations between Executive Functions and interpretation in-
dices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
x
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to many people for their help and support during my PhD. First
and foremost I would like to thank Matthew Inglis for the huge amount of time
and effort he has invested in my work and my development as a researcher. I
am incredibly grateful to have had him as a supervisor.
I would also like to thank my second supervisor, Tony Croft, and the mem-
bers of the midlands Mathematical Cognition Group for their valuable comments
and suggestions throughout the course of my PhD. I am also grateful to the staff
and students of the Mathematics Education Centre at Loughborough University
for providing a friendly and encouraging environment in which to work.
This work would not have been possible without the help of my participants
and their schools, who volunteered their time and effort for very little personal
reward.
Finally, my thanks go out to the family and friends who have gotten me to
this point in my life, in particular, my mum, Fay, my brother, Jack, and my
grandparents, Pat and John.
xi
Declaration
I, the author, declare that the work presented here is my own and has not been
submitted for a degree at any other institution. None of the work has previously
been published in this form.
xii
Abstract.
This thesis investigates the Theory of Formal Discipline (TFD): the idea that
studying mathematics develops general reasoning skills. This belief has been
held since the time of Plato (2003/375B.C), and has been cited in recent policy
reports (Smith, 2004; Walport, 2010) as an argument for why mathematics
should hold a privileged place in the UK’s National Curriculum. However, there
is no rigorous research evidence that justifies the claim. The research presented
in this thesis aims to address this shortcoming.
Two questions are addressed in the investigation of the TFD: is studying
advanced mathematics associated with development in reasoning skills, and if
so, what might be the mechanism of this development? The primary type of
reasoning measured is conditional inference validation (i.e. ‘if p then q; not p;
therefore not q’). In two longitudinal studies it is shown that the conditional
reasoning behaviour of mathematics students at AS level and undergraduate
level does change over time, but that it does not become straightforwardly
more normative. Instead, mathematics students reason more in line with the
‘defective’ interpretation of the conditional, under which they assume p and
reason about q. This leads to the assumption that not-p cases are irrelevant,
which results in the rejection of two commonly-endorsed invalid inferences, but
also in the rejection of the valid modus tollens inference. Mathematics students
did not change in their reasoning behaviour on a thematic syllogisms task or a
thematic version of the conditional inference task.
Next, it is shown that mathematics students reason significantly less in line
with a defective interpretation of the conditional when it is phrased ‘p only if q’
compared to when it is phrased ‘if p then q’, despite the two forms being logic-
ally equivalent. This suggests that their performance is determined by linguistic
features rather than the underlying logic. The final two studies investigated the
heuristic and algorithmic levels of Stanovich’s (2009a) tri-process model of cog-
nition as potential mechanisms of the change in conditional reasoning skills. It
is shown that mathematicians’ defective interpretation of the conditional stems
in part from heuristic level processing and in part from effortful processing, and
that the executive function skills of inhibition and shifting at the algorithmic
level are correlated with its adoption.
It is suggested that studying mathematics regularly exposes students to im-
plicit ‘if then’ statements where they are expected to assume p and reason
about q, and that this encourages them to adopt a defective interpretation of
conditionals. It is concluded that the TFD is not supported by the evidence;
while mathematics does seem to develop abstract conditional reasoning skills,
the result is not more normative reasoning.
xiii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the time of Plato (375B.C./2003) it has been assumed that people can be
taught to think more logically, and in particular, that mathematics is a useful
tool for doing so. This is known as the Theory of Formal Discipline (TFD) and
is exemplified by the philosopher John Locke’s suggestion that mathematics
ought to be taught to “all those who have time and opportunity, not so much
to make them mathematicians as to make them reasonable creatures” (Locke,
1706/1971, p.20).
Versions of the TFD are regularly cited in educational policy debates and
curricula reform documents (e.g. National Research Council, 2001; Walport,
2010). For example, in a report to the UK government, Smith (2004) argued
that mathematics education “disciplines the mind, develops logical and critical
reasoning, and develops analytical and problem-solving skills to a high degree”
(p.11). Smith went on to argue that mathematics students at university should
receive tuition fees rebates, and that school mathematics teachers should benefit
from higher salaries. The TFD is not readily accepted by all, however (e.g.
Bramall & White, 2000). As of yet there is very little evidence to suggest
that the TFD is accurate, and even less to inform us on what the nature and
extent of any changes in logical thinking might be. Indeed, Kilpatrick (1983)
argued that understanding whether (and which) reasoning skills are developed
by studying advanced mathematics was one of the three most important open
research questions in mathematics education, and it has been little addressed
since that time.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the veracity of the TFD: does study-
ing advanced mathematics develop reasoning skills, and if so, how? Chapter
2 reviews the psychology of reasoning literature and previous research related
to the TFD. Chapter 3 discusses research ethics, the experimental and quasi-
experimental methods, and issues of reliability and validity. Chapter 4 intro-
1
duces the most commonly used tasks to measure reasoning skills, and presents
an argument for using Evans, Clibbens and Rood’s (1995) Conditional Inference
Task as the primary measure of reasoning skills for this thesis.
Chapter 5 presents a longitudinal quasi-experimental study investigating the
development of conditional and syllogistic reasoning skills in AS level mathem-
atics students compared to AS level English literature students. It is shown
that while the groups do not differ in reasoning behaviour at the start of post-
compulsory education, the mathematics students hold a significantly changed
interpretation of the conditional after a year of study, while the English literat-
ure students do not. However, the students did not become straightforwardly
more normative (i.e. correct according to formal logic) in their reasoning. In-
stead they increasingly adopted the so-called ‘defective’ interpretation of the
conditional, which despite its name can be seen as an improvement on the
biconditional interpretation that was more widely adopted at the start. Under
a defective interpretation of the conditional statement ‘if p then q’, not-p cases
are considered irrelevant to the conditional. This leads to the failure to endorse
the Modus Tollens inference, which is considered valid under the normative
model of conditional logic (the different models of the conditional are discussed
in Chapter 2). The same pattern of change was found in undergraduate math-
ematics students in Chapter 6, but the study suffered from low power rendering
the effect non-significant.
Chapter 7 presents an experimental study in which mathematics undergradu-
ate students are given the Conditional Inference Task with the conditional state-
ments phrased as either ‘if p then q’ or the logically equivalent ‘p only if q’. The
‘only if’ group performed significantly less in line with the defective conditional
than the ‘if then’ group, suggesting that the change in interpretation found in
the AS level study is specific to the linguistic phrasing commonly encountered
in mathematics – ‘if p then q’. This is contrary to the TFD assumption that
studying mathematics brings about a broad change in reasoning behaviour.
Chapter 8 demonstrated, with a time-limited version of the Conditional In-
ference Task, that the difference in mathematicians’ and non-mathematicians’
adoption of the defective conditional is partly, but not entirely, due to automatic
cognitive processing.
Finally, Chapter 9 examined the relationship between conditional reasoning
behaviour and executive functions – the skills that allow us to control our at-
tention and cognitive effort – and suggested that inhibition and shifting skills
may play a role in the adoption of a defective conditional interpretation over a
biconditional interpretation.
The thesis concludes (Chapter 10) with a proposal that studying mathemat-
ics exposes students to implicit statements of the form ‘if p then q’, where they
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are expected to assume that p is true and deduce something about q (Houston,
2009). This appears to foster a defective interpretation of the conditional that
is limited to abstract conditional reasoning of the form ‘if p then q’. The re-
lationship between studying mathematics and changes to reasoning skills may,
therefore, be far more limited than previously thought.
3
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This research aims to test the claim known as the Theory of Formal Discipline
(TFD): that studying mathematics improves general reasoning skills to a greater
extent than other disciplines. The research into this issue falls into two strands:
1. Does studying mathematics at advanced levels improve general reasoning
skills to a greater extent than other subjects?
2. What cognitive mechanisms are associated with ‘better’ reasoning skills
(see Section 2.3 for a discussion of what constitutes ‘better’ reasoning)
and are these responsible for any improvement found in strand 1?
The literature review presented below will define reasoning, discuss some
perspectives on rationality, review the history of the TFD and evidence relating
to its claims, discuss some theories of reasoning and how it might be improved,
and finally, it will summarise the current status of the TFD and why it is
important that it be investigated.
2.2 Defining reasoning
Before discussing the literature on how we reason and its relation to mathem-
atics, it is important to clarify what reasoning is. Reasoning can be seen as
the cognitive process of inferring new information from given information, and
there are broadly two forms: deductive and inductive. In deductive reasoning,
a conclusion must be true when the premises are true, for example, ‘if p then
q ; p; therefore q ’. With inductive reasoning, a conclusion is probably, but not
necessarily, true when the premises are true, for example, ‘all ps seen so far
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If p then q
p
Conclusion: q
a) Modus Ponens (MP)                           b) Denial of the antecedent (DA)
If p then q
not p
Conclusion: not q
If p then q
q
Conclusion: p
c) A!rmation of the consequent (AC)         d) Modus Tollens (MT)
If p then q
not q
Conclusion: not p
Figure 2.1: The basic structure of the four inferences: Modus Ponens, Denial of
the Antecedent, Affirmation of the Consequent, and Modus Tollens.
are qs; therefore; all ps are qs’. Deductive reasoning is therefore more rigorous
than inductive reasoning, and it is also the form used in mathematical proof.
In fact, Polya (1954, p. V) stated that “[a] mathematical proof is [deductive]
reasoning”. Deductive reasoning can be sub-divided into several forms, such
as conditional, disjunctive and syllogistic reasoning, and these are discussed in
more detail in Chapter 4. However, conditional reasoning will be central to the
thesis so it is worth elaborating on here.
Conditional reasoning is the process of drawing conclusions from a condi-
tional statement such as ‘if p then q’. It is considered central to logic (Anderson
& Belnap, 1975; Braine, 1978; Inglis & Simpson, 2008) and to mathematics
(Houston, 2009). There are four inferences commonly drawn from a conditional
statement: modus ponens (MP), modus tollens (MT), denial of the antecedent
(DA) and affirmation of the consequent (AC). The structure of each of these
inferences in shown in Figure 2.1.
There are also four forms of conditional statement created by the presence
and absence of negations: ‘if p then q ’, ‘if p then not q ’, ‘if not p then q ’, and
‘if not p then not q ’. Table 2.1 shows the premises and conclusions of each
combination of conditional statement and inference type. To elaborate on an
example from the table, an AC inference from an ‘if not p then q ’ statement
would read:
Rule: If not p then q
Premise: q
Conclusion: Therefore, not p
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MP DA AC MT
Conditional Pr Con Pr Con Pr Con Pr Con
if p then q p q ¬p ¬q q p ¬q ¬p
if p then ¬q p ¬q ¬p q ¬q p q ¬p
if ¬p then q ¬p q p ¬q q ¬p ¬q p
if ¬p then ¬q ¬p ¬q p q ¬q ¬p q p
Table 2.1: The four inferences and conditional statement types with and without
negated premises (Pr) and conclusions (Con). The symbol ¬ should read ‘not’.
The validity of each of the four inferences depends on the way in which one
interprets the conditional statement. There are four common interpretations of
a conditional: the material conditional, biconditional, defective conditional and
conjunctive conditional readings (Evans, Handley, Neilens & Over, 2007). Each
of these is demonstrated in truth table form in Table 2.2.
Under a material conditional reading, which is considered correct by logi-
cians, the statement ‘if p, then q ’ means that p is sufficient for q, and q is
necessary for p. In other words, the conditional means ‘q or not-p’. The condi-
tional is true in all cases except when p is true and q is false. It is possible for p
to be false and q to be true, because p is not necessarily the only determinant
of q.
Under a biconditional reading, the conditional is treated as ‘p if and only if
q ’. In other words, p implies q and q implies p, so that both are necessary and
sufficient for each other. As such, the statement ‘if p, then q ’ is not true when
p is false and q is true as well as when p is true and q is false – p and q must
both be true or both be false.
Under a defective reading of the conditional, p is considered necessary and
sufficient for q, so only p q cases are considered to make the rule true. However,
rather than not-p cases making the rule false, they are considered irrelevant.
The rule is considered true when both p and q are true, false when p is true and
q is false, and irrelevant when p is not true. This leads to a similar pattern of
inferences being deduced as in the case of the material conditional, except for
MT. An example of an MT inference is as follows:
If p then q
not-q
Therefore not-p
MT inferences are considered valid under a material interpretation but invalid
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p q Material Biconditional Defective Conjunctive
t t t t t t
t f f f f f
f t t f i f
f f t t i f
Table 2.2: Truth table for the four interpretations of ‘if p then q ’ where t =
true, f = false, and i = irrelevant.
under a defective interpretation. This is because the minor premise does not
affirm p and is therefore considered irrelevant to the conditional meaning that no
necessary conclusions can be drawn. However, if the reasoner is able to construct
a contradiction proof then they may be able to deduce not-p from the premise
not-q and accept the MT inference. For example “assume for contradiction p,
deduce q, but I know not-q, so the assumption p must be false”. This process
requires a high level of working memory and so may only be available to the
most able reasoners. For this reason, MT is generally considered invalid under
a defective interpretation.
Finally, under a conjunctive reading, the conditional is interpreted to mean
‘p and q’, so that the conditional is only true when both p and q are true, and
false in all other cases.
Consider the example ‘if America is in Europe, then China is in Asia’. We
know that the antecedent is false and the consequent is true, and we can see from
Table 2.2 that a false antecedent true consequent case is considered irrelevant
to the rule under a defective interpretation, but it is considered to make the
rule true under the material conditional and false under the biconditional and
conjunctive interpretations.
Table 2.3 shows whether each of the four inferences (MP, MT, DA, AC)
is considered valid under each of the four interpretations of the conditional.
Evans et al. (2007) found that MP was almost universally accepted (97.5%),
followed by AC (74%), MT (50%) and finally DA (38.5%). It is the material
conditional that is considered correct by logicians, but Evans et al.’s participants
clearly did not hold this interpretation. Conditionals in everyday language
tend to assume a biconditional or defective interpretation (Cummins, 1995;
Markovits, 1985; Venet & Markovits, 2001; Zepp, 1987; Verschueren, Schaeken
& d’Ydewalle, 2005) and so on the whole, people are not well versed with the
material conditional, as reflected in the endorsement rates of Evans et al.’s
(2007) participants. An interesting possibility in the context of this thesis is that
the study of mathematics increases one’s familiarity and competence with the
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Inference Material Biconditional Defective Conjunctive
MP Valid Valid Valid Valid
DA Invalid Valid Invalid Invalid
AC Invalid Valid Invalid Valid
MT Valid Valid Invalid Invalid
Table 2.3: Validity of the four inferences under each interpretation of the con-
ditional.
material conditional, leading to more normative performance on the Conditional
Inference Task.
Conditional inference ability will be the focus of this thesis for reasons dis-
cussed in Chapter 4, but the literature review will consider relevant research into
any form of reasoning because, as is demonstrated below, the TFD claims are
vague as to exactly which skills are improved by studying mathematics. Each
further type of reasoning discussed will be defined as it is introduced.
2.3 Rationality – what is ‘better’ reasoning?
This thesis is concerned with whether reasoning can be improved, so an obvious
issue is what should be considered ‘better’ and ‘worse’ reasoning. It is widely
evidenced that people’s reasoning behaviour is biased (i.e. it deviates from
normative models of reasoning, Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Stanovich, 2009b),
but the issue is whether this demonstrates irrationality or whether it can be
explained and excused in some other way. Some argue that the biases we are
prone to are not evidence of bad reasoning at all, while of course others disagree
and argue that we can do better. Before elaborating on these perspectives, some
of the common reasoning biases are discussed in order to clarify the problem
that these different views conflict over.
Heuristics and Biases
There is a huge literature on heuristics and biases in reasoning behaviour, and
this section will review just a few of the common issues. The term heuristic refers
to a cognitive ‘shortcut’, which is used in place of a longer process of thinking,
and which may be conscious or unconscious (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).
Heuristics save a great deal of mental effort and usually they are very effective,
but in some cases they may lead to biases. A bias is a systematic deviation
from normative models of rationality: an error that tends to be shown repeatedly
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within and between reasoners (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). Biases are deemed
to be errors based on the assumption that normative models maximise the
outcomes of the individual, and so if one does not follow the normative model
of a given reasoning situation, it is to their own detriment (Stanovich, 1999).
Chapter 4 provides an introduction to the most commonly used tasks to measure
reasoning behaviour, and in doing so it also provides an overview of many of the
biases commonly observed. Here, only a few biases are introduced in order to
demonstrate that humans do not always behave in line with normative models.
Beginning with the Conditional Inference Task, two biases that are com-
monly observed are the negative conclusion bias (NCB) and affirmative premise
bias (APB). The NCB refers to the tendency for participants to accept more
inferences that result in negative conclusions than affirmative conclusions. For
example, the DA inference ‘if p then q, not p, therefore not q ’ would be accepted
more often than the DA inference ‘if p then not q, not p, therefore q ’ despite
being logically equivalent (Evans et al., 1995; Evans & Handley, 1999). This
effect is observed on both denial inferences (MT and DA) but only occasion-
ally and weakly on AC, and never on MP (Schroyens, Schaeken & d’Ydewalle,
2001). There are two popular explanations for NCB. One suggestion is that
people assume that not-p is more common than p in the real world (e.g. there
are more not-blue things than there are blue things), and are therefore more
willing to conclude not-p than p (Pollard & Evans, 1980; Oaksford, Chater &
Larkin, 2000). An alternative account is that NCB stems from a problem with
processing double negations. NCB is most commonly observed on MT and DA
inferences, where an affirmative conclusion results from a double negation, for
example ‘if not A then 3; not 3; therefore not (not A)’. The reduced endorse-
ment rates in these problems may be due to reasoners failing to convert ‘not
(not A)’ into ‘A’.
The APB refers to the observation that participants are more likely to accept
inferences with an affirmative premise than a denial premise, particularly when
the denial is implicit (such as ‘7’ instead of ‘not 3’, Evans et al., 1995). For
example, the inference ‘if not A then 5, 5, therefore not A’ would be accepted
more often than the inference ‘if A then not 5, 8, therefore A’, although both are
invalid AC inferences. This has been explained as a matching bias (see more
below), whereby the premise ‘5’ is more obviously related to the conditional
than is the premise ‘8’ (Evans & Handley, 1999).
Another bias which is particularly relevant to this thesis is belief bias. This
is the tendency for participants to reason according to their prior beliefs rather
than the information at hand (Evans, Barston & Pollard, 1983; Sa´, West &
Stanovich, 1999). For example, when faced with the syllogism “all things with
four legs are dangerous; poodles are not dangerous; therefore, poodles do not
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have four legs”, a person biased by their prior beliefs that poodles do have four
legs would answer that the syllogism is invalid, whereas a person basing their
judgement on the information at hand would answer that it is valid. It is only on
items where validity and believability are in conflict (i.e. valid and unbelievable
or invalid and believable problems) where belief bias may be shown.
This section has described just a small selection of the biases that have been
empirically demonstrated in the reasoning literature, but they are sufficient
to show that people do not always reason according to normative standards.
The following section discusses this discrepancy in terms of various views on
rationality and whether we can expect people to be capable of ‘doing better’ by
reasoning according to the normative models.
Are humans irrational?
As demonstrated above, humans often show biases when reasoning. The issue
at hand is whether these biases demonstrate irrationality and whether it is
reasonable to expect people to do better, or at least to be able to do better.
This is a vital question for the thesis, because if we cannot expect people to
do better, then the question of whether mathematics specifically makes people
better at reasoning would be redundant.
There are three positions on human rationality which differ in their perspect-
ive on the relationship between descriptive, prescriptive and normative models
of human reasoning (Stanovich, 1999). Descriptive models describe and theor-
ise on the reasoning patterns of human beings. Normative models set the ideal
standards for reasoning, which if achieved would maximise outcomes for the
individual. However, as Harman (1995) and Stich (1990) argued, humans have
limited intelligence and limited time, and it would be unreasonable to expect
us to act in a normatively rational way given these restrictions. It is this argu-
ment that leads to the idea of a prescriptive model. Prescriptive models specify
the best we can hope to achieve when reasoning, given the cognitive and often
situational limitations that the reasoner must work within. This then replaces
the normative model as the standard we should hope to achieve and with which
we should compare descriptive models.
As mentioned above, there are three positions on the relationship between
descriptive, prescriptive and normative models of reasoning behaviour, and these
are shown in Figure 2.2. ‘Panglossians’ do not see that there is any substan-
tial gap between the three models (Stanovich, 1999). They argue that humans
reason as well as they can and as well as they should, and that human irra-
tionality is therefore not an issue. The biases described above are explained
as either random performance errors, incorrect norm application on the exper-
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The Meliorist position
The Panglossian position
The Apologist position
Less good reasoning
Less good reasoning
Less good reasoning Good reasoning
Good reasoning
Good reasoning
ND
D
D
P
P
P
N
N
Figure 2.2: The three positions on human rationality. N = normative model, P
= prescriptive model, and D = descriptive model.
imenter’s side, or a misunderstanding of the problem by the participant, due
to the experimenter being unclear (Stanovich & West, 2000). These explana-
tions are elaborated below. Under no circumstances are the biases considered
demonstrations of irrationality in the participants.
‘Meliorists’, on the other hand, argue that the way we actually reason is
far from the standard by which we could and should reason. They see the
prescriptive model as close to the normative model, while the descriptive model
falls somewhat short of the other two. The gap between the descriptive and
prescriptive models can therefore be deemed irrationality, because we are failing
to do as well as we could reasonably be expected to do (Stanovich, 1999).
The final position is that of the ‘Apologist’. The Apologist position agrees
with the Meliorists in that the descriptive model falls short of the normative
model, but it differs in that it places the prescriptive model much closer to the
descriptive. It argues, then, that while we are not reasoning perfectly, we are
doing the best we could hope to do given our cognitive limitations (Stanovich,
1999). Like the Panglossians, the Apologists believe that we cannot accuse hu-
mans of irrationality, because we are just about as rational as we could possibly
be. The difference between the two is that the Apologists recognise that this is
not up to ideal/normative standards, whilst the Panglossians argue that it is.
Throughout his book ‘Who is Rational?’, Stanovich (1999) used data on in-
dividual differences in reasoning behaviour to investigate the possible reasons
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for the apparent gap between the descriptive and normative models. The pos-
sible reasons, as alluded to above, are: random performance errors, incorrect
norm application, alternative task construal, computational limitations, and
systematic irrationality.
A Panglossian argument used to preserve human rationality is that the ap-
parent gap between normative and descriptive models is due to random per-
formance errors by the participants – perhaps they were momentarily distrac-
ted, for example (Stanovich & West, 2000). The problem that Stanovich (1999)
identified with this account is that errors are systematic, not random. People
consistently make the same mistakes, and the extent of their errors on one task
predicts the extent of their errors on another task. Performance is also related
to cognitive and personality variables, such as intelligence (or cognitive capa-
city), which is contradictory to a random error view. Whilst all measures used
in psychological research will inevitably be subject to some random errors, or
‘noise’, this is not a sufficient explanation to account for the substantial gap
between descriptive and normative models of reasoning.
The incorrect norm argument places the blame for the normative/descriptive
gap with the experimenter (Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2000). In the
heuristics and biases literature, performance is usually compared to a statistical
or logical norm, and it can be argued that this is inappropriate. Some would
suggest that instead of using norms derived from statistics or logic, the responses
given most often by participants should in fact be considered the norm, because
people are essentially rational (Stanovich, 1999). Stanovich, however, argued
that if we are to use participants’ performance to determine the norm, we should
be looking at the responses of the most intelligent.
Intelligence can be considered a consistent ability for effectiveness in dif-
ferent environments and situations (Larrick, Nisbett & Morgan, 1993, also see
discussion in Section 2.6). This suggests that the behaviour of the most intel-
ligent individuals reflects ‘better’ or more effective behaviour than that of less
intelligent individuals. When the behaviour of the most intelligent individuals
is in line with the normative model set by experts, perhaps this is evidence that
the normative model is in fact appropriate. If, on the other hand, the most
intelligent individuals give a non-normative response, then maybe we should
consider revising the normative model as some suggest.
Stanovich (1999) argued that the first scenario is usually the case. He showed
that across a variety of tasks, participants were consistent in whether they
gave the normative or non-normative response and that there were significant
correlations between normative performance and general intelligence or thinking
disposition. He argued that if experts and more capable participants agree that
the normative response is the correct response, then it very likely is the correct
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response, and this was the case in the majority of tasks he examined. However,
there were a small minority of tasks where this was not the case and in such
cases, perhaps there is room for the incorrect norm argument to explain the
discrepancy between normative and descriptive models.
Another explanation proposed to preserve human rationality is that parti-
cipants misconstrue the tasks given to them. The experimenter may be applying
the correct norm for the task they intend, and the participants may be processing
without error, yet there is still a problem because the participant is responding
correctly to a different interpretation of the task. Cosmides and Tooby (1992)
have argued that humans have inbuilt algorithms for solving reasoning tasks
that have been encountered through our evolutionary history, and that when
problems are framed to elicit these algorithms, we actually reason quite well
(Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992).
However, Stanovich (1999) used the same argument as for the incorrect
norm issue to show that the normative task construal, in most cases, should be
considered the correct one. Those of higher general cognitive ability tended to
construe tasks in the manner intended by the experimenter. Again, this was
not the case for every task so there is some room for the argument that tasks
are presented in an ambiguous way, but it is the case for the majority of tasks.
One could argue that it is incorrect to use the behaviour of high ability
individuals to justify traditional norm applications and task interpretations.
The argument seems somewhat circular – high ability individuals are considered
high ability because they tend to give normative responses on intelligence tests,
and we therefore assume that because they give normative responses to other
tasks as well, the norms must be correct. However, there are very compelling
reasons to consider high cognitive ability individuals’ responses as ‘better’ –
these people get better degrees (Farsides & Woodfield, 2003), have higher job
performance and success (Deary, 2001 Judge, Higgins, Thoresen & Barrick,
1999), higher incomes (Ashenfelter & Rouse, 1999), and, surprisingly, they live
longer (Deary, 2008). As Frederick (2005) noted, this issue could be clarified
by giving the responses and intelligence scores of previous participants to new
participants. If the new participants were influenced by the responses of high
intelligence individuals, it would indicate some degree of consensus in the idea
that intelligent individuals tend to make better choices and that we want to do
as they do.
The idea of cognitive limitations being the cause of the reasoning gap has
some support, although it is not a complete explanation. Intelligence is limited
and related to reasoning performance (Evans et al., 2007; Sa´ et al., 1999; Stan-
ovich & West, 2008). However, in Stanovich’s (1999) analyses, once intelligence
was controlled for there was substantial remaining variance in reasoning per-
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formance, and this was related across tasks and predictable from individuals’
thinking dispositions (West, Toplak & Stanovich, 2008).
Thinking dispositions refer to an individual’s cognitive style – traits such
as the extent to which they are willing to put effort into solving a task, or to
change their beliefs based on new evidence or a lack of coherence. The evidence
suggests that while there is some blame for the descriptive/normative gap to
be put on cognitive limitations, there is also a role for dispositions (Stanovich,
1999, also see Section 2.6). This leaves us with the final explanation for the
normative/descriptive gap – systematic irrationality. If it is the case that in-
dividuals vary in terms of how much effort we are willing to put into a task,
and that the amount of effort we put in determines, in part, the quality of our
reasoning, then it could be said that we are irrational when we do not choose
to put all of our cognitive resources into computing a response that will benefit
us.
Stanovich (1999) demonstrated that none of the excuses given by Panglos-
sians or Apologists for the normative/descriptive gap were sufficient. Random
performance errors, incorrect norm application, alternative task construal, and
computational limitations were all shown to be either insufficient or inapplicable
to the majority of tasks where biases are shown. This leaves only the Melior-
ist explanation – systematic human irrationality. Even when we are capable
of reasoning normatively, we do not always do so. Although this may seem to
be a very negative view of human rationality, it does leave open the optimistic
possibility that we can do better. There is a real gap between the descriptive
model of behaviour and the prescriptive/normative model, at least for most
individuals on most tasks. It is possible, then, that the study of mathematics
might be one way of reducing the gap.
To refer back to the original issue set out in this section, ‘better’ reasoning
when mentioned in this thesis should be taken to mean reasoning closer to the
normative (and prescriptive) models, in line with the Meliorist position. In con-
ditional reasoning, a material interpretation could be considered ‘best’ because
it is the normative model, considered correct by logicians. Of the three other in-
terpretations, the defective conditional could be considered second best because
although MT is not accepted when it should be (according to the material in-
terpretation) the invalid inferences are also not accepted. Under a biconditional
interpretation, all of the inferences are accepted, two valid and two invalid, and
under a conjunctive interpretation MP and AC are the only ones accepted, one
valid and one invalid. Therefore the biconditional and conjunctive interpreta-
tions could be considered equal and ‘worse’ than the defective interpretation.
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Section summary
• Conditional (‘if, then’) logic is a central aspect of deductive reasoning.
• Humans demonstrate a vast array of heuristics and biases in reasoning,
including with conditional problems.
• Stanovich’s (2000) individual differences data suggested that a Meliorist
perspective on rationality is accurate – on the whole, the standard norm-
ative models of reasoning are appropriate competence models and because
humans do not always reason to these standards, they thus show system-
atic irrationality.
• When mentioned in this thesis, ‘better’ reasoning should be taken to mean
reasoning closer to the relevant normative model.
2.4 A brief history of the Theory of Formal Dis-
cipline
For millennia it has been assumed that people can be taught thinking skills.
Plato was a holder of this belief:
“Those who have a natural talent for calculation are generally quick
at every other kind of knowledge; and even the dull, if they have had
an arithmetical training [...] become much quicker than they would
otherwise have been [...] We must endeavour to persuade those who
are to be the principal men of our state to go and learn arithmetic.”
Plato (375B.C/2003, p. 256)
Nisbett (2009) provided a brief history of the Theory of Formal Discipline,
describing how the curriculum was extended from Plato’s arithmetic to include
grammar, logic, Latin and Greek throughout the Roman, medieval and Renais-
sance periods. This curriculum lasted for centuries and eventually resulted in
the English school system of the nineteenth century.
The first challenge to the TFD came at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury with the development of psychology as an academic discipline. Nisbett
summarised the harsh rejection of the TFD well by stating that “William James
ridiculed the idea that the mind had muscles that could be exercised by arith-
metic or Latin” (p.29). The behaviourist movement conjectured that learning
was very much limited to stimulus-response links, learned through such mech-
anisms as positive and negative reinforcement of behaviours (Hergenhahn &
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Olson, 2004; Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901; Skinner, 1938), so the idea of
skills transfer from one subject to another or to thinking overall was a complete
contradiction. One of the first authors to dispute the behaviourists’ extreme
domain-specific view of learning was Piaget.
Piaget’s theory of cognitive development suggested that we develop domain-
general skills and knowledge through four stages (Beth & Piaget, 1966; Inhelder
& Piaget, 1958; Piaget, 1928; Piaget, 1960; Piaget, 1970). The sensorimotor
stage occurs between birth and 2 years of age and is characterised by infants
learning about the physical world through their interactions with and sensory
experiences of it. The preoperational stage occurs between the ages of approx-
imately 2 and 7, and is characterised by sparse and logically inadequate mental
operations. The child can represent objects through words and drawings but
cannot perform complex mental operations and cannot take the viewpoint of
others.
The concrete operational stage occurs between 7 and 11 years of age and
consists of proper use of logical reasoning. Children are able to sort objects by
categories, understand relationships between objects, and understand others’
points of view, to name a few examples. In the final stage, the formal operational
stage, individuals from around 11 years into adulthood become able to think
abstractly as well as concretely. This means there is further development of
logical reasoning, such as with hypothetical situations. Piaget believed that
only formal operational thinkers are able to distinguish the material conditional
from the biconditional (Beth & Piaget, 1966).
Each of Piaget’s proposed stages is domain-general, and the logical skills
developed are applicable across contexts. Inhelder and Piaget (1958) highlighted
this belief by stating that “reasoning is nothing more than the propositional
calculus itself” (p. 305, translated in Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Schaeken, 1992).
In the 1950s and 1960s came the cognitive revolution (see Neisser, 1967),
which argued against behaviourism that in fact it is possible and useful to infer
mental processes rather than just the behaviour resulting from them. This
meant there was a shift towards investigating the processes behind reasoning.
What it also meant was that there was scope for investigating what makes better
or worse reasoning.
According to Piaget’s theory of cognitive development, everybody goes through
the same stages acquiring the same skills (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958), and again,
according to behaviourism, everybody would learn the same reasoning beha-
viour from the same stimulus, and so there is little room for variation in quality
of reasoning between individuals or for strategies to improve reasoning beyond
the standard stages or stimuli. What cognitivism allows is the possibility that
there are different types of processes used in reasoning, that some of these pro-
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Each of the cards below has a letter on one side and a number on the other side. 
Select all those cards, but only those cards, which would have to be turned over 
in order to discover whether the rule is true.
Rule: If there is an A on one side of the card, there is a 3 on the other side.
A D 3 7
Figure 2.3: The Wason Selection Task.
cesses are more effective than others, and that by investigating these processes
it might be possible to alter an individual’s reasoning.
Wason was one of the first psychologists to demonstrate how flawed human
reasoning can be. He disputed Piaget’s idea of the development of formal logical
reasoning by showing experimentally that, on the whole, humans are not very
logical (Wason, 1968). He also attempted to explain our errors by reference to
the cognitive processing responsible for solving reasoning tasks (Johnson-Laird
& Wason, 1970; Wason, 1966). Probably the most famous task in the reasoning
literature is Wason’s four card selection task (Wason, 1966, 1968, see Figure 2.3.)
Participants are asked which cards they need to turn over to check whether the
rule ‘if there is an A on one side of the card, then there is a 3 on the other side’
is true. The correct answer is to choose the A and 7 cards, but only around
10% of participants gave this response (Wason, 1968). The majority answered
either A only, or both A and 3.
Johnson-Laird & Wason (1970) proposed a detailed model of the cognitive
processing involved in dealing with the selection task, including some explan-
ations of where people go wrong. For example, they suggested that reasoners
initially focus only on the items mentioned in the rule, A and 3, and consider
items not mentioned irrelevant. This leads to the common and incorrect re-
sponse ‘A and 3’. They also proposed that subjects have either no insight,
partial insight, or complete insight, and that this determines whether they will
select, respectively, only their first intuitions (A and 3), select the cards that
can falsify the rule as well (A, 3 and 7) or select only cards that can falsify
the rule (A and 7). This is a level of theorising about cognitive processes and
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individual differences that would not have occurred before the cognitive revolu-
tion. As such, this type of work represents a significant step forward in our
understanding of human logical reasoning.
Following on from Wason’s groundbreaking work, other psychologists such
as Philip Johnson-Laird, Jonathan Evans, Keith Stanovich, Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky have described a wide range of other biases in human reas-
oning (see Section 4.2.1) and provided theories on the cognitive processing that
underlies both successful and flawed responses. Current theories on reasoning
are described below in Section 2.6. What is important here is that current the-
ories do allow for differences in processing of reasoning problems, and hence the
possibility of improving reasoning.
2.5 Research into thinking skills and their rela-
tion to mathematics
The TFD makes two claims: 1) thinking skills are transferable across contexts,
and 2) the study of mathematics improves these skills to a greater extent than
other disciplines. Research related to each of these assumptions will be reviewed
separately, beginning with the transferability of thinking skills.
Are thinking skills transferable across contexts?
One of the first tests of the TFD was published by Thorndike and Woodworth
(1901), when behavioural psychologists began to doubt the generality of learned
skills, advocating instead specific stimulus-response links. Thorndike & Wood-
worth reported an experiment in which participants were trained in estimating
the area of rectangles, and improvement in estimating the area of other shapes
was measured.
The results showed that improvement in estimating the area of rectangles
was not paralleled by improvement in estimating the area of different shapes.
Thorndike and Woodworth (1901) suggested that the estimation of areas is a
group of functions rather than a single function, with the specific data (e.g.
shape and size) determining which function is necessary. In this view, functions
(or skills) are not transferable because they are closely tied to the stimulus, and
any change to the stimulus renders the function redundant.
This conclusion was supported in a much more recent and large scale study
published by Owen et al (2010). In the study, 11,430 viewers of the BBC
programme ‘Bang Goes The Theory’ received six weeks’ online training in
reasoning, memory, planning, visuospatial skills and attention. Pre- and post-
intervention reasoning ability was assessed by a speeded grammar task, where
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a) The circle is not smaller 
than the square
b) The square is in the circle
Figure 2.4: An example of a reasoning task used by Owen et al (2010) showing
(a) false and (b) true sentences about shape pairs.
participants read a statement about a pair of shapes and judged whether the
statement was true. For example, when shown a small circle within a larger
square, participants judged whether the sentence ‘The circle is not smaller than
the square’ was true (see Figure 2.4).
During the intervention participants practiced three different reasoning tasks,
as well as memory, planning and visuospatial tasks, with feedback. In one reas-
oning task, participants were required to infer weight relationships from images
of see-saws with objects at each end in order to select the heaviest object from a
choice of three presented separately. In the second reasoning task, participants
were required to select the odd one out of four shapes that varied in shape,
colour, and fill. The final reasoning task required participants to move crates
from a pile with reference to the overall pattern of crates. Although there were
improvements in every one of the tasks trained, there was no evidence of transfer
to the untrained grammatical reasoning task, which the authors considered to
be closely related (Owen et al., 2010). This seems to be evidence that thinking
skills are closely tied to context, as Thorndike and Woodworth (1901) proposed.
In another blow to the idea of training thinking skills, Cheng, Holyoak, Nis-
bett and Oliver (1986) found that even a one semester course in standard logic
did not lead to improved performance on four Wason Selection Task problems.
The course consisted of around 40 hours of teaching and covered modus pon-
ens, modus tollens, denial of the antecedent, affirmation of the consequent and
the distinction between the material conditional and biconditional statements.
Students were also taught with both contextualised sentences and formal truth
tables. It seems reasonable to expect that after such training participants should
be very competent at dealing with conditional reasoning problems, and it is even
difficult to imagine a more promising way to improve a students’ logical com-
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petency. Nonetheless, there was a non-significant decrease in errors of only 3%.
However, this could be due to the measure used. It has recently been suggested
that Selection Tasks may not actually measure conditional reasoning ability,
particularly thematic (situated in a real-world context) versions (Sperber, Cara
& Girotto, 1995; Sperber & Girotto, 2002).
Sperber et al. (1995) have suggested that Selection Task performance is
highly influenced by relevance mechanisms that pre-empt any reasoning mech-
anisms. When faced with a reasoning problem, or any other text, we need to
comprehend the meaning intended by the author. In the case of the selection
task, participants are asked to judge the relevance of each of the cards to the
rule so the judgments of relevance that come from the comprehension process
provide an intuitive answer to the problem and there is no explicit need to
engage in any further reasoning. This may the source of the pervasive match-
ing bias described above. This account has been supported in several studies
(Sperber et al., 1995; Sperber & Girotto, 2002) and it implies that Selection
Tasks do not actually measure reasoning processes at all. Sperber’s argument
is further elaborated on in Chapter 4.
In a similar study on teaching reasoning, White (1936) investigated the effect
of logic training on 12 year old boys’ reasoning ability. One class spent an hour
per week for three months being taught logic, including deduction, induction
and syllogisms, while another class did not. At the end of the three months the
students were given a reasoning test that measured, among other things, syllo-
gism validation. The class that had been taught logic scored significantly higher
on the reasoning test than the control class. The authors concluded, conversely
to Cheng et al. (1986), that logical thinking can be taught. Perhaps the differ-
ence between the findings of Cheng et al. (1986) and White (1936) is due to the
age of the participants, it could be that children’s reasoning strategies are more
malleable than adults’. Another possibility is that the measure used by Cheng
et al. (1986) was not appropriate for measuring development, as elaborated on
above (Sperber et al., 1995; Sperber & Girotto, 2002).
Further supporting the idea that reasoning can be taught, Lehman, Lempert
and Nisbett (1988) found that the extent to which conditional reasoning was im-
proved in graduate students was a function of their degree studies. Students in
psychology, medicine, law and chemistry were tested on conditional reasoning,
statistical and methodological reasoning, and verbal reasoning in their first and
third years of study. The medical students improved in verbal reasoning and
both the psychology and medical students improved in statistical and method-
ological reasoning. Most relevant here is that the psychology, law and medical
students all improved in conditional reasoning as tested by one abstract, one
causal framed, and one permission framed Selection Task and one biconditional
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Selection Task. However, as mentioned above, it is unclear what skills contex-
tualised Selection Tasks are actually measuring (Sperber et al., 1995; Sperber
& Girotto, 2002). The findings should therefore be treated with caution.
Kosonen and Winne (1995) found evidence for transfer after training parti-
cipants in statistical reasoning. Training in the ‘law of large numbers’ (which
states that the greater the sample size, the more representative it is) improved
students’ ability to reason with everyday problems that required the law of large
numbers in a wide range of domains. Before training, participants were more
likely to reason statistically about problems that explicitly referred to probab-
ility than those which did not, but this equalled out post-training.
Because their undergraduate and teenage participants did use statistical
rules before instruction, although infrequently and without sophistication, Kosonen
and Winne (1995) suggested that informal reasoning rules are learned through
experience and that these were recruited and refined with the training given,
making them transferable. This was also the conclusion of Fong, Krantz and
Nisbett (1986), who found that training in the law of large numbers improved
participants’ performance even when they were tested with a problem context
completely different to that of the training. Furthermore, Fong and Nisbett
(1991) found that the transfer was still evident after a two week delay.
In order to test the generality of critical thinking, Sa´ et al. (1999) measured
participants’ belief bias in a verbal (syllogism) task and a non-verbal (height
judgement) task. The syllogism task consisted of 24 syllogisms with real-world
content, such as ‘all living things need water; roses need water; therefore, roses
are living things’ (see Figure 2.5). In the height judgement task participants
were shown full length photographs of seated males and females and asked to
estimate their heights. In an ecological version, the heights shown reflected
actual male-female height differences. In a matched version, the pictures shown
were of males and females matched for height, and participants were informed of
this and that they should ignore the gender cue when making their judgements.
In each task, participants’ responses could be influenced by prior beliefs
and/or logical validity. Belief bias is the extent to which judgements are influ-
enced by prior beliefs over validity when the two are in conflict. The authors
found a significant correlation (r=.209) between belief bias in the syllogism task
and belief bias in the matched height judgement task and there was an even
larger correlation between belief bias in the two versions of the height judge-
ment task (r=.526). While the significant correlations conflict with an extreme
domain-specificity view, like that of Thorndike and Woodworth (1901), they do
support the idea that generality is related to similarity between task stimuli;
the correlation was stronger between the two non-verbal height judgement tasks
than between either of those and the verbal syllogism task.
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Unbelievable, valid:
Premises: All things with four legs are dangerous.
Poodles are not dangerous.
Conclusion: Poodles do not have four legs.
Unbelievable, invalid:
Premises: All guns are dangerous.
Rattlesnakes are dangerous.
Conclusion: Rattlesnakes are guns.
Believable, valid:
Premises: All !sh can swim.
Tuna are !sh.
Conclusion: Tuna can swim.
Believable, invalid:
Premises: All living things need water.
Roses need water.
Conclusion: Roses are living things.
Neutral, valid:
Premises: All ramadions taste delicious.
Gumthorps are ramadions.
Conclusion: Gumthorps taste delicious.
Neutral, invalid:
Premises: All lapitars wear clothes.
Podips wear clothes.
Conclusion: Podips are lapitars.
Figure 2.5: An example of each type of item from the Belief Bias Syllogisms
task.
On a similar theme, Toplak and Stanovich (2002) investigated the domain
generality of disjunctive (‘either, or’) reasoning. They gave participants nine
tasks that all relied on an exhaustive consideration of all possible states of
the world given the ‘either, or’ rule (such as the Knights and Knaves problem
shown in Figure 2.6). If this is a single skill that generalises to all of the
tasks, there should have been large correlations between performance on them.
In fact, performance on the tasks showed specificity. This led the authors to
concentrate on five of the tasks which indisputably require disjunctive reasoning.
Between these tasks, five of the ten correlations were statistically significant, still
indicating a considerable degree of domain specificity between tasks which are
confidently thought to use the same skill, although within different contexts.
Again, this appears to support Thorndike and Woodworth’s (1901) argument
that any change in stimuli prevents a skill suitable for another context from
being properly applied.
There are two final studies that can inform the question of whether thinking
skills are transferable, although both have significant impediments that mean
they should not be considered definitive. Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga, Sanz de
Acedo Baquedano and Soria Oliver (2010) looked at the effect of a year long
teaching intervention on thinking skills in two Spanish schools and Lehmann
(1963) looked at the development of critical thinking over four years of college
education.
In the Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al. (2010) study, the participants were aged
11 to 13 years old and were from two schools in Spain. One school was randomly
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Imagine that there are three inhabitants of a !ctitious country, A, B and C, each 
of whom is either a knight or a knave. Knights always tell the truth. Knaves always 
lie. Two people are said to be of the same type if they are both knights or both 
knaves. A and B make the following statements:
A: B is a knave
B: A and C are of the same type
What is C?
Figure 2.6: The disjunctive Knights and Knaves problem used by Toplak and
Stanovich (2002), adapted from Shafir (1994).
assigned to the experimental condition and one to the control condition. The
experimental condition involved the teaching method ‘Thinking Actively in an
Academic Context’, which is designed to promote thinking skills in students.
The intervention lasted for one academic year and was implemented for twelve
hours per week. Participants completed pre- and post-intervention tests that
measured a range of cognitive abilities.
The intervention was shown to improve verbal, abstract and numerical reas-
oning, creativity, and academic achievement to a greater extent than the con-
ventional teaching method used with the control group. While this may support
the generality of thinking skills, there are important drawbacks to the design of
the study. The intervention was assigned randomly at the school level rather
than the participant level, meaning any differences between the schools that
may have influenced the results, such as general ability of the students, were
not controlled for. It was also not assigned blindly. This issue is particularly
important because the study involved an entirely novel teaching method, both
for the teachers and students, which they were told would have the intended be-
nefits. This may have lead to increased interest, enthusiasm and expectations of
those involved, and this so-called Hawthorne effect1 may be what was actually
responsible for the effects observed.
Lehmann’s (1963) study investigated changes in American college students’
critical thinking and stereotypical beliefs over the course of their higher educa-
tion studies. Between their first and fourth years, he found a significant improve-
1The Hawthorne effect refers to the observation that participants in research studies may
modify their behaviour simply as a result of being observed, regardless of the manipulation.
This was first identified by Henry Landsberger who conducted a study at the Hawthorne
Works factory into the effect of lighting levels on productivity. An increase in productivity
occurred while the study was being conducted and a decrease occurred when the study ceased.
It was suggested that the workers became more productive simply because they were being
observed (Landsberger, 1958).
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ment in critical thinking, as measured by the American Council on Education’s
Test of Critical Thinking (American Council on Education, 1953), and a de-
crease in stereotypical beliefs (i.e. the participants became more flexible and
less authoritarian). The students were not specifically trained for these effects,
so it might be that the changes came about as a generalisation of something
from their education. Alternatively, as there was no control group, it might be
the case that these changes occur in all college-aged people regardless of whether
they are in education or not. Nevertheless, these two education studies provide
some hope for the generality of critical thinking.
In sum, the evidence for the first claim made by the TFD, that thinking skills
are transferable across contexts, is inconsistent and therefore fairly weak. While
some studies have found some degree of generality of thinking skills, others have
found complete specificity.
Perhaps this is because each study has looked at different aspects of thinking
and it may be the case that each skill has a different position on a specificity-
generality continuum. Statistical reasoning (Kosonen & Winne, 1995) and sus-
ceptibility to belief bias (Sa´ et al., 1999) would appear to be further towards the
generality end of the spectrum than disjunctive reasoning (Toplak & Stanovich,
2002) and reasoning about shape area (Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). A
wide range is taught in the ‘Thinking Actively in an Academic Context’ teach-
ing method and in higher education, so it is unclear exactly what skills are being
generalised in the cases of Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al. (2010) and Lehmann
(1963).
This interpretation of the inconsistencies is in line with Nisbett and his
colleagues’ suggestion that the difficulty of teaching a type of reasoning depends
on the extent to which people already have an intuitive understanding of the
rules (Nisbett, Fong, Lehman & Cheng, 1987; Nisbett, 2009). As Kosonen
and Winne (1995) also suggested, people may have a basic understanding of
statistical laws inducted through experiences, which makes them available for
training. Perhaps disjunctive and geometrical (shape area) reasoning are not
already within the cognitive repertoire of rudimentary rules and are therefore
more difficult to teach in a transferable way.
Does the study of mathematics improve ‘thinking skills’?
Moving on to the second assumption of the TFD, that mathematics improves
thinking skills to a greater extent than other subjects, the evidence is again
mixed. As with the first assumption, Thorndike (1924) published one of the
first studies that tested the influence of school subjects on reasoning abilities.
Thorndike (1924) used a pre-test/intervention/post-test design, where the
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As part of your job as quality control inspector at a shirt factory, you have the task 
of checking fabric and washing instruction labels to make sure they are correctly 
paired. Fabric and washing instruction labels are sewn back to back. Your task is to 
make sure that all silk labels have the 'dry clean only' label on the other side.
You must only turn over those labels you need to check to make sure 
the labels are correct.
Machine 
wash in 
warm water
Silk Cotton Dry clean only
Figure 2.7: The causal schema conditional problem used in Lehman and Nisbett
(1990).
intervention was one year of school education with varying subjects and the
pre- and post-tests measured general intelligence (ability on tests of various
school-type subjects, such as arithmetic and word analogies and opposites).
He found that the subjects taken by students had only a minimal influence
on scores on general intelligence tests. French, chemistry and trigonometry
were associated with the largest, albeit small, improvements, while arithmetic,
geometry and algebra were associated with improvements barely above zero. So
again, Thorndike’s research paints a bleak picture for the TFD.
However, Lehman and Nisbett (1990) did find some support for a version
of the TFD. They tested US undergraduates in their first and fourth years on
statistical and methodological reasoning, conditional reasoning and verbal reas-
oning. They compared students studying natural sciences, humanities, social
sciences, and psychology. Although there were no between group differences on
any of the measures at the first test or on SAT scores, there were some post-
test effects of discipline studied. The social science and psychology students
improved dramatically on statistical and methodological reasoning, while the
natural science and humanities students improved significantly on conditional
reasoning, becoming more material on one abstract, one causal framed (Figure
2.7), and one permission framed Selection Task, and one biconditional Selection
Task.
Most importantly, there was a correlation between change in material condi-
tional reasoning and number of mathematics courses taken (Lehman & Nisbett,
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1990). As has already been stated, conditional reasoning is an important com-
ponent of logical reasoning (Anderson & Belnap, 1975; Braine, 1978; Inglis &
Simpson, 2008). It falls within the bracket of deductive reasoning, which Polya
(1954) considered very important in mathematical proof. The correlation with
number of mathematics modules taken was significant over all majors (r=.31),
but more strongly so when focusing on natural science majors (r=.66), who
took the most mathematics courses.
The authors concluded that reasoning can be taught, and that different
disciplines teach different types of reasoning (Lehman & Nisbett, 1990). This
is very promising for the TFD, especially considering how pessimistic some of
the findings discussed up to this point have been. However, as mentioned above
in the discussion of the Lehman et al. (1988) study, it is unclear what skills
Selection Tasks are really measuring (Sperber et al., 1995; Sperber & Girotto,
2002). Again, then, the results must be considered with caution.
Conditional reasoning ability was also investigated by Inglis and Simpson
(2008), who compared mathematics and arts undergraduates. They gave the
undergraduates a 32 item abstract Conditional Inference Task and observed
that mathematics undergraduates performed significantly more in line with the
material conditional than the arts undergraduates. Again, this seems to support
the TFD, but there were two problems with this study: there was no measure
of intelligence, which may have differed between groups and been responsible
for the difference in conditional inference scores, and there was no longitudinal
component, which makes it impossible to infer development. These problems
were addressed in a second study.
Inglis and Simpson (2009a) matched a group of mathematics undergraduates
with a group of comparison undergraduates on intelligence scores determined
by the AH5 test (Heim, 1969), and again gave them the Conditional Inference
Task. Intelligence was positively related to a material conditional reasoning
scores and was higher in the mathematics students than the non-mathematics
students before the matched sub-groups were selected. Nevertheless, matching
the groups for intelligence still left a significant difference between them on the
material conditional score, with mathematics students again outperforming the
comparison group. In other words, the mathematics group was more normative
in their conditional reasoning over and above their higher intelligence scores.
The mathematics students were re-tested at the end of their first year of
study to look for development in conditional reasoning ability. There was an
average change of only 1.8% towards a material interpretation, which did not
approach significance. The lack of improvement leaves two possible explana-
tions for the initial difference between groups on entry to university: either
post-compulsory but pre-university study of mathematics is responsible, i.e. A
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level2; or those who are more normative in their conditional reasoning are dispro-
portionately filtered into studying university level mathematics. Distinguishing
these two possibilities is in essence the key aim of this thesis.
Assuming that the results found by Inglis and Simpson (2008, 2009a) are
sufficient to say that mathematics undergraduates are more normative in their
conditional reasoning than other undergraduates on entry to university, then
the issue to resolve is not whether mathematicians are better at reasoning,
but whether mathematics made them better at reasoning. Inglis and Simpson’s
mathematics participants may have outperformed their comparison participants
because studying mathematics at A level changed their reasoning ability to
get them to that point, as the TFD suggests, or because they were always
more normative in their reasoning, independently of any mathematics studied,
and were filtered into studying mathematics at advanced levels because of this
inherent trait. The way to distinguish these possibilities is with a longitudinal
study looking at changes in reasoning ability throughout an A level (the first
post-compulsory stage of education), where mathematics students are compared
to non-mathematics students. Although it it not possible to determine causation
without an experimental design (see Chapter 3), it is possible to distinguish the
development hypothesis from the pre-disposition hypothesis.
In conclusion, the research reviewed here is unclear on whether the assump-
tions of the TFD are justified or not. Although it appears that some thinking
skills cannot be transferred from the original context in which they were learned,
there is some evidence that mathematicians reason more normatively on the
Conditional Inference Task. In order to effectively test the TFD, a longitudinal
study is required in which sixth form and university students of mathematics
are compared to students of another discipline, and each group’s development
is measured and contrasted. Only then will it be possible to effectively test the
two claims of the TFD. The two studies by Inglis and Simpson (2008, 2009),
along with the Lehman and Nisbett (1990) study, provide a promising line of in-
vestigation in further studies: if the TFD is correct, it appears that conditional
reasoning may be a thinking skill that mathematics develops.
Section summary
• The question of whether thinking skills are transferable across contexts
or domains has been hotly debated and there is evidence both for and
against it.
2A levels are optional two year courses taken after compulsory education in the UK. Stu-
dents usually take four A levels in chosen subjects and the results are used by universities to
select incoming undergraduates. The first year of an A level is called the Advanced Subsidiary
(AS) level, and is a qualification in itself.
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• There is some evidence that studying mathematics may be related to
conditional reasoning ability (Inglis & Simpson, 2008) but not necessarily
improvement in it (Inglis & Simpson, 2009a) or improvement in statistical,
methodological or verbal reasoning (Lehman & Nisbett, 1990).
2.6 The psychology of reasoning
The TFD suggests that studying mathematics improves reasoning, but it does
not elaborate on what cognitive change might actually be taking place that
could cause this. However, a huge amount of research has been conducted into
the psychology of reasoning independently of any relation to mathematics, and
there are currently several dominant theories that may help to identify possible
mechanisms. The theories are reviewed in three sections depending on how many
reasoning systems or process-types they posit: single-process, dual-process and
tri-process theories.
Single-process theories
It is worth noting here that single-process theories are not necessarily in com-
petition with each other or with multiple-process theories. At least some single
processes theories only attempt to explain certain types of reasoning rather than
reasoning as a whole, and they could also be considered explanations of one of
the process-types in multiple-process theories. This should become more clear
as each of the theories is discussed below.
Mental Models Theory
The mental models theory of reasoning (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991;
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Johnson-Laird, 2008) suggests that participants
create in their mind a model of the task premises as they understand them,
and they reason from their model of the task. Mental models represent possible
states of the world given that the major premise is true. For example, when
given the conditional statement ‘if it rains then I take an umbrella’, the initial
model might be:
rain take umbrella
...
The first line indicates a model in which both ‘rain’ and ‘take an umbrella’
are true. The ellipsis indicates an implicit model that reminds the reasoner that
p may not be true, without actually building the model explicitly. This oc-
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raining take umbrella ‘if it rains then I take an umbrella’
t t t
t f f
f t t
f f t
Table 2.4: Truth table for ‘if it rains then I take an umbrella’ where t = true
and f = false, assuming the material conditional.
curs because building mental models requires working memory, which is limited
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Johnson-Laird,
2008).
Each mental model represents a ‘true’ row in a truth table, although as
already noted the models may not represent all of the information in the cor-
responding row, and there may be rows which are not represented explicitly
at all (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). The full material truth table for this
conditional statement is shown in Table 2.4.
Reasoners may construct multiple models from the premises to represent all
possibilities as they see them, and from these models they draw a conclusion
that holds true in all of them. For example, a reasoner may see the possibilities
as:
rain take umbrella
no rain don’t take umbrella
...
If the minor premise presented is ‘take umbrella’ then based on their mental
models the reasoner may conclude that ‘rain’ necessarily follows, because there
are no models in which that conclusion is not true, but this would be an invalid
affirmation of the consequent deduction.
The last step in the reasoning process proposed by mental models theory
is that the reasoner attempts to think of counterexamples to their models and
conclusion. If they do not find any counterexamples they accept their conclusion,
otherwise they may reconstruct their models to include any counterexamples
and then draw a new conclusion.
To further demonstrate this theory, we can imagine how a person might deal
with the abstract conditional statement ‘if p then q ’. The initial model might be:
p q
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...
The first line indicates a model in which both p and q are true and the ellipsis
indicates an implicit model that reminds the reasoner that p may not be true.
If the minor premise following ‘if p then q ’ is the modus ponens inference
‘p’, then participants can easily draw the conclusion ‘q ’ from their initial model.
Similarly, if the minor premise is the affirmation of the consequent inference ‘q ’,
then it would be easy for participants to incorrectly conclude ‘p’. In the case of
modus tollens, though, the initial premise is not sufficient to draw a conclusion.
When the minor premise reads ‘not q ’, the reasoner must flesh out their impli-
cit model in order to draw any conclusions. If a reasoner completely builds all
models that are possible under the conditional rule, they will end up with:
p q
not p q
not p not q
In this case, the premise ‘not q ’ is true in the last model, in which ‘not p’
is also true, and so this is the conclusion drawn. The participants would then
search for a counterexample to this conclusion, a model in which the conclusion
could not be true. If they fail to find such a model, they accept the conclusion.
Errors in reasoning occur when participants either fail to flesh our their im-
plicit mental models, or when they miss a valid counterexample (Johnson-Laird
& Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Johnson-Laird, 2008). This may
occur because of working memory limitations and/or lack of effort. As such,
there are ways to improve reasoning under the mental models theory: increase
working memory capacity, aid working memory with task design, or increase
the effort participants put into their reasoning. In terms of how mathemat-
ics specifically might improve reasoning ability, an increase in working memory
capacity or a change in thinking disposition (such as increased enjoyment of
effortful thinking), might result from studying mathematics.
Mental Logic Theory
Mental logic theory (Rips, 1989; O’Brien, 2009; O’Brien & Manfrinati, 2010),
also known as mental rules theory, inference rules theory, and natural deduc-
tion theory, suggests that humans have an inbuilt logical rule system. This is
somewhat similar to Piaget’s proposition (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). When we
solve a reasoning task, according to mental logic theory, we follow a series of
logical steps to reach a conclusion. This is the case for any type of reasoning
task, whether it be contextualised or abstract, familiar or novel. The system
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is innate, as are the rules that it uses. However, whilst we follow a pattern of
formal logical deduction, our system and it’s rules are not perfect and there is
much room for error, which is why humans display as many biases as we do.
For example, we may have innate access to the modus ponens deduction but
not the modus tollens deduction.
According to the mental logic theory, the way in which reasoning may be
improved would be to work on the accuracy of the natural deduction system,
presumably though the study of formal logic since it is of the same structure
as our innate system. This suggests that mathematics may actually be a fairly
good way to improve generalised reasoning, because it exposes students to logic
in the form of mathematical proofs, and in some instances it may even teach
logic directly.
Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas Theory
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) proposed that we reason based on pragmatic reas-
oning schemas. These are context-sensitive knowledge structures induced from
everyday experiences. They relate to rule sets such as permissions, obligations,
and causations and they allow us to deal effectively with the sorts of reasoning
situation we encounter daily. For example, if somebody lends us money, our
obligation schema is invoked to tell us that we are obliged to pay them back.
Rules not related to our previous experiences, including abstract rules and
rules set in a context with which we are not familiar, will not invoke a schema
and will therefore be very difficult to solve. If we do not have a relevant schema
we must rely on logical rules, which only few of us are said to be competent
with (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985). This is supported by the finding that 81%
of participants could correctly solve a thematic version of the Selection Task,
while only 15% could solve an abstract version (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi &
Legrenzi, 1972). However, Sperber et al. (1995) showed that this is not always
the case, and at the very least the pragmatic reasoning schemas theory is not
a comprehensive theory of reasoning if it only attempts to explain reasoning in
specific contexts and defers to theories such as mental logic to explain reasoning
in non-schema-eliciting contexts.
An important feature of pragmatic reasoning schemas is that they are not
always logically valid, but are instead heuristics that help us to solve most reas-
oning tasks we would come across in day-to-day life. For example, a permission
schema provides these four rules:
1) If an action is to be taken, then the precondition must be satisfied.
2) If an action is not to be taken, the precondition need not be satisfied.
3) If the precondition is satisfied, then the action may be taken.
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4) If the precondition is not satisfied, then the action must not be taken.
(Cheng & Holyoak, 1985, p. 397)
This schema would be elicited given the conditional statement ‘if someone drinks
alcohol, then they must be over 18.’ However, rule 3 is not logically consistent
with rule 1. It may be the case that if someone is to drink alcohol they must be
over 18, but it is not necessarily the case that if someone is over 18 they may
drink alcohol. It might be the case that they are pregnant or about to drive
a car, in which case the precondition of being over 18 would be necessary but
not sufficient for the action to be taken. The problem occurs because schemas
involve words such as ‘may’, whereas conditional logic is concrete.
Pragmatic reasoning schemas theory explains poor reasoning performance
in terms of lack of an appropriate schema for the task. Abstract tasks such as
the Conditional Inference Task are too far removed from everyday experience
for participants to be able to deal with them by applying a schema.
This a problem both for the theory and for the purpose of finding a mech-
anism for the TFD: firstly, some people can do the Conditional Inference Task
very well, even those with no formal training in conditional logic can score at
above chance levels (Inglis & Simpson, 2009a), and secondly, the theory doesn’t
provide any potential mechanism by which abstract reasoning could improve.
The latter issue isn’t necessarily a problem for the theory itself – perhaps it is
not possible to improve in abstract reasoning – but it does mean that the theory
is not very useful in the current context.
Dual-process theories
Dual-process theories posit that humans have two types of cognitive processes:
heuristic based Type 1 processes and analytic based Type 2 processes (Evans,
2003; Evans, 2007; Evans, Handley & Bacon, 2009). Type 1 processes are auto-
matic, fast, effortless, non-conscious and evolutionarily old. They are shared
with other animals and among many things, they allow us to navigate our en-
vironment and filter out all of the irrelevant information we are surrounded
with (Evans, 2003). For example, they allow us to walk through a room avoid-
ing obstacles without consciously processing every detail of them. They are
sometimes referred to as The Autonomous Set of Systems (TASS, Stanovich,
2004) which emphasises the important point that many different systems are
encompassed as being Type 1 process based.
Type 2 processes on the other hand are deliberate, slow, demanding of work-
ing memory, conscious and evolutionarily more recent. They allow us to com-
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plete complex and evolutionarily novel tasks, such as, for example, setting up a
DVD player or thinking hypothetically (Evans, 2003). Here, the processes will
be referred to as Type 1 and Type 2.3
Dual-process theories are not specific to reasoning, but rather they describe
two types of processing that underlie all cognition. As such, various dual-process
theories have been used to investigate a wide range of phenomena, including
mathematical thinking (Gillard, Van Dooren, Schaeken & Verschaffel, 2009a;
Vamvakoussi, Van Dooren & Verschaffel, 2012a, 2012b), social persuasion (Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986), fear of death (Pyszczynski, Greenberg & Solomon, 1999),
memory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), moral judgements
(Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001), and self-esteem and
stereotypes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
It was mentioned above that some single-process theories could be considered
explanations of one of the process types in dual-process theories. Pragmatic
reasoning schemas theory with its context-specific heuristics, for example, could
fit into Type 1 processes here, while mental logic theory’s proposition of a series
of logical steps could be seen as an explanation for how Type 2 processes operate.
The important thing to remember here is that the various theories do not have
to be seen as competitors. Support for one is not always a contradiction to
another.
Turning back to dual-process theories, an important issue is how the two
process types interact. On the majority of reasoning tasks, the two process
types would come to the same conclusion. Take for example a valid syllogism
with a believable conclusion:
All fish can swim.
Tuna are fish.
Therefore, tuna can swim.
In this case, if Type 1 processes were used they may decide that the syllogism
is valid because the conclusion is believable and if Type 2 processes were used
they may decide it is valid because it is logically sound. So, the output of the
systems would be the same, even though the processing by which they come to
their outputs is different. However, on some problems the systems may come
to different conclusions. The valid syllogism with an unbelievable conclusion in
Figure 2.8 can demonstrate this effect.
In this case, Type 1 processes may quickly decide that the syllogism is wrong
3Although many sources refer to them differently, e.g. System 1 and System 2 (Stanovich,
1999; Evans, 2003), TASS and analytic (Stanovich, 2004), heuristic and analytic (Evans,
1984; Evans, 2006), experiential and rational (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), and associative and
rule-based (Sloman, 1996).
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All things that are smoked are good for the health.
Cigarettes are smoked.
Therefore, cigarettes are good for the health.
Figure 2.8: A valid and unbelievable syllogism.
because the conclusion strikes the reader as unbelievable. Slow and rational
Type 2 processes on the other hand may decide that the syllogism is valid
because, as above, it is logically sound. Dual-process theories must account
for how such potential conflicts are dealt with, and there are several strands
that differ in their explanations: parallel-competitive, pre-emptive, and default-
interventionist theories.
Parallel-competitive theories
Parallel-competitive theories (e.g. Sloman, 1996) suggest that the two sys-
tems run simultaneously from the start. If they come to the same conclusion
processing ends and the conclusion is output. If the processes conflict, the Type
2 processes can override Type 1 processes, but because Type 1 processes are
so much faster they often win the competition. Sloman (1996) suggested that
participants are always aware of both responses when there is a conflict and
he referred to this as Criterion S, for ‘Simultaneous Contradictory Belief’. Al-
though the conflicting responses are not both strong enough to be acted upon,
they are both compelling to some extent, and this creates conscious conflict in
the mind of the reasoner.
From the view of parallel-competitive theories, there are two ways in which
reasoning might be improved. One way would be for Type 2 processes to become
more efficient so that they more often win the race with Type 1 processes and
so more often determine the output. Another way would be for the Type 1
heuristics that sometimes lead to fallacious reasoning to be altered, so that
Type 1 processing can more effectively deal with reasoning problems itself, and
the race becomes less important.
The problem with the first solution is that the speeds of the systems are so
inherently different that it seems unlikely that the slow and resource-demanding
Type 2 processes could ever get to the point of being as fast as the automatic
and effortless Type 1 processes (Evans, 2003). The most promising mechanism
for the TFD to operate via under parallel-competitive theories is a change to
some relevant Type 1 heuristics. Although some heuristics may be innate, some
are also learned from experience in a gradual manner (Chen & Chaiken, 1999),
so it is plausible that the study of mathematics could have some gradual influ-
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ence on them.
Pre-emptive theories
Pre-emptive models argue that it is decided at the outset of a task, via its
superficial characteristics, which system will be used to solve it. This means
that there is never a conflict between system outputs. An example model of
this type is the selective scrutiny model of Evans, Newstead and Byrne (1993),
which was developed to account for belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.
Belief bias occurs when a participant judges the conclusion of a syllogism
based on whether or not it is believable rather than whether or not it is logical
(Evans et al., 1983; Sa´ et al., 1999, also see Section 2.3). Take for example
the syllogism given above (Figure 2.8) where it is logically concluded from the
premises that cigarettes are good for the health. A person biased by their prior
beliefs would answer that the syllogism is invalid, whereas a person ignoring their
beliefs and concentrating on the logical steps of the argument would answer that
it is valid. The selective scrutiny model suggests that ‘belief comes first’ so that
when a conclusion is believable, it is decided at the outset that it is correct and
when a conclusion is unbelievable, it is decided that Type 2 processes should
evaluate it more thoroughly.
It is difficult to identify a way in which reasoning might improve under the
pre-emptive type of theory. If the task characteristics determine which system
is used, perhaps the only way to improve reasoning would be to alter the heur-
istics that evaluate the task so that they become more conservative, and more
often judge that a task requires Type 2 processing.
Default-interventionist theories
Default-interventionist models suggest that Type 1 processes are always used
as the default method to solve any task, but in some cases Type 2 processes
may override them.
An example is the heuristic-systematic theory proposed by Chen and Chaiken
(1999). It proposed that reasoners have the aim of expending the minimum ef-
fort necessary whilst also striving for accuracy. This means they use Type 1
processes as much as possible, but will engage Type 2 processes when neces-
sary for confidence. The sufficiency principle states that individuals hold a
continuum of confidence about their judgements, with one point on the scale
relating to their actual confidence in their judgement, and another relating to
the desired level of confidence. Reasoners will use Type 1 processes as far as
possible, but if the actual confidence gained by this does not reach the desired
confidence level, they will use Type 2 processes to close the gap.
Another default-interventionist model is that proposed by Evans (2006). In
35
Evans’s (2006) model (shown in Figure 2.9) Type 1 processes output an answer
first, and then some form of evaluation occurs. Often it is decided that the
output is plausible and so it is accepted and given as the person’s response.
However, it is occasionally decided that the Type 1 response is not satisfactory,
and the problem is re-processed with Type 2 processes.
This approach assumes that we are cognitive misers as much as is possible,
but that we have a desire to respond correctly and that there is a mediating
evaluation mechanism which determines when the minimum effort response is
not sufficient. The feeling of rightness (FR, Thompson, 2009) is a meta-cognitive
process that can explain how the interaction between the systems is moderated
in the case of the default-interventionist model.
The output of every cognitive process is proposed to come with an associated
FR – an intuition about whether the output is correct or not possibly based
on the fluency with which the output was computed (Thompson, 2009). The
stronger the FR, the more likely it is that an output will be rationalised with
shallow analytic processing rather than re-processed analytically. In the case of
Heuristic processes Analytic processes
Construct most plausible 
or relevant model
Inferences/judgements
Analytic system 
intervention
Does model 
satisfy?
Explicit reasoning and 
evaluation processes
Task features
Current goal
Background 
knowledge
Instructional set
General 
intelligence
Time available
Yes
No
No
Yes
Figure 2.9: Evans’s (2006) default-interventionist model. The model uses the
terms ‘heuristic’ and ‘analytic’ to refer to Type 1 and Type 2 processes respect-
ively.
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1. A bat and a ball costs $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. 
How much does the ball cost?
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets?
3. In a lake there is a patch of lily pads. Every day the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the 
patch to cover half of the lake?
Intuitive answers: Q1 = 10 cents, Q2 = 100 minutes, Q3 = 24 days.
Correct answers: Q1 = 5 cents, Q2 = 5 minutes, Q3 = 47 days.
Figure 2.10: Frederick’s (2005) three item Cognitive Reflection Test.
the default-interventionist model, it can be supposed that the Type 1 process
output has an associated FR, and if this is high, the output is accepted, but
if it is lower than some threshold, the analytic system will conduct further
processing.
From the view of a default-interventionist model, there are two ways in
which mathematics might improve reasoning performance: there might be some
change to the threshold for analytic system intervention, so that it is more likely
to be engaged; or it might be that the analytic system becomes more efficient,
so that when it is engaged it is more likely to compute a correct response. Of
course, it could also be a combination of these two. The Cognitive Reflection
Test (CRT, see Figure 2.10), developed by Frederick (2005), provides a good
way of testing the first possibility.
The three items on the CRT prompt intuitive answers, which quickly spring
to mind but are incorrect. These are presumably Type 1 processing default
responses, and if a person responds with them, it is assumed that they have
not engaged Type 2 processes. If a person does engage Type 2 processes on the
task, they will almost certainly give the correct response because once you stop
to think about it it is easy to see that the first answer is wrong and easy to
calculate the correct answer (Frederick, 2005). Therefore, a person’s answer to
each question gives a good measure of whether or not they have engaged Type
2 processes.
It may be useful to demonstrate the default-interventionist model shown
in Figure 2.9 using the CRT as an example. Upon reading question 1, the
answer ‘10 cents’ springs to mind – this is the most plausible model. Because
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the answer comes with such a high FR, it is likely that it will be decided that
the analytic system need not intervene, and the answer given will be ‘10 cents’.
However, if a person has a lower FR, a more conservative threshold for FR, is
more intelligent, or is prompted by the instructions that the task is difficult (see
Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley & Eyre, 2007), for example, then they may decide
that the analytic system should intervene.
When explicit reasoning and evaluation occurs, it is quite likely that the
mistake will be spotted. One merely has to work through the simple arithmetic
to spot the problem: ‘if the ball costs 10 cents and the bat costs $1.00 more
than the ball then the bat costs $1.10, and in total they cost $1.20’. By now
the problem has been spotted and the reasoner decides that the model does not
satisfy. A new (and usually correct in the case of the CRT, Frederick, 2005)
model is then created, and the answer will either be accepted without any
further analytic intervention, or the new model will be evaluated analytically
and deemed to satisfy. The new answer (usually ‘5 cents’) is then given.
In Frederick’s (2005) data from 3,428 people over 11 different studies, the
mean number of CRT items answered correctly was 1.24 out of 3. Over all of
the studies, only 17% of participants got all three questions correct, 23% got
two correct, 28% got only 1 correct, and 33% did not answer any questions
correctly. Even in the highest scoring sample, from Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, only 48% of participants answered all three items correctly. The
CRT then, is very difficult. This is presumably because the intuitive responses
come to mind so easily that they have a high FR and the questions are rarely
dealt with by Type 2 processes.
It is possible but rare to give non-intuitive incorrect responses (Frederick,
2005), and in this case it may indicate that Type 2 processes have been engaged,
rejected the default response, but failed to compute the correct response. Al-
though this appears to be useful for differentiating engagement of the analytic
system and efficiency of the analytic system, it happens with such low frequency
(because the arithmetic is so simple) that it is unlikely to be useful (Frederick,
2005).
In sum, the CRT provides a good indication of Type 2 process engagement.
Therefore, it can be used to test the possibility that studying mathematics
increases the likelihood of Type 2 process intervention. If mathematics does
improve reasoning ability but not the likelihood of Type 2 process involvement,
then presumably the change has come from more efficient Type 2 processing,
according to the default-interventionist perspective.
Comparing the three strands of dual-process theory
Gillard (2009) conducted several experiments to distinguish between the
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three strands of dual-process theory using probability tasks. Participants were
shown an image of two boxes of black and white marbles and asked which box
gave the highest probability of picking a black marble. Participants often display
so-called ‘denominator neglect’ and choose the box with the highest frequency
rather than preferable ratio.
Gillard varied the ratios and absolute frequencies to construct congruent
and incongruent trials (Figure 2.11). On congruent trials, the box with the
highest probability of picking black also had the highest frequency of black
marbles, e.g. 1/3 compared to 4/7. On incongruent trials, the box with the
highest probability of choosing black had the lowest frequency of black marbles,
e.g. 2/3 compared to 3/7. In one experiment time pressure was manipulated,
in another working memory was manipulated, and in a third the proportion of
congruent and incongruent trials was manipulated, to investigate whether any
of these factors would influence which system was used. Reaction times were
analysed and compared to predictions stemming from each theory.
Over all three experiments, Gillard (2009) found consistent support for the
FR-moderated default-interventionist account. She argued that depending on
the strength of the FR, Type 2 processes can range from very minimal activation
in the form of simply accepting the heuristic output, to very strong activation
that might be a complete reformulation of the problem. FR, therefore, determ-
ines the extent of analytic system input, not merely whether it will be activated
or not.
Gillard (2009) also proposed that analytic processing can be strengthened
as it progresses. If minimal analytic intervention turns up information that
conflicts with the heuristic model, the analytic processing will be increased.
Therefore, even if the initial FR was high and analytic processing low, it is still
possible that the heuristic output could be completely overthrown.
What this means for the current purpose of identifying mechanisms that the
a) Congruent trial b) Incongruent trial
Figure 2.11: An example of a) a congruent and b) an incongruent trial of the
denominator neglect task used by Gillard (2009).
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TFD may operate by is that as far as dual-process theories of reasoning are con-
cerned, the default-interventionist-with-FR model may be the most promising
place to look. As discussed above, the ways for reasoning to improve according
to this view are for the analytic system to be used more often or for the ana-
lytic system processing to become more efficient when it is used. Reasons for
the analytic system to be used more often would be a general lowering of the
FR associated with heuristic outputs, or for the threshold for sufficient FR to
become more conservative. Either of these changes would result in the analytic
system more often being engaged. The CRT can determine whether the analytic
system is engaged or not, but not necessarily whether it was because of low FR
or conservative threshold. It may even be the case that it is impossible to dis-
tinguish these two accounts empirically because each would have the same effect
on observable behaviour – in either case more frequent slow analytic processing
would be expected.
A tri-process theory
Keith Stanovich has long been an advocate of the dual-process approach to
reasoning, but recently he has gone a step further to propose a tripartite model
(Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich, 2009a). He suggested that Type 2 processing can
actually be divided into two further types – in this case, those of the algorithmic
level and those of the reflective level. The algorithmic level can be thought of as
the computational element to Type 2 processes, while the reflective level is the
dispositional element (Stanovich, 2009a). The algorithmic level is subordinate to
the reflective level in that the reflective level determines when the algorithmic
level will override Type 1 processes. Type 1 processes in this theory are no
different to the dual-process theories discussed above.
The tripartite theory could be considered analogous to the FR-moderated
default-interventionist theory discussed above. There it was suggested that
Type 1 processes are used by default and the output has an associated FR.
When the FR is less than some threshold, Type 2 processes intervene to conduct
a more rigorous analysis of the problem. In the case of the tripartite theory,
Type 1 processes are again the default processing method, but it is the conscious
reflective level of cognition rather than the intuitive FR which determines when
to use more rigorous analytic processing. When the reflective level deems it
necessary, the algorithmic level takes over.
One of the reasons to propose a tripartite theory of this structure is that
ability with critical thinking measures has been shown to be somewhat sep-
arate from general intelligence (Stanovich & West, 2008), and both thinking
disposition and general intelligence explain unique variance in reasoning ability
40
(Stanovich & West, 1997; Toplak & Stanovich, 2002). This suggests that gen-
eral intelligence and thinking dispositions map onto different types of cognition
– the algorithmic and reflective levels, respectively. This also means that be-
having rationally depends on more than just analytic system capacity – it also
depends on the disposition to put effort into using one’s algorithmic capacity,
in line with the Meliorist position on human rationality.
Implications for the TFD
Assuming that there are indeed three types of processing in reasoning – heur-
istic, algorithmic, and reflective – via which type might the TFD operate? The
possibilities are that a) studying mathematics changes Type 1 processing heur-
istics, b) studying mathematics improves algorithmic efficiency or adds new
algorithms, and c) studying mathematics alters the reflective level to make the
individual more keen to put effort into reasoning tasks.
If System 1 heuristics are the root of differences between mathematicians’
and non-mathematicians’ reasoning behaviour, then the best methods for identi-
fying this would be eye-tracking, reaction times, or speeded tasks. In these ways
it is possible to separate initial intuitions from slightly later analytic processing,
whereas non-speeded accuracy based tasks such as the standard Conditional
Inference and Belief Bias Syllogisms tasks do not allow such a distinction.
With eye-tracking it is possible to identify which aspects of a task draw the
participant’s attention first and hold it for longest, and with reaction times it
is possible to infer which type of processing determined an answer, based on
the speed with which it is given. Similarly, speeded tasks allow us to see how a
participant will respond when they do not have time to effectively engage Type
2 processes.
If studying mathematics changes one’s intuitions when faced with a reas-
oning task, we would expect to see differences between mathematicians and
non-mathematicians in conditional inference accuracy even when each item has
a short time limit. If mathematicians were to outperform others when they only
have, say, 5 seconds to answer each item, we could infer that their advantage
lies with Type 1 processing.
If the TFD operates via the algorithmic level, we would need to identify
this through constructs such as general intelligence and executive functions.
General intelligence is a fundamental aspect of cognition – it contributes to
an individual’s ability with any cognitive task. When individuals complete a
series of tests measuring different cognitive abilities, there tends to be large
correlations between performance on each one, and this is thought to be due to
the single underlying factor of general intelligence (g, Spearman, 1927; Jensen,
1998, see Figure 2.12).
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Science test Maths test
Art testEnglish test
g
Figure 2.12: An illustration of g as the shared variance between cognitive abil-
ities, such as school subjects.
Intelligence and education are strongly related. Those of higher intelligence
tend to do better in school and stay in education longer (Neisser et al., 1996).
Looking at the relationship in the other direction, we see that formal schooling
develops intellectual abilities and a lack of schooling or schooling at weak in-
stitutions can have significant negative effects on intelligence scores (Neisser et
al., 1996). As noted in Section 2.3, people of higher intelligence also get better
degrees (Farsides & Woodfield, 2003), have higher job performance and success
(Deary, 2001, Judge et al., 1999), receive higher incomes (Ashenfelter & Rouse,
1999), and live longer (Deary, 2008).
It seems from this that intelligence may be a factor in the development of
reasoning skills. It is already known that the students studying mathematics
may have a higher group mean intelligence than those studying English and
that intelligence scores are related to material conditional reasoning (Inglis &
Simpson, 2009a). If the TFD operates via Stanovich’s (2009a) algorithmic level,
intelligence seems like a possible mechanism – perhaps studying mathematics
increases one’s intelligence and that in turn changes one’s behaviour with reas-
oning tasks such as the Conditional Inference Task.
However, despite some malleability in intelligence due to schooling, it is
generally agreed in the intelligence literature that g is stable in adulthood both
over time (Larsen, Hartmann & Nyborg, 2008; Jensen, 1998; Reeve & Lam,
2005; Ro¨nnlund & Nilsson, 2006) and environmental change (Locurti, 1990),
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so although it is possible, it is unlikely that studying mathematics at advanced
levels could increase intelligence. Nevertheless, if intelligence were to increase
through the study of mathematics, it is quite plausible that this would lead to
improvement in general reasoning skills, so g is a worthwhile factor to consider
in a study looking for mechanisms of reasoning improvement.
Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven & Court, 1998) is a non-verbal
intelligence test that is thought to be the best single measure of g (Jensen, 1998).
The task is a series of matrices, each of which show a pattern with one piece
missing, and participants are asked to select the missing piece from a choice of
eight possibilities. An example item is shown in Figure 2.13. If intelligence is
a factor in reasoning improvement, Raven’s Matrices should be a good measure
to reflect that. It should be noted that intelligence tests, including Raven’s
Matrices, have been shown to be susceptible to repeat testing effects (Ruston
& Jensen, 2010; Bors & Vigneau, 2003). In the case of comparing participants
from different subjects for improvement, though, it is the difference between
groups in degree of improvement that is important, not the absolute extent of
improvement. In other words, repeat testing should affect both groups equally
(except in the case of a selection-maturation effect, see Chapter 3), and any
difference between groups in the extent of improvement may be considered a
real change in g.
Figure 2.13: An example item from Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices.
Participants are asked to select which of the eight numbered pieces correctly
completes the grid.
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Another algorithmic level construct is executive function, which is actually a
group of cognitive functions: working memory (including capacity for, monitor-
ing of, and updating of information being held in mind), inhibition of irrelevant
stimuli or dominant responses, and shifting attention between tasks or processes
(Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki & Howerter, 2000). These abilities are all
proposed to be involved in how we regulate our cognitive processes in order to
reach a goal. When we encounter a cognitive task, particularly a novel task,
these skills guide the way we approach and solve it (Banich, 2009). There is
dispute over whether the three functions have the same underlying mechanism
(Banich, 2009), and although Miyake et al. (2000) found moderate correlations
among performance on each aspect, they concluded that they are actually clearly
separable.
Stanovich (2009a) made the point that executive functions are not actually
‘executive’ at all. ‘Executive’ implies the highest level of processing, which
according to the tripartite theory is the reflective level. However, executive
function tasks actually constrain reflective level processing because the tasks
are always fairly simple and come with instructions, and the measure instead
is how efficiently one can perform given that they know exactly what to do. A
truly executive-tapping task would require the participant to work out how to
solve the task themselves and then be able to put in a self-determined level of
effort to complete it. As stated above then, executive function tasks measure
efficiency of algorithmic level functioning.
The name issue aside, the three main executive functions alongside gen-
eral intelligence provide some insight into the algorithmic mind and are there-
fore a useful place to look for differences between mathematicians’ and non-
mathematicians’ reasoning behaviour. Moutier, Angeard and Houde´ (2002), for
example, found some evidence that matching bias may be due to a failure of
inhibition rather than a problem with logic. This demonstrates how execut-
ive functions may indeed be a promising line of investigation when searching
for mechanisms of better reasoning. If studying mathematics improves one’s
algorithmic functioning, we may find that reflected in one or more of: higher
general intelligence, higher working memory capacity, stronger inhibition, or
more efficient shifting ability.
Finally, it may be the case that the TFD operates via the reflective level,
which is tapped via measures of thinking disposition. Stanovich (1999) de-
scribed thinking dispositions as “relatively stable psychological mechanisms and
strategies that tend to generate characteristic behavioural tendencies and tac-
tics” (p. 157). They may also be referred to as intellectual styles, cognitive styles,
or habits of mind. As discussed before, the CRT provides a behavioural measure
of the tendency for effortful thinking. Other measures that assess thinking dis-
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positions include the Need for Cognition (NFC) scale (Cacioppo, Petty & Kao,
1984) and the thinking dispositions questionnaire devised by Stanovich and West
(1998) that includes the actively open-minded thinking subscale, the counter-
factual thinking subscale, the absolutism subscale (adapted from Erwin, 1981),
the dogmatism subscale (adapted from Troldhal & Powell, 1965 and Rokeach,
1960), and finally the paranormal beliefs subscale (adapted from Jones, Russell
& Nickel, 1977 and Tobacyk & Milford, 1983).
A person’s thinking disposition may influence how long they persevere at a
difficult task, whether they seek or avoid effortful thinking or how open or closed
their thinking tends to be. As Stanovich’s (2009a) tripartite theory proposes,
thinking disposition may be just as important as cognitive ability, or intelligence,
because it determines the extent to which a person’s intellect will actually be
used.
The NFC scale has 18 self-report items (Figure 2.14) that provide a measure
of enjoyment of effortful thinking. It is considerably shorter than Stanovich
and West’s (1998) thinking dispositions questionnaire, but is nonetheless re-
lated to grade point average in undergraduates (Elias & Loomis, 2002) and
complex problem solving behaviour (Nair & Ramnarayan, 2000). The CRT is
a behavioural as opposed to self-report measure, and so the two measures used
side-by-side may provide a more broad reflection of thinking disposition, mak-
ing them suitable measures for a study of reasoning skills in students. If it is
the case that studying mathematics improves reasoning skills by influencing an
individual’s reflective mind, then we may find that their Need for Cognition or
CRT score increases as well.
Section summary
• Psychological theories of reasoning tend to describe one, two or three
process-types.
• Gillard’s (2009) work supported the default-interventionist model of reas-
oning. According to the tripartite model of reasoning, which falls into the
default-interventionist category, there are several possible mechanisms via
which the TFD may operate.
• The TFD may operate via Type 1 processes, presumably though changing
the heuristics that sometimes cause errors in reasoning.
• It may also operate via the algorithmic level of Type 2 processes, i.e. learn-
ing new logical rules, increased intelligence or improved executive functions
resulting in more effective or more efficient processing.
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• Finally, the TFD may operate via the reflective level of Type 2 processes,
i.e. a change in thinking disposition that means individuals are more will-
ing to engage in effortful thinking and so use algorithmic level processing
more often or more effortfuly.
• These possibilities are not mutually exclusive. If the TFD is correct, it
may operate through any combination of these mechanisms.
I would prefer complex to simple problems.
I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking.
Thinking is not my idea of fun.*
I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is 
sure to challenge my thinking abilities.*
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have 
to think in depth about something.*
I !nd satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
I only think as hard as I have to.*
I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.*
I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.*
The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.*
I prefer my life to be !lled with puzzles that I must solve.
The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
I would prefer a task that is intellectual, di"cult, and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought.
I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot 
of mental e#ort.*
It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why 
it works.*
I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not a#ect me 
personally.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
* Reverse scored
Figure 2.14: The Need for Cognition Scale.
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2.7 Current status of the Theory of Formal Dis-
cipline
Despite the many changes in psychological opinion and the conflicting evidence
about whether thinking skills can be generalised across contexts or not, the TFD
view is still held by many academics and policy makers today. Oakley (1949)
argued that “The study of mathematics cannot be replaced by any other activity
that will train and develop man’s purely logical faculties to the same level of
rationality” (p.19) and Amitsur similarly stated that “Through mathematics we
also wish to teach logical thinking – no better tool for that has been found so
far” (Sfard, 1998, p. 453).
The TFD has also motivated arguments for mathematics to receive a special
status in the UK National Curriculum. In his report on secondary mathematics
education in the UK, Professor Adrian Smith stated that as well as being im-
portant for its own sake, mathematics is also important because it “disciplines
the mind, develops logical and critical reasoning, and develops analytical and
problem-solving skills to a high degree” (Smith, 2004, p. 11). Based on this,
the report recommended that high priority be given to “encouraging and fund-
ing a significant increase in the number of mathematics graduates admitted to
the Fast Track Scheme” (Smith, 2004, p. 45), a programme which gives new
teachers an additional spine point on the pay scale and a £5,000 bursary.
This was one of many recommendations intended to raise the status of math-
ematics and increase the numbers of mathematics students and teachers. More
recently, the Walport report (2010) identified quantitative and logical thinking
as science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) skills, and quoted
the Advisory Committee on Mathematics Education who stated that “prob-
lem solving abilities, perseverance and logic are [...] highly sought after and
are commonly found in those with a high level of competency in mathematics”
(p.185).
The arguments cited above are evidence that the TFD belief is still held, both
in academic writings and in policy debates. It has even been found that people
with an A level in mathematics earn 7-10% more than those with similar ability
and qualifications at the age of 33 (Dolton & Vignoles, 2002). Mathematics
qualifications are clearly highly valued and it is possible that this is due, at
least in part, to the belief that studying mathematics improves one’s reasoning
ability.
The TFD is not supported by all, though. The recent book ‘Why Learn
Maths?’ (Bramall & White, 2000) challenged the TFD in several chapters.
Bramall argued explicitly that mathematics does not deserve to be prioritised
in the curriculum and that subjects should be more equally balanced (Bramall,
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2000). Peter Huckstep reviewed several theories of how mathematics trains
the mind and concluded that the most defensible version was that of Thomas
Tate, which applies only to the elementary level – not to the advanced level
where recent policy debates have focused (Huckstep, 2000). Tate suggested
that mathematics provides a useful introduction to reasoning but that it only
trains students in how to deal with mathematical knowledge – he did not believe
that mathematics provides reasoning skills for other contexts (Huckstep, 2000).
Despite the fact that the TFD debate is still unresolved, UK education
policies are being influenced in a way that assumes the TFD is correct. At best,
the lack of conclusive evidence means that the TFD may not be wielding as
much clout as it could, and at worst, it leaves open the possibility that it is just
not true. The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to provide a direct test of the TFD
by investigating whether, and if so how, studying mathematics at A level and
undergraduate level improves reasoning skills.
Section summary
• Belief in the Theory of Formal Discipline has been held since the time of
Plato and is still held today, despite some disputes from recent psycholo-
gists.
• The Theory of Formal Discipline is used in modern day policy reports to
support the prioritisation of mathematics in the curriculum.
• This thesis aims to provide a direct test of the TFD which may be able
to inform debates about the place of mathematics in the UK’s national
curriculum.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to outline the necessary considerations for conduct-
ing high quality ethical research. The areas covered will be research ethics,
experimental and quasi-experimental designs, reliability, and validity. Potential
problems in each of these areas will be identified and addressed in order to lay
a solid base for the research presented later in the thesis.
3.2 Overview of longitudinal study
In order to put some of the methodological considerations discussed below into
context, it would be helpful to include a brief overview of the main studies
presented later in the thesis. The main studies, presented in Chapters 5 and
6, were designed to answer the question of whether studying mathematics at
advanced levels is associated with improvement in logical reasoning skills. The
studies followed longitudinal quasi-experimental designs. In Chapter 5 students
studying AS level mathematics were compared to students studying AS level
English Literature for improvement in logical reasoning skills over their year of
study and in Chapter 6, mathematics and psychology students were compared
for development in reasoning skills over a year. This type of design raised several
issues, which are discussed in the sections below.
3.3 Research Ethics
The first thing that may spring to mind when the subject of research ethics
comes up is the need to look out for participants’ welfare – we cannot subject
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them to just any conditions for the sake of answering our research question and
this is discussed below. First, the issue of the relationship between science and
society is considered (Diener & Crandall, 1978) due to its relevance to research
on the TFD.
3.3.1 Science and society
The issue of the relationship between science and society concerns the extent to
which society should influence which research topics are pursued (Christensen,
2000). Competition for research funding can be intense, and the money tends
to go the projects that are ‘in vogue’. For example, our society is currently con-
cerned about poverty in third world countries, the economic climate of our own
country, obesity, and immigration (amongst other things). Correspondingly, the
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), one of the primary research
funding bodies in the UK, states in its priorities for the 2009-2014 period ‘redu-
cing poverty among the poorest countries in the world’ (p. 6), ‘understanding of
individual and household responses to the rapidly changing economic climate’
(p. 6), ‘the reduction of obesity’ (p. 8), and understanding ‘the dynamics of
migration into and from the UK’ (p. 21, ESRC, 2009).
What this subsequently means is that researchers may alter their research
focus for the sake of obtaining funding. While it is not necessarily wrong for
researchers to investigate what is important to society, especially when research
funding is coming from taxpayers’ money, it does compromise the objectivity
of science. Traditionally, science is supposed to be the uncovering and explain-
ing of the nature of our world by objective scientists but this may well be
compromised when researchers have to compete for funding by tailoring their
research questions to social or political motives. As Christensen (2000) points
out, researchers’ interests may also be determined by personal experiences. For
example, a dyslexic researcher may want to investigate dyslexia in school chil-
dren, and again, this may compromise the objectivity of the research.
The issue of society influencing science is relevant to the research reported
in this thesis. As discussed in Section 2.7 on the current status of the TFD,
there have been many recent arguments for mathematics to be prioritised in
the National Curriculum based on the assumption that studying mathematics
improves thinking skills. Investigating the accuracy of that assumption is a part
of the motivation for conducting this research. It is important, therefore, that
the research is conducted as objectively as possible – not biasing the results
towards either supporting or refuting the TFD. One way in which this issue
is dealt with is by withholding the purpose of the study from the participants
(discussed below). Another benefit to objectivity is that I am approaching the
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question with a background in psychology, not mathematics, and so do not feel
the need to support mathematics by finding the TFD to be true, whereas others
with a background in mathematics might.
3.3.2 Welfare of participants
Participants in research studies should always be asked for informed consent,
given the right to withdraw, and debriefed after participation. Wherever pos-
sible, research should be conducted in a way in which participants do not suffer
any negative effects, such as failure, stress or embarrassment, and they should
not be deceived (Ethics Committe of the British Psychological Society, 2009).
Two of these issues which have particular importance for the research presented
in this thesis are informed consent and deception.
Consent
Informed consent means that participants should be told all relevant informa-
tion about the nature and purpose of the research and that they should only
subsequently take part having given their voluntary consent. When the par-
ticipants are vulnerable adults or children special considerations are required
for informed consent. The participants in all studies reported in this thesis,
including in the AS level study, were aged 16 or over. According to the BPS
(The British Psychological Society, 2010), only those under the age of 16 are
considered to be children. Nevertheless, parental consent was obtained for the
participants aged under 18 in Chapter 5. The participants in all of the stud-
ies reported here were given information about the purpose and nature of the
studies they were asked to take part in (except for some minor withholding of
information in the case of the AS level study, see below), and all gave consent
before their participation began.
Deception and withholding information
In the longitudinal studies reported in this thesis, it was necessary to withhold
some of the details of the purpose of the study from participants. If they were
aware that I was testing the hypothesis that mathematics students would im-
prove in reasoning to a greater extent than the English/psychology students,
the results may have been invalidated by stereotype threat.
Stereotype threat occurs in test situations when a person could potentially
reinforce a negative stereotype about a social group they belong to. For example,
when men and women were given the same mathematics test and told either that
it did or did not tend to show a gender difference in scores, Spencer, Steele and
Quinn (1999) found that gender differences in performance followed accordingly:
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for the group of participants who were told the test did not produce a gender
difference, no gender difference was found, but for the group that were told
that it did produce a gender difference, women scored significantly lower than
men. In another study, Asian-American women were found to perform better
on a mathematics test when their ethnic identity was primed, and worse when
their gender was primed, than a control group who had neither identity primed
(Shih, Pittinsky & Ambady, 1999). White men’s mathematics performance
was also found to suffer when they were reminded that Asian people tend to
outperform white people on mathematics tests, compared to a control group
that was not reminded of the stereotype (Aronson, Lustina, Good & Keough,
1999). These examples demonstrate what a powerful effect stereotype threat is
– a single statement from researchers can create a significant difference in the
performance of participant groups.
In the longitudinal studies reported here, stereotype threat could be a prob-
lem if participants were told that I was testing the claim that mathemat-
ics students would improve in reasoning to a greater extent than the Eng-
lish/psychology students – it could be enough to create the difference between
groups that I was testing for. Instead, participants were told that the research
was looking at improvement in reasoning over A-levels without emphasising any
comparisons between subjects. The participants were not deceived, therefore,
rather information was withheld. In this case, the cost to participants was
minimal, and the findings would simply not be valid if the information were
not withheld. In line with the BPS code of conduct (Ethics Committe of the
British Psychological Society, 2009), it was deemed that this withholding of
information was appropriate, and the study was approved by Loughborough
University’s Ethics Approvals (Human Participants) Sub-Committee.
3.4 The Experimental Method
Most of the studies reported in this thesis follow experimental and quasi-experimental
designs, and the current and following sections will elaborate on each of these
methods respectively.
The experimental method is used to test hypothesised causal relationships
by systematically manipulating one or more variables and measuring the effect
on other variables. This can occur in a highly controlled laboratory setting or in
a less controlled field setting. The variables that are manipulated are referred to
as independent variables, and those that are measured are dependent variables.
In an experiment, the independent variable is split into two or more conditions,
which could be something like a drug condition and a placebo condition, or
stimuli display time conditions of 250ms, 500ms, and 750ms, for example. The
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Complete Latin Square
Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3
Task 1 A A B B C C A C B
Task 2 B C A C A B B A C
Task 3 C B C A B A C B A
Table 3.1: Demonstration of complete and Latin Square counterbalancing for a
set of three tasks. A = administered first, B = administered second, and C =
administered third.
experimenter then measures and compares the dependent variable under each
condition, e.g. patients’ reports of their symptoms following treatment.
One way in which experiments can differ is in whether the conditions are
administered between- or within-participants. In a between-participants design,
the participants are randomly assigned to different conditions. Random assign-
ment is very important because it means that any differences between groups,
other than the experimental manipulation, are due to random variation rather
than systematic variation. Any differences between groups found in the depend-
ent measure can therefore be said to be due to the manipulation.
In a within-participants design, all participants experience all conditions,
and the order in which they are administered must be counterbalanced. Com-
plete counterbalancing means that all possible orders of tasks are administered
(with participants randomly assigned to one order each). Latin square counter-
balancing means that tasks are presented in a set but rotating order. Figure
3.1 demonstrates complete and Latin square counterbalancing for a set of three
tasks. The reason for counterbalancing is to prevent any order effects. For ex-
ample, if participants become tired towards the end of a study, counterbalancing
ensures that this does not affect performance on one task alone but balances
the effect between all tasks.
Christensen (2000) stated that there are three conditions that must be met
for a good experimental research design. The first criterion is that the design
must allow the research question to be answered. The second criterion is that
extraneous variables (variables that are not of interest but that affect the de-
pendent variable) are controlled for (also known as internal validity, see Section
3.6.2). The third is that the findings are generalisable.
The first criterion, that the design must allow the research question to be
answered, seems so fundamental as to not require stating. However, it is not im-
possible for a researcher to get as far as trying to interpret data before realising
that this criterion has not been met. For example, take the research question
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‘Is intervention X effective in helping dyslexic children improve their reading
speed?’. A flawed approach to answering this question would be to take a
sample of dyslexic children and measure their reading speed before and after
administering intervention X. Suppose the findings showed that the children’s
reading speed was faster after the intervention. Does this answer the research
question? No, it merely shows that the children’s reading speed became faster
over time, whether or not that has anything to do with the intervention is im-
possible to say in the absence of a control group. Recall the study by Lehmann
(1963) which showed that undergraduate students’ critical thinking skills im-
proved throughout their university education. It was mentioned in the literature
review in Chapter 2 that this could have been a change that occurs in all college-
aged people. Due to the lack of a control group, it was not reasonable to assume
that the change had any relation to the participants’ educational experiences.
To adequately answer such questions, the design needs an experimental group
that receives the intervention and a control group that does not, and the par-
ticipants need to be randomly assigned to one group or the other to allow any
differences to be attributable to the manipulation.
The second criterion, that extraneous variables are controlled for, is neces-
sary to be able to eliminate rival hypotheses. An extraneous variable is some-
thing other than the independent variable that influences the dependent vari-
able. It would be no good if you concluded that participants who read a happy
story recalled more details than those who read a sad story if the participants
in the happy story group were more intelligent, for example. The best way to
control for extraneous variables is to include a control group and to randomly
assign participants to groups. The control condition should be identical to the
experimental condition in all aspects except that it does not receive the exper-
imental manipulation. In this way, the independent variable is isolated as the
difference between conditions and a research question about that variable can
be answered. By randomly assigning participants to conditions, there should
be no known or unknown variables that affect one group more than another,
except for the independent variable.
The third and final criterion is generalisability (also known as external valid-
ity, see Section 3.6.2) – the extent to which the results can be applied beyond
the study itself. Generalisability is restricted by having a non-representative
sample or an artificial experimental situation. For example, if your sample is
entirely made up of females the findings may not generalise to males. Similarly,
if you study factors affecting attractiveness of faces using photographs in a lab
setting, your results may not apply to attractiveness of faces as seen in natural
public settings. It is likely that participant samples will always be restricted in
some dimension, but the important thing is to be aware of the boundaries of
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the population to which your sample belongs and thus how far your results can
generalise when you draw your conclusions. Artificiality of study environments,
however, is a more interesting issue.
A complaint often levelled at lab based and experimental research is that the
artificiality of the setting makes the results non-generalisable to other settings
(Mook, 1983). This complaint often reflects a fundamental misunderstanding
of the aims of the research. On the whole, such research is not conducted
with the aim of generalising the results to other situations, it is done with
the aim of testing a theory. In psychological research, theories describe and
explain real world behaviour and the role of experiments is to test and refine
those theories. In testing a theory, a researcher derives a hypothesis that can
be tested in a controlled situation. The results of the experiment are only
used to accept or reject that hypothesis, thus informing the researcher about
the accuracy of the theory from which it was derived. This means that it is
irrelevant whether or not the experiment resembles real life, what is important
is that the experiment is highly controlled so that the hypothesis is being tested
accurately – in the absence of confounding variables. Mook (1983) provided a
very detailed discussion of this issue, and it is also discussed further in Section
3.6.2 below on external validity.
3.5 The Quasi-Experimental Method
A quasi-experiment differs from a true experiment in that the independent vari-
able is not randomly assigned. It may be that it is a pre-existing characteristic
such as gender, nationality, number of siblings or degree subject, in which case
the conditions cannot be assigned or manipulated by the experimenter. It may
instead be the case that participants cannot be randomly assigned because of
ethical reasons, for example, if you were looking at the effectiveness of an alcohol
addiction treatment it might be unethical to deny treatment to an alcoholic by
assigning them to a control condition (Christensen, 2000), although of course
this regularly happens in medical research, presumably because the knowledge
gained is deemed to justify the temporary withholding of treatment.
The design of the longitudinal studies in this thesis is quasi-experimental.
The hypothesis is that studying mathematics improves students’ reasoning skills
to a greater extent than studying other subjects. Students who had already
chosen to study mathematics were compared to students who had already chosen
to study other subjects. It would be unethical, and practically impossible, to
randomly assign people to studying different A levels or degrees and so a quasi-
experimental design is the only way to test the hypothesis.
The problem with non-random assignment to conditions is that extraneous
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variables, and in particular, confounding extraneous variables, are not properly
controlled for. An extraneous variable is a factor other than the independent
variable that affects the dependent variable. An extraneous variable becomes
confounding when it also systematically varies with the independent variable. If
a confounding variable is not controlled for by random assignment to conditions,
it can become an alternative explanation for any effects found and this creates
a problem for determining causation.
A way to deal with this problem in a quasi-experimental design is to measure
and statistically control for any factors that are anticipated to be confounding.
In the case of the longitudinal study, the mathematics group may have a higher
mean intelligence than the non-maths group (Inglis & Simpson, 2009a), and
intelligence may affect reasoning ability and development. In this case, the way
to deal with the problem is to measure participants’ intelligence and statistically
control for its influence in the analysis.
In a true experiment with random assignment to conditions, causation can be
established because no other variables could be creating the effects observed. In
a quasi-experiment, it is only possible to establish plausible causation by ruling
all alternative hypotheses implausible. Christensen (2000) gave the example of
a person who dies immediately after being hit by a car. It is possible that they
actually died from a heart attack, independently of being hit by the car, but
that is quite implausible so you can reasonably conclude that the collision was
the cause of death.
Beyond the problem of causation, there are several other issues associated
with quasi-experimental designs. In each of the examples given below, the
results of a study would seem to support the hypothesis that an intervention
or treatment works. However, there are alternative explanations of the results
that have not been ruled out.
In the longitudinal studies reported in Chapters 5 and 6 participants’ reas-
oning skills are being measured both before and after the conditions are exper-
ienced. One potential outcome of this design identified by Christensen (2000)
is that the comparison group does not change in reasoning skills and the math-
ematics group does, as demonstrated in Figure 3.1. This would imply that
the hypothesis is correct, but there is a potential problem known as selection-
maturation.
Selection-maturation means that one group may already be developing faster
in the dependent variable than another group, for example, because they are
more intelligent. Perhaps mathematics students are more intelligent than those
of other subjects, and perhaps high intelligence individuals are on a faster de-
velopmental trajectory for reasoning skills than lower intelligence individuals.
There are several approaches to dealing with this potential issue. One is
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Figure 3.1: Possible quasi-experimental design outcome 1.
to match the groups on the extraneous variable that could be responsible for
a selection-maturation effect. In this case, we would need to match the par-
ticipants in each group on intelligence scores. This would mean taking parti-
cipants from the lower range of the higher scoring group and from the upper
range of the lower scoring group in such a way that the selected groups means
are equal on the intelligence measure. There is a problem with this solution
though: the participants that are at the extremes of their group range of in-
telligence scores at pre-test may regress towards the mean of their group by
post-test, which could lead us to underestimate the effect of the independent
variable.
Another possible solution is to use statistical methods such as analysis of cov-
ariance (ANCOVA) that take into account the effect of the confounding variable
when determining the results. Van Breukelen (2006) discussed the advantages
and disadvantages of using ANCOVA compared to repeated measures analysis
of variance (ANOVA) for inferring a treatment effect. The ANCOVA method
is to perform an analysis on Time 2 scores with Time 1 scores as a covariate
along with the suspected confounding variables, while the repeated-measures
ANOVA method involves comparing change-from-baseline in each group with
only the confounding variables as covariates. Van Breukelen (2006) argued that
in randomised studies both methods are unbiased but ANCOVAs have more
power. However, where there is not random assignment to conditions, repeated-
measures ANOVAs are less biased because ANCOVAs assume no baseline differ-
ence, which cannot be certain in non-randomised designs. Therefore, repeated
measures ANOVA with covariates of intelligence and thinking disposition will
be used in the longitudinal studies presented in this thesis. A major benefit
of this approach as opposed to matching participants is that the sample is not
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Figure 3.2: Possible quasi-experimental design outcome 2.
reduced.
Besides a selection-maturation effect, another potential threat with such a
pattern of results is a local history effect. This is where some event affects one
group but not the other. Some possible events that could create this problem in
the longitudinal study would be if the mathematics group were also more likely
to be taking a logic, critical thinking, or perhaps physics course. This is easy
to identify by recording all of the subjects that the participants are studying.
Another possible outcome of the design that was identified by Christensen
(2000), shown in Figure 3.2, is that both groups change on the dependent meas-
ure over time, but the experimental group changes more than the control group.
Again, this could be the result of a selection-maturation effect where the exper-
imental group are on a faster developmental trajectory than the control group.
A third possibility identified by Christensen (2000) is shown in Figure 3.3. In
this case the experimental group scores lower than the control group at pre-test,
and increases to nearer the level of the control group by post-test. This pattern
of results is more likely to occur when the experimental group is a disadvantaged
group and the treatment is an intervention designed to help them. For example,
an intervention to help dyslexic students improve in their reading speed.
It is not likely that possibility 3 would occur in the case of reasoning ability
in mathematics and non-mathematics students, but if it were to occur there
would be a danger that the effect was due to a regression towards the mean by
the unusually low-scoring experimental group. In this case it would be neces-
sary to also track the deprived group’s scores over time in the absence of any
intervention. If the scores were consistent over time, it would help to support
the conclusion that the improvement in the experimental group was in fact due
to the treatment.
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Figure 3.3: Possible quasi-experimental design outcome 3.
The fourth and final possibility identified by Christensen (2000) is that shown
is Figure 3.4 where the experimental group’s scores start below the control
group’s and finish higher, while the control group scores do not change. In this
case the alternative hypotheses that threaten the other possible results are not
an issue. Regression towards the mean is not a plausible possibility, and neither
is a selection-maturation effect because it is usually the group that scores highest
at pre-test that develops fastest.
To conclude, a quasi-experimental design is not ideal, but because parti-
cipants cannot ethically or practically be assigned to studying different subjects
at A level or degree level, it has to suffice. The main issue is that by not ran-
domly assigning participants to conditions, confounding extraneous variables
are not ruled out. This means that there may be alternative explanations
for any effects found. Unless these alternatives can be statistically controlled
for or deemed implausible, it is not possible to establish causation in a quasi-
experimental design. In fact, even if all known confounding variables are ruled
out, it is still not safe to conclude a causal relationship because there may be un-
known confounding variables that are having an influence. Random assignment
to conditions is really the only way to avoid any problems of this kind. This
does not mean that the findings of quasi-experimental studies are not important
or useful, but it means that they must be interpreted very carefully so as not
to overstate any relationships found.
3.6 Reliability and Validity
This section will discuss the concepts of reliability and validity in research, spe-
cifically in relation to my own studies. In general, reliability refers to consistency
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Figure 3.4: Possible quasi-experimental design outcome 4.
of measurement, and validity refers to the extent to which an instrument meas-
ures what you intend it to measure. However, these terms can be divided into
many sub-types, as will be seen below.
3.6.1 Reliability
Beginning with test-retest reliability, the issue is whether the concept you are
measuring is being measured consistently across time (Christensen, 2000). If,
for example, you measured your participants’ heights twice and got a different
measurement each time, then unless they were on some sort of growth-spurt
drugs you could conclude that the way in which you are measuring height is
not very reliable. Unless the construct you are measuring is theorised to be
unstable, then it is desirable that your measure provides the same results on
different occasions.
How, then, can you ensure that your measures have high reliability? Changes
in measurements can be the result of either systematic error (a changing factor
of the situation that biases the results) or random error (Christensen, 2000). As
the name suggests, random error happens for no particular reason and so cannot
be controlled. The way in which to increase reliability, therefore, is to tightly
control the experimental situation, ensuring that it is as similar as possible for
all participants every time the study is run.
The main way in which reliability is maximised in the longitudinal study
reported in this thesis is by ensuring that all participants complete the tasks in
the same exam style conditions at every testing point. This includes working
alone, in silence, and having the same amount of time to complete the tasks.
This control should reduce the chance of any distractions or time pressure in-
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terfering with performance. It would be a problem if, for example, the tasks
were completed in silence at the first testing point and in a noisy environment
at the second testing point – this could inhibit performance the second time
round giving the misleading impression that the participants had become sys-
tematically worse at reasoning or it could hide any real improvements. As it is,
any change that is found should be the product of an actual change in ability,
not an error in measurement.
Internal reliability is the extent to which all items in a measure are related,
i.e. consistently measuring the same construct (Heiman, 2002). If you have a
measure made up of multiple items, it is a good idea that all items are meas-
uring the same construct to some extent, although it is also desirable that each
item brings something slightly unique as well. This ensures that the measure is
useful, interpretable and not unnecessarily long. To take an example, suppose
you have a 15 item task that is supposed to measure attitudes towards immig-
ration, but three of the items actually measure attitudes towards emmigration.
Attitudes towards the two things may be separate and unrelated so scores on
the 12 immigration items may not be correlated with scores on the three em-
migration items and this would give the task low internal reliability. Note how
this is different from test-retest reliability – the immigration task may produce
consistent results if re-administered every week, but the items within the task
are not producing consistent responses.
Internal reliability can be measured with a split-half analysis or a Cronbach’s
alpha after the task has been completed by a number of participants (Novick
& Lewis, 1967). In a split-half analysis, the items on a task are split into two
groups, usually by alternating trials or at the midpoint. Participants’ scores
on the two halves of items are then subjected to a correlation analysis. In a
Cronbach’s alpha, a similar correlation is computed but averaging across every
possible combination of test halves. The resulting correlation, or reliability coef-
ficient, from either method is considered to be good when it is over .8 (Heiman,
2002). A reliability of below .7 would indicate questionable internal reliability,
but these are just rules of thumb (George & Mallery, 2003). Split-half and
Cronbach’s alpha analyses are reported for the reasoning measures used in later
chapters.
3.6.2 Validity
Validity is a slightly broader concept than reliability, encompassing external
validity and internal validity. External validity is the extent to which a study
generalises to other people and other situations, and it was touched upon in
Section 3.4. It includes ecological validity – whether the study closely resembles
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a real-life situation – and temporal validity – whether the findings would apply
in the past and future as well as the present (Christensen, 2000). Reasoning
is a cognitive process, and cognitive psychology assumes that all humans are
born with the same cognitive processing systems (Miller, 2011; Neisser, 1967).
This means that findings related to cognitive processing are assumed to apply
across time and across the species. That said, this assumes that the manipu-
lation is the same. If other people, at other times, studied the current UK A
level mathematics syllabus, then we could hope for the results to be the same.
This is not to say that the results can generalise to students studying different
mathematics syllabi in non-UK education systems, or in the past or future.
In terms of ecological validity, one issue is whether the measures of reasoning
ability used in my research are relevant to the TFD claims about the sort of
reasoning that is valued by the job market. Are pen and paper based tasks
valid measures of the types of reasoning skills that mathematics graduates might
demonstrate in their future jobs? On the one hand, it is unlikely that the tasks
closely resemble tasks that would be encountered in day-to-day life. On the
other hand, it can be argued that an improvement in logical reasoning skills
in general (as suggested by the TFD) would be demonstrated on any logical
reasoning task because of the universal nature of cognitive processing (Miller,
2011). Since the TFD does not specify the exact types of logical reasoning skills
that are improved by studying mathematics, this is the best we can hope for.
As Mook (1983) argued, however, ecological validity is often misunderstood
and is not necessary if the research is designed to test a theory as opposed to
generalise directly to the real world. In psychological research ecological validity
is often compromised for the sake of internal validity (absence of confounding
variables). This allows a hypothesis derived from a theory to be tested effect-
ively. It is simply not possible to control for all confounding variables in a real
world setting (and it is also difficult to find a real world setting that is the same
as every possible real world setting to which you want to generalise, Mook,
1983). By accurately testing a hypothesis derived from a theory in a controlled
artificial setting, it is possible to support, refute or refine that theory, and use
the theory to explain real world behaviour. In this thesis, I am testing the TFD,
and it is that theory, not my data, which generalises to the real world. The TFD
argues that studying mathematics improves general reasoning skills. If this is
true, then performance on an ‘artificial’ task that requires reasoning should be
changed as part of the umbrella development.
As stated previously internal validity is basically the absence of confounding
extraneous variables. High internal validity means that a relationship between
two factors can be taken to be a relationship between those two factors alone
(Heiman, 2002). If a study has low internal validity, there may be extraneous
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variables that have not been controlled that are influencing the relationship
(making them confounding variables). The best way to ensure that a study
has high internal validity is to randomly assign participants to conditions so
that any extraneous variables are balanced out and cannot systematically bias
the results. Another safeguard to is to measure any variables that you know
may be confounding factors so that you can control for them in the analysis
(Christensen, 2000).
As already stated, the quasi-experimental design of the longitudinal study
means that participants are not randomly assigned to conditions. However, it
is likely that intelligence is a confounding factor in the study – it may differ
between conditions and it is related to reasoning ability. To deal with this issue,
intelligence will be measured so that its effects can be accounted for in the
analysis.
Internal validity may be compromised by the quasi-experimental design of
the longitudinal study. However, despite the fact that external validity is ar-
guably irrelevant because the study is testing the TFD rather than trying to
generalise to real-world settings directly (Mook, 1983), it does have fairly high
external validity due to the manipulation (mathematical study) being carried
out ‘in the field’ rather than in a laboratory setting, and because it is dealing
with a cognitive process that is believed to be common across humans (Miller,
2011).
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Chapter 4
Measures of reasoning
4.1 Introduction
The psychology of reasoning has been a strong and growing area of research since
the 1960s, when Peter Wason first demonstrated that people systematically fail
to behave logically on his famous Selection Task (Wason, 1966). Since that
time, a huge amount of research has been conducted with the Wason Selection
Task and a collection of other tasks. The aim of this chapter is to justify why
the Conditional Inference task was chosen as the primary measure of logical
reasoning in this thesis, and why the Belief Bias Syllogisms task was chosen as
a secondary measure. In order to do this, the most commonly used tasks in the
field are described and discussed.
The chapter is split into two broad sections: judgment and decision making
tasks and deductive reasoning tasks. The deductive reasoning section is fur-
ther divided into three parts: disjunctive reasoning tasks, conditional reasoning
tasks, and syllogisms tasks. After each of the tasks has been described, I will
present an argument for why the Conditional Inference and Belief Bias Syllo-
gisms tasks were chosen to measure reasoning in the studies presented in this
thesis.
4.2 Judgment and Decision Making
In a commentary piece, Kahneman (1991) characterised the judgment and de-
cision making field by three features: the role of the normative theory of rational
belief and choice, the emphasis on risky choice, and the cognitive, rather than
social or emotional, focus. Put simply, the judgment and decision making field
aims to explain the cognitive basis of human thinking, and in particular, its
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departure from rationality. This latter aspect is known as the heuristics and bi-
ases tradition and was pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky in the early 1970s
(e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1974). This area of work has attempted to
understand human rationality (or irrationality) by examining the biases we are
prone to and their basis in heuristic processes.
4.2.1 Heuristics and Biases tasks
Law of large numbers problems
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) gave their participants the following problem:
A certain town is serviced by two hospitals. In the larger hospital
about 45 babies are born each day, and in the smaller hospital about
15 babies are born each day. As you know, about 50 percent of all
babies born are boys. However, the exact percentage varies from
day to day. Sometimes it may be higher than 50 percent, sometimes
lower.
For a period of one year, each hospital recorded the days on which
more than 60 percent of the babies born were boys. Which hospital
do you think recorded more such days?
• The larger hospital
• The smaller hospital
• About the same (that is, within 5% of each other)
According to the statistical law of large numbers, the greater the sample size
the more closely it represents the population. By this rule, the large hospital
should have a birth rate of boys that is closer to 50% than the small hospital.
Therefore, the small hospital will have more days where over 60% of the babies
born are boys. In contrast to the law of large numbers, most participants (56%)
thought that the hospitals were ‘about the same’ in terms of the number of days
on which more than 60% of babies were boys. Equal numbers of participants
(22% each) chose the smaller hospital or larger hospital. This and many other
studies (e.g. Neilens, Handley & Newstead, 2009; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson &
Kunda, 1983; West et al., 2008) have shown that, on the whole, people do not
invoke the law of large numbers when they should.
Base rate neglect
A base rate is the probability of an event occurring in the absence of any other
information. For example, in a sample of 100 people where 99 are women, the
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base rate of women in the sample is 99/100. Base rate neglect is another issue
that was raised by Kahneman and Tversky (1972). The issue is nicely described
with Tversky and Kahneman’s (1982) taxi problem:
A taxi is involved in a hit and run accident at night. In the city,
there are two taxi firms, the Green Cab Company and the Blue Cab
Company. Of the taxis in the city, 85% are Green and the rest are
Blue.
A witness identifies the offending cab as Blue. In tests under similar
conditions to those on the night of the accident, this witness correctly
identified each of the two colours 80% of the time, and was wrong
20% of the time.
What is the probability that the taxi involved in the accident was
in fact blue?
According to Bayes’s rule, given that the base rate of Blue cabs is .15 and
that the witness said it was blue with .8 accuracy, the probability of the taxi
actually being Blue is .41. Conversely, most of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1982)
participants rated the probability as .8, which is simply the accuracy of the
witness. This suggests that participants do not take account of the base rate
information at all.
The Linda problem
The famous Linda problem originated with Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983)
study, and demonstrated a bias towards thinking that a conjunction of two
factors could be more probable than either factor alone. The problem goes like
this:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored
in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues
of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-
nuclear demonstrations.
1. Linda is a teacher in elementary school.
2. Linda works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes.
3. Linda is active in the feminist movement.
4. Linda is a psychiatric social worker.
5. Linda is a member of the League of Women Voters.
6. Linda is a bank teller.
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7. Linda is an insurance salesperson.
8. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
Participants were asked to rank the eight statements associated with Linda
in order of their probability. The interesting finding was that participants were
inclined to rank the conjunction ‘Linda is a bank teller and is active in the
feminist movement’ as more probable than the constituent part ‘Linda is a
bank teller’, presumably because the description leads people into think that
Linda must be a feminist, whether or not she is a bank teller. However, it is
simply not possible for a conjunction of two characteristics to be more probable
than either one alone.
Framing bias
Framing bias describes the finding that participants may give different responses
to two questions which are essentially the same, but which are framed differently.
Take this example from Tversky and Kahneman (1981):
1. You are a health service official making plans for dealing with
a new disease that is about to break out. It is expected to
kill 600 people. Your scientific advisors tell you about the con-
sequences of two possible treatment programmes: Programme
A will definitely save 200 lives, whereas Programme B will have
a one-third (.33) chance of saving 600. Which programme will
you approve?
2. Your colleague has a choice between Programme C, which will
certainly result in 400 deaths, and Programme D, which has a
two-thirds chance (.67) that 600 people will die. Which should
she approve?
In the first scenario participants are more inclined to choose Programme A,
whereas in the second scenario Programme D is the preferred choice, although
of course A and C are equivalent and B and D are equivalent. This is thought
to reflect adversity to risk when it is framed in terms of positive outcomes, but
preference for risk when it is framed in terms of negative outcomes. Nevertheless,
this pattern of responses demonstrates a departure from logic.
Sunk cost fallacy
The sunk cost fallacy refers to the tendency to allow previous sunk costs (past
costs that cannot be recovered) to affect current decision making. For example,
say you bought a non-refundable ticket to a concert, but on the day you felt
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very ill and did not want to go. If you thought you should go anyway because
you had paid for the ticket then you would be committing the sunk cost fallacy.
Toplak, West and Stanovich (2011) gave their participants the film problem
from Frisch (1993). First, participants are told to imagine that they are staying
in a hotel room, and they have just paid $6.95 to see a film on TV. Then they
are told that 5 minutes in the film seems pretty bad and they are bored. They
are asked whether they would continue to watch the film or switch to another
channel. Second, participants see the same scenario except that they have not
had to pay for the movie. They are again asked whether they would continue
to watch the movie or switch to another channel. If participants report that
they would change the channel when the film was free but that they would keep
watching when they had paid for it, they were presumed to have committed the
sunk cost fallacy. This was the case for 35.8% of participants in Toplak et al.’s
(2011) study.
Outcome bias
Outcome bias is the tendency to rate the quality of a decision based on the
outcome rather than on the situation at the time the decision was made. A
problem that is often used to measure outcome bias derives from Baron and
Hershey (1988) and has been used in many studies by Stanovich (Stanovich &
West, 1998, Stanovich & West, 2000, Stanovich & West, 2008, Toplak et al.,
2011). Participants are told about a 55-year-old man who had a heart condition
and who was given an operation with an 8% mortality rate. The surgery was
successful and participants rated the quality of the decision on a seven point
scale. Later participants are told about a patient with a hip condition who was
given an operation with a 2% mortality rate. Despite the decision to operate
being objectively better, the patient died during the operation. If a participant
rates the first decision (with a positive outcome) as better than the second (with
a negative outcome), they have displayed outcome bias.
Gambler’s fallacy
The Gambler’s fallacy refers to people’s misunderstanding of chance. Often,
people incorrectly believe that what has happened in the past can affect the
probability of future events. Toplak et al. (2011) gave their participants two
problems designed to tap into the gambler’s fallacy. The first problem went as
follows:
When playing slot machines, people win something about 1 in every
10 times. Julie, however, has just won on her first three plays. What
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are her chances of winning the next time she plays?
out of
The correct response to this problem is 1 out of 10, the odds given in the
question. The fact that Julie has already won three times has no bearing on the
probability that she will win on any subsequent tries. Toplak et al. (2011) found
only 69.4% correct responses to this problem in their study with undergraduate
and graduate students. The second problem they gave participants was as
follows:
Imagine that we are tossing a fair coin (a coin that has a 50/50
chance of coming up heads or tails) and it has just come up heads 5
times in a row. For the 6th toss do you think that:
1. It is more likely that tails will come up than heads.
2. It is more likely that heads will come up than tails.
3. Heads and tails are equally probable on the sixth toss.
The correct answer is 3, because again the past events are irrelevant to
future probabilities, and in this case 92.2% of participants in Toplak et al.’s
(2011) study answered correctly, suggesting that the bias is shown inconsistently
across tasks.
Summary
This section has presented some of the common tasks used to measure pervas-
ive biases in human judgement and decision making. The problems tend to
resemble real world scenarios and each measures a small aspect of human reas-
oning (usually on a binary scale) which may be important in a limited range of
scenarios but which are not necessarily more widely relevant.
The next section discusses deductive reasoning, which may be measured
with problems resembling the real world, but which often is not. Deductive
reasoning tasks require a necessary conclusion to be derived from given premises.
Necessity means that the conclusion must be true when the premises are true.
As such, deductive reasoning is about assessing logical validity when all the
necessary information is available, rather than about making decisions in the
face of limited information.
4.3 Deductive Reasoning
Deductive reasoning is the process of drawing necessary conclusions from given
premises. It is based on absolute certainty, even though the premises may be
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assumed rather than known. For example, the premises ‘All archbishops are
believers’ and ‘No believers are Cannibals’ can lead to the necessary conclusion
that ‘No archbishops are cannibals’. The premises may or may not be true, but
when we assume they are true the conclusion becomes necessarily true. This
certainty is what defines a deduction as valid or invalid: a deduction is valid if the
conclusion must be true when the premises are true, and is invalid otherwise.
In this section three types of deductive reasoning are discussed: disjunctive,
conditional and syllogistic reasoning.
4.3.1 Disjunction tasks
The THOG task
The most famous disjunction problem, the THOG task, was created by Wason
and is shown in Figure 4.1 (Wason & Brooks, 1979). Readers unfamiliar with
the THOG problem should read it now before moving on.
The answer to the THOG problem is that the white square and black circle
cannot be THOGs while the white circle must be a THOG, but only 35% of
In front of you are four designs:
Black Square, White Square, Black Circle, White Circle
You are to assume that I have written down one of the colours (black or white) 
and one of the shapes (square or circle). Now read the following rule carefully.
If, and only if, any of the designs includes either the colour I have written down, 
or the shape I have written down, but not both, then it is called a THOG.
I will tell  you that the Black Square is a THOG.
Each of the designs can now be classi!ed into one of the following categories:
A. De!nitely is a THOG
B. Insu"cient information to decide
C. De!nitely is not a THOG
Figure 4.1: Wason’s abstract THOG problem.
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I have brought a deck of cards. It contains only these four types of card:
Black Square, White Square, Black Circle, White Circle
I deal one for myself from the deck, and I won't show it to you. Now I'll deal you 
each a card, and I will pay for a dinner for each person who has a card including 
either the colour of my card, or the shape of my card, but not both.
(The four cards above are given to Rob, Tim, Paul and John, respectively.)
Without showing you my card, I can tell you that I owe Rob a dinner. Which 
card do you think I could have? And do you think that I have to pay for a dinner 
for someone else? If so, for whom?
Figure 4.2: The Pub problem, a contextualised version of the THOG task.
participants in Wason and Brooks’s (1979) study gave this response. The prob-
lem states that the black square is a THOG, which means that the experimenter
must be thinking of a white square or a black circle (a THOG shares one char-
acteristic with the design the experimenter is thinking of). If the experimenter
is thinking of a white square then the black circle (shares neither characteristic)
and white square (shares both) can be ruled out as THOGs. If the experimenter
is thinking of the black circle then the black circle (shares both) and white square
(shares neither) can be ruled out as THOGs. Under both alternatives, a white
circle shares one characteristic, and is therefore a THOG.
Girotto and Legrenzi (1989) created the pub problem, a reformulation of the
THOG problem using realistic content. The problem is about a character called
Charles who plays a game with four friends in a pub. The problem stated by
Charles appears in Figure 4.2.
This problem is analogous to the abstract problem (in this case the answer is
that John is also owed a dinner), yet 89% of people answered correctly accord-
ing to Girotto and Legrenzi (1989). Furthermore, when Girotto and Legrenzi
(1993) simply gave the name SARS to the hypothesised shape in the abstract
version of the task, so that a THOG has one feature in common with a SARS,
they observed 70% correct performance. The explanation given for the difficulty
of the original THOG problem is called confusion theory and argues that people
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p q p or q
T T F
T F T
F T T
F F F
Table 4.1: Truth Table for the exclusive disjunction ‘p or q ’ where T = true
and F = false.
simply treat the exemplar THOG as if it was the design chosen by the experi-
menter. They then look for other designs that have one feature in common with
the exemplar (Newstead, Girotto & Legrenzi, 1995). It is suggested that when
people have to keep several hypotheses in mind at once, as with the exclusive
disjunction in the THOG problem, they experience a cognitive overload and re-
sort to more intuitive strategies. In this case, the intuitive strategy is to match
the values of the exemplar with the test cases.
Truth Table tasks
Disjunctive reasoning can also be measured with a Truth Table task. A Truth
Table is used in logic to demonstrate how the truth or falsity of each variable
determines the validity or invalidity of a proposition about those variables. For
example, Table 4.1 presents a Truth Table for the exclusive disjunction rule ‘p
or q’. The fact that the disjunction is exclusive means that either p or q must
be true, but not both. Each line represents a different combination of truth
and falsity of the values p and q, and the final column denotes whether that
combination makes the disjunctive rule true (valid) or false (invalid). In an
inclusive disjunction, either p or q must be true, but both can be true as well.
The Truth Table for an inclusive disjunction is shown in Table 4.2.
Truth Table tasks given to participants to measure their conceptions of
p q p or q
T T T
T F T
F T T
F F F
Table 4.2: Truth Table for the inclusive disjunction ‘p or q ’ where T = true and
F = false.
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I order wine I order water I’ll order wine or water
T T T/F?
T F T/F?
F T T/F?
F F T/F?
Table 4.3: Truth Table for the disjunction rule ‘I’ll order wine or water’, where
T = true and F = false.
the conditional include the truth and falsity of the variables but leave the
rule column blank for the participant to complete, i.e. the participant decides
whether each combination of variables makes the rule true or false. This can
be given in thematic as well as abstract form, as demonstrated in Table 4.3 for
the disjunction ‘I’ll order wine or water’. By asking participants to complete
the final column we can infer how logical people are in their assessment of dis-
junctions and whether they prefer an exclusive or inclusive interpretation of the
disjunction.
Evans (1993) reviewed a set of studies that used abstract disjunctive Truth
Table tasks. He found that the not-p not-q case was always rated false, as it
should be under both exclusive and inclusive readings, but the p not-q and not-p
q cases were rated true about 80% of the time, despite both being true under
both readings. This suggests that people do not reason entirely logically with
disjunctions. As for a preference for exclusive or inclusive readings, the findings
were inconsistent. In some studies there was a clear preference for an exclusive
reading (where the p q case is rated false), in some there was a clear preference
for an inclusive reading (where the p q case is rated true) and in others there
was no clear preference (Evans, 1993).
Disjunctive Inference task
In a Disjunctive Inference task, participants are given a disjunctive rule along
with a premise about that rule, followed by a conclusion derived from the rule
and premise. The participant then assesses whether the conclusion is valid or
invalid. For example:
Rule: Either A or B
Premise: not B
Conclusion: A
There are two denial inferences and two affirmation inferences. The denial
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p q Material Conditional Biconditional
t t t t
t f f f
f t t f
f f t t
Table 4.4: Truth Table for ‘if p then q ’ where t = true and f = false.
inferences are ‘Either p or q; not p; q’ and ‘Either p or q; not q; p’. Both of
these inferences are valid under both the exclusive and inclusive readings. The
affirmation inferences are ‘Either p or q; p; not q’ and ‘Either p or q; q; not
p’. Under an exclusive reading, both affirmation inferences are valid. Under an
inclusive reading, the conclusions may or may not be true, so the inferences are
invalid (not necessarily true).
As with the Truth Table task, the Disjunctive Inference task can be given
with thematic as well as abstract content. For example, ‘My sister keeps trop-
ical fish, which are either angels or neons; they’re not angels; therefore they’re
neons’. As with the Truth Table task, this type of task can be used to assess
the extent to which participants conform to normative logic and whether they
prefer an exclusive or inclusive reading.
4.3.2 Conditional tasks
Conditional reasoning is the process of drawing conclusions from rules based
on ‘if’. As Manktelow (1999) argued, the word ‘if’ has probably sparked more
interest from psychologists, philosophers and logicians than any other word in
the English Language.
Conditional rules come in many forms, including ‘p only if q’, ‘q if p’, ‘p
if and only if q’ and the most commonly used form, ‘if p then q’. According
to formal propositional logic, each of these statements should be treated as the
material conditional except for ‘p if and only if q’, which is biconditional. Under
a material conditional reading, the rule is only proved false when p is true and
q is false. Under a biconditional reading, p implies q but q also implies p, so the
rule is false when p is false and q is true but also when p is true and q is false.
The material conditional and biconditional readings are represented in Figure
4.3 as Euler diagrams and in Figure 4.4 as Truth Tables.
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p              q
p
q
Figure 4.3: Euler diagrams to represent ‘if p then q’ under the a) material con-
ditional interpretation, where p implies q, and b) biconditional interpretation,
where p implies q and q implies p.
Wason Selection Task
The most famous task in the psychology of reasoning is the Wason Selection
Task (WST), which was designed to measure conditional reasoning. It was
developed in the 1960s and has spawned a great deal of research since, so much
so, that one journal stopped publishing any research that used it (Manktelow,
1999). Figure 4.4 displays the task. Participants are shown four cards that each
have a letter on one side and a number on the other side. Two cards are letter
side up, say A and D, and two are number side up, say 3 and 7. Participants
are asked to chose those cards, but only those cards, that they would need to
turn over in order to tell whether a rule such as ‘if there is an A on one side of
the card then there is a 3 on the other side’ is true or false. In this case, the A
and 7 cards would need to be turned over. If the A card had a not-3 number
on the other side, or if the 7 had an A on the other side, then the rule would be
falsified. However, hundreds of participants across many studies have failed to
make this choice. Most chose the A card and sometimes the 3 card too (Wason
& Johnson-Laird, 1972; Evans, 1993).
Matching bias (Evans, 1998) is commonly observed on the Wason Selection
Task (Wason, 1968). The typical response, A or A and 3, still tends to be given
even when the rule is changed from ‘if A then 3’ to ‘if A then not 3’, despite the
‘A, 3’ response then becoming logically correct. This result has been interpreted
as indicating that participants simply match the cards to the rule rather than
using any systematic reasoning strategy. Wason and Evans (1975) demonstrated
that participants showed no awareness of their bias in verbal reports, suggesting
that it is an unconscious attentional bias.
The WST has been investigated with thematic content as well as abstract
content and in many cases, this has been found to improve performance. Wason
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Each of the cards below has a letter on one side and a number on the other side. 
Select all those cards, but only those cards, which would have to be turned over 
in order to discover whether the rule is true.
Rule: If there is an A on one side of the card, there is a 3 on the other side.
A D 3 7
Figure 4.4: A Wason Selection Task example
and Shapiro (1971) gave participants the rule “every time I travel to Manchester
I travel by train”, with the cards ‘Manchester’, ‘Leeds’, ‘train’ and ‘car’. While
success on the abstract version of the task tends to be lower than 10%, in the
thematic case 10 out of 16 participants selected the correct cards: Manchester
and car. The facilitative effect of thematic content doesn’t always hold true
though, it appears only to help when the rule is deontic rather than descriptive,
i.e. conveying a rule, permission or obligation, such as ‘if a person is drinking
alcohol then they must be over 18 years of age’ or ‘if a person is on the train
then they must have a valid ticket’. It has been argued that this is because
familiar rules elicit evolutionarily developed schema, for the purposes of such
things as cheater detection (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992).
Despite its popularity the effectiveness of the WST as a measure of reasoning
has been challenged. Sperber et al. (1995) have suggested that the task doesn’t
necessarily measure conditional reasoning at all. Instead, performance is highly
influenced by relevance-guided mechanisms that pre-empt any reasoning mech-
anisms. When faced with a reasoning problem, or any other text, we first need
to comprehend the information given and this will include inferring the writer’s
intended meaning. In the case of inference tasks participants need to infer or
evaluate conclusions derived from premises, so although their interpretation of
the premises may be influenced by relevance principles, it is explicitly clear that
they must go further and engage in reasoning processes as well. In the case of
the selection task, participants are not asked to reason from premises to con-
clusions but are instead asked to judge the relevance of each of the cards to the
rule. In this case, the judgments of relevance that come from the comprehension
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p q if p then q
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
Table 4.5: Truth Table for ‘if p then q ’ where T = true and F = false.
process provide an intuitive answer to the problem and there is no explicit need
to engage in any further reasoning. This may be the source of the pervasive
matching bias.
This interpretation of the selection task was supported by six studies across
two papers (Sperber et al., 1995; Sperber & Girotto, 2002). Sperber and his
colleagues have shown that success rates in the task can be dramatically ma-
nipulated by altering the relevance factors of the content. Success in descriptive
versions of the task can be increased to over 50%, more in line with the success
rates usually found with deontic versions (Sperber et al., 1995). Furthermore,
success in deontic versions can be reduced to below 20%, similar to the rates
usually found with descriptive and abstract versions (Girotto, Kemmelmeir,
Sperber & van der Henst, 2001).
Due to this controversy, the WST was ruled out as a measure of reasoning
ability for this thesis. Had mathematics students been found to change in WST
performance alongside their mathematics study, it would be unclear whether the
change had been in conditional reasoning ability or in interpretation processes.
Truth Tables
Truth Table tasks were discussed in Section 4.3.1 as a measure of disjunctive
reasoning, but they can also be used for measuring conditional reasoning. Table
4.5 presents a Truth Table for the conditional rule ‘if p then q’. Again, each
line represents a different combination of truth and falsity of the values p and q,
and the final column denotes whether that combination makes the conditional
rule true or false. Again, Truth Table tasks can be given to participants to
complete in thematic as well as abstract form, as demonstrated in Table 4.6 for
the conditional ‘If it rains then I take an umbrella’.
By asking participants to decide which lines of the table they consider to be
valid, it is possible to determine which reading of the conditional most closely
matches their interpretation. As discussed in Section 2.2, there are at least
four ways in which people may interpret a conditional statement: material con-
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If the letter is H then the number is 5
The letter is H
Conclusion: The number is 5
Yes
No
Figure 4.5: Example Modus Ponens item from the Conditional Inference task.
ditional (that endorsed by formal propositional logic), biconditional, defect-
ive conditional and conjunctive conditional, and these differ in terms of Truth
Tables (see Table 2.2).
Conditional Inference Task
In a Conditional Inference task, participants are given a conditional rule along
with a premise about that rule, followed by a conclusion derived from the rule
and premise. The participant then deduces whether the conclusion is valid or
invalid. Alternatively, participants may generate a conclusion that they consider
to be valid, but this is far less common in the literature and so the evaluation
version is focused on here.
Figure 4.5 shows a typical conditional inference task item with a valid con-
clusion. This is an example of a Modus Ponens inference, one of four inference
types used in the task. The four inferences, modus ponens (MP), denial of the
antecedent (DA), affirmation of the consequent (AC) and modus tollens (MT)
are shown in Table 4.7, along with the four rule forms created by rotating the
presence of negations, and whether the inferences are considered valid according
to the four interpretations.
An abstract (using only letters and numbers) 32-item version of the condi-
tional inference task was used by Inglis and Simpson (2008, 2009a) to compare
mathematics and non-mathematics students’ reasoning behaviour. The task in-
it rains I take an umbrella if it rains then I take an umbrella
T T
T F
F T
F F
Table 4.6: Truth Table for the conditional rule ‘if it rains then I will take an
umbrella’, where T = true and F = false.
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If the letter is S then the number is 6
The number is not 6
Conclusion: The letter is not S
Yes
No
a) Modus tollens                                   b) Denial of the antecedent
If the letter is M then the number is 4
The letter is not M
Conclusion: The number is not 4
Yes
No
Figure 4.6: Example items from the Conditional Inference task showing a) a
Modus Tollens inference and b) a Denial of the Antecedent inference.
cluded the four inference types, each presented four times with the four different
rule forms shown in Table 4.7, which were created by varying the position of
negatives. This created 16 items, with explicit negations. In a further 16 items
the problems were identical in structure except that the negations were implicit
(e.g. ‘not 3’ might be represented as ‘6’). Figure 4.6 shows some example items
from the task.
Inglis and Simpson (2009a) found that mathematics students outperformed
non-mathematics students (based on the material conditional being the norm-
ative reading, see Section 2.3), even when the groups were matched for general
intelligence. The mathematics students did not improve in task performance
over the course of a year, but the initial difference left open two possibilities:
the mathematics students may have improved in conditional reasoning during
MP DA AC MT
Conditional Pr Con Pr Con Pr Con Pr Con
if p then q p q ¬p ¬q q p ¬q ¬p
if p then ¬q p ¬q ¬p q ¬q p q ¬p
if ¬p then q ¬p q p ¬q q ¬p ¬q p
if ¬p then ¬q ¬p ¬q p q ¬q ¬p q p
Minor Premise Type Affirmative Denial Affirmative Denial
Material Validity Valid Invalid Invalid Valid
Defective Validity Valid Invalid Invalid Invalid
Biconditional Validity Valid Valid Valid Valid
Conjunctive Validity Valid Invalid Valid Invalid
Table 4.7: The four inferences and conditional statement types with and without
negated premises (Pr) and conclusions (Con). The symbol ¬ should read ‘not’.
At the bottom, the validity of each inference under each interpretation is given.
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pre-university but post-compulsory study of mathematics, in line with the TFD,
or it could be the case that people with more normative reasoning styles are
disproportionately filtered into studying post-compulsory mathematics.
In an interview study conducted by Inglis (2012), eight stakeholders in the
mathematics community (e.g. members of the education committees of the Insti-
tute of Mathematics and its Applications and the London Mathematical Society)
were asked to look at the Conditional Inference task and rate their agreement
with the statement “This task captures some of the skills that studying ad-
vanced mathematics develops”. Of those eight participants, six strongly agreed
with the statement (five on a five-point Likert scale) and two agreed (four on
a five-point Likert scale). One participant even went as far as to say that “If
studying A-level maths doesn’t make you better at that, there is something
wrong with the syllabus”.
4.3.3 Syllogisms tasks
Syllogisms represent the oldest form of formal deductive reasoning, dating back
to the time of Aristotle over 2,000 years ago (Manktelow, 1999). They are
formed from statements of four forms: ‘All A are B’, ‘Some A are B’, ‘No A
are B’, and ‘Some A are not B’, known as A, I, E and O respectively. A and
I are affirmative while E and O are negative, and A and E are universal while
I and O are particular. A syllogism such as ‘All A are B; All B are C; All A
are C’ is an example of an AAA structure. In all syllogisms, the conclusion
will describe a relationship between the first and last terms of the premises, in
this case, A and C. It is possible to construct 512 different syllogisms, but the
amount to be considered valid has not been agreed upon: figures range widely,
between 14 and 48 (Manktelow, 1999). Human interpretation of syllogisms has
been investigated widely, using both abstract and contextual tasks.
Belief Bias Syllogisms Task
A commonly used task is the Belief Bias Syllogisms Task (Sa´ et al., 1999). In
this task, participants see 24 syllogisms, 12 of which are valid and 12 of which
are invalid, and they are asked to decide which is which. However, the syllogisms
are made to be either believable, unbelievable or belief-neutral (there are 8 of
each type, 4 of which are valid and 4 of which are invalid, examples of each type
are given in Figure 4.7), and so it is possible to determine the extent to which
participants are persuaded by belief and by logic (participants are instructed
to put their beliefs to one side and reason logically, but this can be difficult to
do). For example, in a valid syllogism with unbelievable content, such as ‘All
things that are smoked are good for the health; cigarettes are smoked; therefore
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Unbelievable, valid:
Premises: All things with four legs are dangerous.
Poodles are not dangerous.
Conclusion: Poodles do not have four legs.
Unbelievable, invalid:
Premises: All guns are dangerous.
Rattlesnakes are dangerous.
Conclusion: Rattlesnakes are guns.
Believable, valid:
Premises: All !sh can swim.
Tuna are !sh.
Conclusion: Tuna can swim.
Believable, invalid:
Premises: All living things need water.
Roses need water.
Conclusion: Roses are living things.
Neutral, valid:
Premises: All ramadions taste delicious.
Gumthorps are ramadions.
Conclusion: Gumthorps taste delicious.
Neutral, invalid:
Premises: All lapitars wear clothes.
Podips wear clothes.
Conclusion: Podips are lapitars.
Figure 4.7: Example items from the Belief Bias Syllogisms task.
cigarettes are good for the health’ a person who can overcome their prior belief
and reason with logic would be more likely to accept the syllogism as valid than
someone who is more greatly swayed by their beliefs than by the instruction
to ignore them. What the Belief Bias Syllogisms task provides, therefore, is a
measure of participants’ ability to reason independently of their prior beliefs.
This is considered a central component of critical thinking (Sa´ et al., 1999; West
et al., 2008).
There are two measures that can be taken from the Belief Bias Syllogisms
task: total score, reflecting syllogistic reasoning ability across item-type, and a
Belief Bias Index (BBI), which is the total number of consistent items endorsed
(valid-believable, invalid-unbelievable) minus the total number of inconsistent
items endorsed (valid-unbelievable, invalid-believable) and reflects participants’
ability to reason based on logical validity over believability.
A great deal of research has been conducted with the Belief Bias Syllogisms
task, and there are three main findings: valid items are accepted more often than
invalid items, believable items are accepted more often than unbelievable items,
and believability and validity interact (Manktelow, 1999). Evans et al. (1983)
found that valid items were accepted more often than not whether they were
believable or unbelievable, but that invalid items were only accepted less often
than not when they were unbelievable; believable invalid items were incorrectly
accepted 66% of the time. This suggests that when a syllogism is easily believed,
people tend to accept it without further thought. Evans et al. (1983) suggested
a selective scrutiny model to account for the finding. The idea is that people
initially reason with a heuristic that tells them to accept believable items straight
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away. Only unbelievable items are subjected to further scrutiny with deliberate
and conscious Type 2 processing.
4.4 Summary
It should be clear by now that there are many tasks that have been used to
measure various aspects of human reasoning. It is simply not possible to use all
of these tasks in a research study and still expect to find willing participants. In
particular, the longitudinal studies presented in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis
were carried out during school and university classes, and so the measures used
needed to fit into the length of a standard class (50 minutes). To allow time for
covariates to be measured as well as reasoning ability, it was decided that just
two of the many reasoning tasks discussed above should be selected.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate changes in reasoning behaviour in
mathematics compared to non-mathematics students, and to investigate pos-
sible mechanisms for any changes found. It has been suggested that conditional
reasoning is central to logical reasoning (Anderson & Belnap, 1975; Braine, 1978;
Inglis & Simpson, 2008) and also to mathematics (Houston, 2009). Houston
(2009) argued that most mathematical statements are of the form ‘if statement
A is true, then statement B is true’, even if they are heavily disguised (p. 63).
For this reason, conditional reasoning may be a useful place to begin in the in-
vestigation of reasoning skills in mathematics students. However, as seen above,
there are three main tasks that have been used to measure conditional reason-
ing skills: the Wason Selection Task, Truth Table tasks, and the Conditional
Inference task.
The findings discussed in Section 4.3.2 suggest that the Conditional Inference
task would be the most appropriate measure of conditional reasoning to use in
this thesis. Firstly, the task has been widely used and is widely respected in
the psychology of reasoning literature (it is free from the type of criticisms
that have been levied against the Selection Task, e.g. Sperber et al., 1995).
Secondly, it measures an aspect of reasoning on which mathematics and non-
mathematics students have already been found to differ (Inglis & Simpson, 2008,
2009a). Thirdly, it would allow me to differentiate between the two hypotheses
left open by Inglis and Simpson (2009a): the development hypothesis and the
filtering hypothesis. Finally, it was considered by a group of stakeholders in
the mathematics education community to be a good measure of the skills that
studying mathematics develops (Inglis, 2012).
In addition to the Conditional Inference task, including the Belief Bias Syl-
logisms task as a measure of reasoning in this thesis allowed me to broaden the
scope of the work in two ways: by measuring syllogistic reasoning ability as well
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as conditional reasoning ability, and by measuring reasoning with thematic con-
tent as well as reasoning with abstract material. The Belief Bias Syllogisms task
provides measures of syllogistic reasoning ability and the extent to which people
are able to reason with logic over beliefs, and this is an important component
of critical thinking (Sa´ et al., 1999; West et al., 2008).
Recall the quote from the Smith (2004) report that studying mathematics
“develops logical and critical reasoning, and develops analytical and problem-
solving skills to a high degree” (p. 11.). The Conditional Inference task relates
to the logic aspect of this quote, while the Belief Bias Syllogisms task relates to
the critical thinking aspect.
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Chapter 5
The development of
reasoning skills in AS level
mathematics students
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Testing the Theory of Formal Discipline
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the Theory of Formal Discipline (TFD)
claim that studying mathematics improves reasoning skills. The two main re-
search questions are (a) is studying mathematics at advanced levels associated
with improvement in reasoning skills and (b) if there is improvement, what
might its mechanism be? Some light will be shed upon both of these issues in
the current chapter, although that is not to say that both will be conclusively
resolved.
The TFD suggests that studying mathematics improves one’s logical reas-
oning and critical thinking skills. This belief is held by philosophers (Locke,
1971/1706; Plato, 2003/375B.C), mathematicians (Amitsur, 1998; Oakley, 1949),
and policymakers (Smith, 2004; Walport, 2010) alike. As of yet, however, em-
pirical evidence that supports the TFD is remarkably sparse. There is mixed
evidence as to whether thinking skills can be transferred at all (see Chapter 2
for a review of the evidence), and although there is evidence of better reasoning
skills from those who have studied mathematics at advanced levels than those
who have not (Inglis & Simpson, 2009a), there is no evidence of reasoning skills
developing alongside mathematical study. The study presented here investig-
ated whether studying mathematics at AS level (the first year of an A level)
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is associated with greater improvement in logical reasoning and critical think-
ing skills than studying English literature. Improvement in reasoning skills is
defined as reasoning that is closer to the relevant normative model, as discussed
in Chapter 2 (Stanovich, 1999).
The measures of logical reasoning and critical thinking that I will use are
the Conditional Inference and Belief Bias Syllogisms tasks, respectively. The
reasons for this were elaborated in Chapter 4, but briefly, conditional reasoning
is considered central to logical reasoning (Anderson & Belnap, 1975; Braine,
1978; Inglis & Simpson, 2008), and the ability to decouple one’s prior beliefs
from logical validity is considered to be a part of critical thinking (Facione, 1990;
Sa´ et al., 1999; West et al., 2008).
If it is found that studying mathematics is indeed associated with greater im-
provement in reasoning skills than studying English literature, it would beg the
question of what the mechanism for such an improvement could be. Stanovich’s
(2009a) tripartite model was introduced in the literature review as a starting
point for identifying potential mechanisms for improvement in reasoning skills.
The tripartite model is an extension of dual-process models of reasoning which
propose fast and automatic Type 1 processes and slow and deliberate Type 2
processes (Evans, 2003). In the tripartite model Type 2 processing is said to
occur at two levels – the algorithmic and reflective levels. The algorithmic level
is the computational element to Type 2 processing – the capacity available for
effortful processing and the efficiency with which effortful processing can occur.
The reflective level is the dispositional element – the processing that regulates
when and to what extent the algorithmic level will be used as opposed to Type
1 processing.
It is possible that improvement in reasoning skills could be brought about by
changes to any of these three types of processes. Studying mathematics could
alter the Type 1 processes that focus our attention on certain aspects of a prob-
lem. Alternatively it could improve algorithmic level capacity for or efficiency
of effortful reasoning. Finally, it could be that studying mathematics alters
the reflective level making the reasoner more willing to put effort into thinking.
Alternatively to domain-general factors, a source of improvement in reasoning
could be what Stanovich (2009a) termed “mindware”. Mindware consists of
domain-specific knowledge, rules and procedures that can be explicitly recalled
from memory to aid in solving specific problems, rather than being useful for
reasoning more generally. Perhaps knowledge, rules or procedures are taught in
mathematics that assist reasoners when solving certain types of tasks.
Type 1 processing is best studied by reaction time or time-limited accuracy
measures due to their speed and automaticity (Gillard, 2009; Evans & Curtis-
Holmes, 2005). Such methods allow initial responses to be isolated from later
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responses that are based on Type 2 processing, but they require computer-
based administration and as such were not suitable for the study reported in
this chapter (where measures were all administered on paper in schools). In-
stead, the role of Type 1 processing in the differences between mathematicians’
and non-mathematicians’ reasoning behaviour is explored in Chapter 8. Here,
the algorithmic and reflective levels of Type 2 processing are investigated as
potential mechanisms for improvement in reasoning skills.
The algorithmic level can be assessed via measures of intelligence and exec-
utive functions, which reflect cognitive capacity and efficiency. The relationship
between executive functions and reasoning skills is investigated separately in
Chapter 9, while intelligence is considered here. If studying mathematics is as-
sociated with improved reasoning skills due to an increase in the capacity for
Type 2 processing then this may be reflected in an increased score on intelligence
tests. A subset of items from Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM,
Raven et al., 1998) were included as a measure of intelligence in the main study
presented below to allow for such a mechanism to be identified. As noted in
Chapter 2, RAPM is a non-verbal pattern completion task that is thought to be
the best single measure of general intelligence (Jensen, 1998). A time-limited
subset of items selected for a student population has been shown to have an ac-
ceptable split-half reliability of .79 (Stanovich & Cunningham, 1992). This also
allowed between-groups differences in intelligence at Time 1 to be controlled for
(see the discussion on quasi-experimental methods in Chapter 3).
The reflective level of cognition is assessed by measures of thinking dispos-
ition, such as the Actively Open-minded Thinking scale (AOT, Stanovich &
West, 1997), the Need for Cognition scale (NFC, Cacioppo et al., 1984) and
the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005). The Cognitive Reflection
Test, introduced in Chapter 2, poses three questions which prompt intuitive but
incorrect responses. Participants need to inhibit these responses in order to an-
swer correctly. Recently, Toplak et al. (2011) demonstrated that the CRT was
a better predictor of normative reasoning than intelligence, executive functions,
or the AOT. This suggests two things: firstly, if studying mathematics is asso-
ciated with more normative reasoning, then changes to the reflective level may
be a more likely mechanism than changes to the algorithmic level, and secondly,
the reflective level may be better tapped by performance measures (e.g. the
CRT) than self-report measures (e.g. the AOT and NFC scales). Here, the
reflective level will be measured with two tasks: the CRT, and the NFC scale.
The NFC scale was not included in Toplak et al.’s (2011) assessment and it may
provide additional predictive power.
As of yet, there is no suggestion of what the nature of any mathematical
mindware responsible for improvement might be, so a starting point is to simply
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look at the effect of subject studied (mathematics or non-mathematics) and
whether this predicts improvement independently of domain-general factors.
If domain general factors are not found to be predictors, then mathematical
mindware is a remaining possibility.
As a side point, if mathematics develops reasoning skills via domain-general
mechanisms then we might expect a wide-spread improvement in reasoning per-
formance. If, on the other hand, mathematics provides some specific mindware,
we might expect improvement on only a small set of reasoning tasks for which
the mindware is relevant. There will not be enough reasoning measures to test
this hypothesis thoroughly here, but perhaps proponents of the TFD would
hope for domain-general changes to be responsible for any improvements so
that mathematics could be said to have a more useful, widespread influence on
thinking skills.
5.1.2 Summary
There are two research questions addressed in this chapter: (a) is studying math-
ematics at advanced levels associated with improvement in reasoning skills? and
(b) if there is such improvement, what might the mechanisms behind it be?
These questions are addressed with a longitudinal study, in which mathemat-
ics AS level students are compared to English literature AS level students for
development in logical reasoning and critical thinking skills. The participants
were tested twice, at the beginning and end of their AS year of study.
The Conditional Inference Task was used as a measure of logical reason-
ing skills and the Belief Bias Syllogisms task was used as a measure of one
aspect of critical thinking. Measures of intelligence (RAPM) and thinking dis-
position (CRT and NFC) were included to indicate whether domain-general
factors at the algorithmic or reflective levels of cognition (Stanovich, 2009a)
were the mechanisms for any development found. These measures also allowed
pre-existing differences between the groups, which are likely to exist due to the
quasi-experimental design (see Chapter 3), to be statistically controlled for. Fi-
nally, a mathematics test was used as manipulation check (to confirm that the
mathematics students did learn more mathematics than the English literature
students).
Before describing the longitudinal study in more detail, three pilot studies
are presented. The first tested whether the Belief Bias Syllogisms task could be
split in half in order to save testing time. The second investigated whether the
CRT could be imbedded in mathematical word problems, for the sake of making
the ‘trick’ nature of the questions less memorable without altering the way that
participants respond to them. The final pilot study assessed the duration and
87
difficulty of the selected measures to ensure suitability for the study.
5.2 Pilot Studies
5.2.1 Pilot 1: Splitting the syllogisms task
In the Belief Bias Syllogisms task, 24 syllogisms are presented in a contextualised
format (Sa´ et al., 1999; see also Chapter 4). In eight of the syllogisms, prior belief
and validity are in accordance (four believable-valid, four unbelievable-invalid),
in another eight they are in conflict (four believable-invalid, four unbelievable-
valid), and in the final eight the context is neutral (four neutral-valid, four
neutral-invalid). This creates four problems for each of six believability-logic
combinations (see Figure 5.1 for an example of each type). Two of each of these
four make positive (P, Q) statements, and two of the four make negative (not-P,
not-Q) statements. Therefore, there are twelve combinations of believability,
validity and valence. Two problems for each of these combinations makes the
total of 24 items. Because there are two problems of each form, the test can be
split in half and still cover all combinations to give a full measure of belief bias.
The test could be split in this way so that half of the problems could be
given to participants at Time 1 and the other half at Time 2 (with the order
counterbalanced by school), to reduce repeat testing effects and testing time.
This method means that any difference between the two halves in terms of
believability could cause misleading gains or losses in belief bias between the
two time points. Therefore, a pilot study was required to determine whether
Unbelievable, valid:
Premises: All things with four legs are dangerous.
Poodles are not dangerous.
Conclusion: Poodles do not have four legs.
Unbelievable, invalid:
Premises: All guns are dangerous.
Rattlesnakes are dangerous.
Conclusion: Rattlesnakes are guns.
Believable, valid:
Premises: All !sh can swim.
Tuna are !sh.
Conclusion: Tuna can swim.
Believable, invalid:
Premises: All living things need water.
Roses need water.
Conclusion: Roses are living things.
Neutral, valid:
Premises: All ramadions taste delicious.
Gumthorps are ramadions.
Conclusion: Gumthorps taste delicious.
Neutral, invalid:
Premises: All lapitars wear clothes.
Podips wear clothes.
Conclusion: Podips are lapitars.
Figure 5.1: Example items from the Belief Bias Syllogisms task.
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any such differences did exist. In the pilot study the conclusions from each
problem, which are where the believability/validity conflicts lie, were rated by
participants in terms of how believable they were. The problems of the same
format from each half of the test (e.g. the believable problems from Half 1 and
Half 2) were then compared for believability ratings.
Methods
Participants Fifty-eight participants (38 male, aged 19-23, M =20.12) were re-
cruited by email through a mathematics module tutor and took part unpaid
during a larger online study. All participants were undergraduate mathematics
and engineering students at Loughborough University.
Procedure Participants took part during an unrelated online study about
their degree course study choices (see Inglis, Palipana, Trenholm & Ward, 2011).
After completing all sections relevant to their study choices, they were asked
to complete a section on the believability of sentences. The instructions read:
“Below is a list of sentences. Some of the sentences will be completely believable,
some will be completely unbelievable, some will be roughly in the middle, and
some will be meaningless. Your task is to decide which is which”.
Below the instructions, on the same page, the 24 conclusions from the Belief
Bias Syllogisms task (see Appendix C) were presented in a set order, alternating
between Half 1 conclusions and Half 2 conclusions. Next to each sentence was
a 5 point scale with the options ‘Very unbelievable’, ‘Moderately unbelievable’,
‘Neither believable nor unbelievable’, ‘Moderately believable’, and ‘Very believ-
able’. Participants rated each statement on the scale before submitting their
answers.
Results
The 24 syllogism conclusions fell into six categories for the analysis: Half 1
unbelievable (H1U), half 1 neutral (H1N), half 1 believable (H1B), half 2 un-
believable (H2U), half 2 neutral (H2N), and half 2 believable (H2B). The aim
of the analysis was to test for differences between test halves on believability
ratings of each item type, i.e, are H1U conclusions rated differently to H2U
conclusions?
Participants’ mean responses are shown in Figure 5.2. A 2 (test half: 1
or 2) × 3 (intended believability: unbelievable, neutral, believable) repeated
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with believability ratings
as the dependent variable. There was a significant main effect of intended
believability on believability ratings, F(2, 114) = 323.2, p < .001, ηp
2 = .85.
Post hoc tests showed that believable items were rated as significantly more
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Figure 5.2: Believability ratings for each problem type by test half (error bars
represent ±1 SE of the mean).
believable (M = 4.14, SD = 0.50) than neutral items (M = 2.90, SD = 0.57),
which in turn were rated as significantly more believable than unbelievable items
(M = 1.50, SD = 0.51). There was no significant main effect of test-half,
meaning that there was no evidence of the two halves of the test differing in
believability. Importantly, there was also no significant interaction between
half and believability (p = .20, ηp
2 = .03). H1U (M = 1.49, SD = 0.57), H1B
(M = 4.05, SD = 0.69) and H1N (M = 2.91, SD = 0.59) conclusions were rated
similarly to H2U (M = 1.54, SD = 0.58), H2B (M = 4.22, SD = 0.55) and H2N
(M = 2.90, SD = 0.58) conclusions, respectively, so there was no evidence that
conclusions in each test half that had the same intended believability status
differed in rated believability (see Figure 5.2).
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Discussion and Implications
There are three findings from this study: 1) each half of the test can be assumed
to be equally believable (at least, there was no evidence of a difference), 2)
problems of the same intended believability in each half can be assumed to be
equally believable (again, insofar as there was no evidence of a difference), and 3)
the intended believability of problems over the test as a whole are in accordance
with participants’ perceptions of believability. All three of these outcomes are
positive for the use of different halves of the test at different time points. The
results suggest that a participant would show consistent extents of belief bias
in each half of the test, and any difference over time found in the longitudinal
study will not be due to a difference in the items used but due to a genuine
difference in the participants’ susceptibility to belief bias.
5.2.2 Pilot 2: Disguising the Cognitive Reflection Test
To the best of my knowledge, the CRT has not been used in any longitudinal
studies before now. A particular concern is that the ‘trick’ nature of the ques-
tions might make them more memorable than other measures at post-test and
that this will affect the way in which participants (at least those who inhibited
their intuitive response and are thus aware of the ‘trick’) respond to them.
An attempt to address this issue was to mix the CRT questions in with
non-trick mathematical word problems, so that the trick might be less salient
at repeated testing points. However, it is possible that this could alter the test
properties in some way, perhaps meaning participants no longer process the
CRT questions in the way they otherwise would have. The aim of the pilot study
reported here was to assess whether this was the case. Participants either saw
the three CRT questions followed by the three non-trick problems or they saw
the six items in a random order. The three non-trick questions, shown in Figure
5.3, were taken from the Woodcock-Johnson III Applied Problems subtest and
were selected for being mathematically simple and of a similar length to the
CRT questions. If mixing the questions does not alter the test properties then
scores should not significantly vary between groups.
Method
Participants Participants were recruited, without payment, through websites
that advertise internet based research studies where they saw a brief description
and could open the study webpage. Fifty-four participants completed all six
questions and were included in the analysis. The participants were aged 18-
59 (M =29.60, SD=10.40), and 23 were male and 31 were female. Twenty-
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1. If a girl saved £1 each week for 1 year, how much money would she have at the 
end of that year?
2. If a dog can run two and a quarter miles in one hour, how long would it take the 
dog to run four and a half miles at that same rate?
3. Mileage varies from car to car. Judy's car gets 22 miles to a gallon of gas, and 
Bob gets 35 miles to a gallon of gas. How many miles can Judy drive on six gallons 
of gas?
Answers: Q1 = £52, Q2 = 2 hours, Q3 = 132 miles
Figure 5.3: The three items from the Woodcock Johnson III Applied Problems
subtest that were used in Pilot Study 2.
seven were randomly allocated to the mixed condition and 27 to the non-mixed
condition when they opened the webpage.
Procedure Participants first saw a page providing information about the
study. They were told that if they took part they would be asked to answer six
arithmetic word problems which would take no more than 10 minutes. They
were also told that their data would be kept confidential and used for research
purposes only. They were asked to select whether they wanted to seriously
participate or just browse the pages before continuing to the study, and only
those who wanted to seriously participate were included in the analysis.
Next they were asked to report their sex, age, degree subject (if applicable),
and whether their native language was English or non-English. The six questions
were each presented on a separate page and required participants to type their
answer into a blank response box. In the mixed condition, the six questions
were presented in a random order. In the non-mixed condition, the three CRT
questions were presented first in a random order, followed by the three non-
trick questions in a random order. Finally, participants were thanked for their
participation and given my email address in case they wanted to request further
information or to withdraw their data (none did).
Results
Two Mann-Whitney U tests were used to compare performance across the two
conditions: one analysing number of correct responses to the three CRT ques-
tions, and one analysing number of intuitive responses (it is possible, but rare,
to give a non-intuitive but incorrect response meaning that these measures are
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Figure 5.4: Mean number of intuitive responses in the mixed and non-mixed
conditions (error bars represent ±1 SE of the mean).
not exact inverses of each other).
Number of correct responses were not significantly different in the mixed
(M =2.00, SD=0.73) and non-mixed groups (M =1.93, SD=1.07), U (54)=358.0,
z = −.12, p=.904, r = 0.02. Similarly, number of intuitive responses were not
significantly different in the mixed (M =0.89, SD=0.70) and non-mixed groups
(M =0.81, SD=1.04), U (54)=417.00, z = −.98, p=.325, r = 0.13, see Figure
5.4.
Discussion and Implications
The aim of this pilot study was to assess whether inter-mixing the three CRT
questions with three non-trick questions would affect the way in which parti-
cipants respond to the CRT questions. There was no evidence that this was
the case. Neither the number of correct responses nor the number of intuit-
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ive responses given to the CRT questions significantly differed when they were
inter-mixed with non-trick questions compared to when they were seen first.
One thing this result suggests is that the reflective level determines on an
item-by-item basis whether the algorithmic level should be used. It is not the
case that answering an item with no intuitive answer which thus requires al-
gorithmic level processing (any of the Woodcock-Johnson questions) sets the
reflective level to a ‘use algorithmic processing’ mindset. If this were the case
the presence of an item that requires algorithmic processing should mean that
the intuitive answer is inhibited for subsequent CRT questions, which was not
the case here. This fits with the established finding that participants do not
tend to get all CRT questions right or wrong, rather they may get one or two
right and give the intuitive responses to the rest (Frederick, 2005).
Returning to the purpose of this pilot study, the results indicate that the
three CRT questions and three Woodcock-Johnson questions can be randomly
inter-mixed in the longitudinal study without affecting the way participants re-
spond to the CRT questions, which are the real measure (responses to Woodcock-
Johnson questions will not be analysed). The Woodcock-Johnson questions ap-
pear to be simple enough as to not influence the reflective level in a task-general
manner. It is hoped that their inclusion will reduce repeat-testing effects on
CRT performance.
5.2.3 Pilot 3: Duration and difficulty of measures
There were several measures selected for the longitudinal study reported below
for which the average completion time was unknown. In order to plan an appro-
priate time slot(s) with schools, a pilot study was conducted to determine the
total session duration required. Five undergraduate mathematics students were
recruited to complete the entire set of tasks (demographics, the RAPM subset,
the Conditional Inference Task, the Belief Bias Syllogisms task, the CRT, the
Need for Cognition scale, and a mathematics task). The aim was to record the
duration of each individual measure and the overall duration of the test for each
participant, so that an average duration could be derived. A further aim was
to assess whether the measures being used were of an appropriate difficulty and
whether the instructions for each measure were clear to participants unfamiliar
with the tasks.
Methods
Participants The participants were five undergraduate mathematics students
(one male, four females), aged 19 to 51 (M =25.80, SD=14.10) who took part
in return for £15 each. Recruitment was through an email advertisement to
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the students on a differential equations module for first and second year under-
graduates. This sample was assumed to be of a higher general ability than the
AS level students of the longitudinal study, although not greatly. Presumably it
tends to be the most able AS level students who go on to degree level study, so
the undergraduate sample here may be similar to the more capable students in
the AS level sample. The implication of this is that the scores found here may
be slightly higher than in the AS level sample, and so any floor effects found
should be of particular concern.
Procedure. Participants were informed that they would be given a test book
to complete. They were told that the aim of the study was to determine the
length of the test, which would be used in a large scale study in the future. They
were then asked to sign a consent form before taking part. Two participants
took part simultaneously but working alone, and three took part individually.
All testing took place in a quiet seminar room.
Participants were asked to work through the booklet at their own pace,
informing the experimenter when they reached the end of a section and began
the next section. The sections were presented in a set order for all participants.
After they had completed the booklet, participants were asked whether any part
of the test was unclear, too easy or too difficult, and whether they had any other
comments. They were then thanked, paid and dismissed.
Results
The first section of the results will deal with the length of the measures, the
second section will deal with the range of scores obtained, and the final section
will discuss the participants’ comments on the clarity of the tasks.
Duration. Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the length of time
taken for each measure. The mean total duration was 45.40 minutes with a
standard deviation of 11.63 minutes. However, the total duration data is posit-
ively skewed (2.13) with four of the data points in the range 39-43 minutes and
one data point of 66 minutes. Therefore, four of the five participants completed
the test faster than the average time of 45.4 minutes.
The RAPM section of the test has a time limit of 15 minutes. However, it
can be seen from the table that some participants finished more quickly than
this.
Scores. Mean scores were examined to indicate whether any of the tasks
suffered from floor or ceiling effects. Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics
for the scores obtained on each measure as well as the theoretical minimum and
maximum scores. The CRT scores were not examined because the participants
had recently been exposed to the task as part of another study. As the table
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Measure Mean SD Min Max
Demographics 2.2 1.64 1 5
Raven’s Matrices 14.0 1.73 11 15
Conditional Inference 10.6 3.13 8 16
Belief Bias Syllogisms 3.8 1.3 3 6
Cognitive Reflection Test 1.2 0.45 1 2
Need For Cognition 3.2 1.79 2 6
Mathematics 10.4 3.64 7 16
Total 45.4 11.63 39 66
Table 5.1: Duration information for each measure used in the test book (units
are in minutes).
shows, none of the mean task scores were at, or approaching, the theoretical
minimum or maximum scores, with the possible exception of the Belief Bias
Syllogisms task approaching the theoretical maximum.
Additional comments. All five participants commented that the Conditional
Inference Task was not completely clear on first reading of the instructions, al-
though they did find that it became clear as they began to complete it (discussed
below).
Discussion and implications
The results of the pilot test have shown that (a) the average duration of the
entire test is 45 minutes, with the majority of participants finishing in less
time, (b) the measures are at ceiling in some individuals but not on average,
and (c) there was one issue noted by the participants; the instructions for the
Conditional Inference Task.
The length of time taken means that the whole test can be completed within
one school lesson, which are usually 50-60 minutes in length. Requiring only
Measure Mean(SD) Min Observed Max Observed
Possible Min Possible Max
Raven’s Matrices 11.40(3.78) 0 8 18 16
Conditionals 22.40(7.23) 0 15 32 32
Syllogisms 10.60(1.67) 0 8 12 12
NFC 5.47(1.09) 0 4.56 9 7.33
Mathematics 10.20(2.49) 0 7 15 12
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for each measure used in the test book (standard
deviations in parentheses).
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one session will reduce the demand on teachers’ and participants’ time. On the
other hand, it is evident from the one participant who took 66 minutes that
some individuals may take longer than one lesson’s worth of time, in which case
they will either need to leave the test incomplete, stay after the lesson to finish,
or continue at another time. This is something that can be decided with the
input of the teachers concerned.
With reference to the second part of the results, the scores obtained were
only problematic for the Belief Bias Syllogisms task, where there is a slight
ceiling effect. It is worth re-emphasising that the participants in this pilot are
educationally more advanced than the participants of the main study reported
below. The main study will use participants from the beginning to the end of
their AS year of study, whereas the participants here were at the end of their
first or second year of undergraduate mathematics degrees, so it can be expected
that they would perform higher on achievement tests than the majority of the
main study participants will. Therefore, all of the measures piloted here are
expected to provide enough variation to detect improvements over the course of
an AS level.
It was noted by all participants that the Conditional Inference Task instruc-
tions were not completely clear. However, none of the participants could suggest
how the instructions might be clarified even once they had completed the test
and reported that they did understand it. This may reflect the unavoidably
complicated nature of the task, since it is not something that is usually en-
countered in day-to-day life. The instructions used were adapted from Evans,
Clibbens & Rood (1995), who did not report any similar issues in their large
scale use of the measure. In the interest of consistency with published research,
the instructions will be made identical to those used by Evans, Clibbens & Rood
for the main study, and it is expected that even if the participants find the in-
structions complicated in isolation, the task will become clear once they start.
An experimenter will always be present when participants complete these tasks,
so there will be the opportunity to ask for clarification if necessary.
In sum, the pilot study described here has not raised any problems that
require the measures selected to be altered or substituted.
5.2.4 Summary
Three pilot studies have been presented that assessed various aspects of the
measures selected for the main study, and each has provided positive results.
Next, the main study itself is presented.
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5.3 Main study
To recap, there were two research questions for the main study:
1. Is studying mathematics at AS level associated with improvement in reas-
oning skills?
2. If there is such improvement, what might the mechanisms behind it be?
5.3.1 Method
Design
The study followed a longitudinal quasi-experimental design. Participants were
recruited after they had chosen their AS level subjects and were tested at the
beginning (during the first term and as close to the start of term as possible)
and end (after teaching had finished) of their AS year of study. They completed
the same set of tasks at both time points (with the exception of the Belief Bias
Syllogisms task as described in Pilot 1).
Participants
One hundred and twenty four participants were recruited from five schools in
Leicestershire, Hampshire and Derbyshire, UK. Seventy-seven were studying
AS level mathematics or further mathematics amongst any other subjects and
forty-seven were studying AS English literature and not mathematics. The
English literature students served as a comparison group. Participants and
their parents/guardians gave written informed consent.
Of the original sample, 44 of the mathematics students and 38 of the English
literature students took part at both time points. There were no differences on
any of the Time 1 measures between those who returned and those who did
not (ps> .15). The mathematics group was composed of 21 females and 23
males and the English group was composed of 23 females and 15 males. Eighty
participants reported their first language as English, one reported both Gujarati
and English, and one did not report their first language. Four participants in the
mathematics group reported having been diagnosed with dyslexia and two in
the English group reported that they suspected having dyslexia. None reported
having dyscalculia or any other relevant disabilities.
Participants also reported their GCSE (General Certificate of Secondary
Education, end of compulsory education exams) grades. From this, a prior
attainment score was calculated for each participant to be used as covariate in
the analyses reported below. This was the sum of the grades achieved, with an
A* being scored 8, an A being scored 7, a B scored 6 and so on. Scores were
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summed rather than averaged to take account of the variation in the number of
GCSEs taken – a student who achieved 10 GCSEs at grade A could be said to
have a higher attainment level than a student who achieved 9 GCSEs at grade
A, for example. Of those who studied AS level mathematics, 25 had achieved
an A* at GCSE mathematics, 15 achieved an A, 3 achieved a B and 1 did not
report their grade. Of those studying English literature, there were 5 A*s in
GCSE mathematics, 6 As, 14 Bs, 11 Cs, 1 D and 1 E.
Mathematics Syllabus
There are three different versions of the AS level mathematics course available
to students in England and Wales, which all have similar content. The syllabus
contains sections on algebra, coordinate geometry, introductory calculus, tri-
gonometry, probability, mathematical modelling, kinematics, Newtons laws of
motion, and forces (e.g., Assessment and Qualifications Alliance, 2011), among
other topics. The course is considered by some to be fairly basic and not ad-
equate preparation for university-level mathematics study (e.g. Lawson, 1997,
2003), and most importantly, students are not taught any proof-based mathem-
atics, nor the definition of the conditional. This was confirmed with an analysis
of every AS-level mathematics examination between 2009 and 2011. Of 929
questions set, only one contained an explicit ‘if then’ sentence, and there were
no mentions of the terms ‘modus ponens’, ‘modus tollens’ or ‘conditional’.
Measures
Conditional Inference. Participants completed the standard 32 item Conditional
Inference Task (Evans et al., 1995), consisting of eight items each of four infer-
ence types: modus ponens (MP), denial of the antecedent (DA), affirmation of
the consequent (AC) and modus tollens (MT). Half of the items used explicit
negations (e.g. “not 5”) and half used implicit negations (e.g. “not 5” represen-
ted as, for example, 6). The inference types used are summarised in Table 5.3
and the full measure is presented in Appendix B.
The lexical content was generated randomly and the items were presented
in a random order for each participant. Participants decided whether each item
was valid (i.e. the conclusion necessarily followed, assuming that the premises
were true) or invalid.
Six measures were taken:
1. A material conditional index (MCI, number of answers out of 32 consist-
ent with the material interpretation), which was calculated as: number
of MP inferences endorsed + (8−number of DA inferences endorsed) +
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(8−number of AC inferences endorsed) + number of MT inferences en-
dorsed.
2. A defective conditional index (DCI, number of answers out of 32 consist-
ent with the defective interpretation), which was calculated as: number
of MP inferences endorsed + (8−number of DA inferences endorsed) +
(8−number of AC inferences endorsed) + (8−number of MT inferences
endorsed).
3. A biconditional index (BCI, number of answers out of 32 consistent with
the biconditional interpretation), which was calculated as: number of MP
inferences endorsed + number of DA inferences endorsed + number of AC
inferences endorsed + number of MT inferences endorsed.
4. A conjunctive conditional index (CCI, number of answers out of 32 consist-
ent with the conjunctive interpretation), which was calculated as: num-
ber of MP inferences endorsed + (8−number of DA inferences endorsed)
+ number of AC inferences endorsed + (8−number of MT inferences en-
dorsed).
5. A negative conclusion index (NCI), which was calculated as the number
of inferences endorsed on arguments with negative conclusions minus the
number of inferences endorsed on arguments with affirmative conclusions.
6. An affirmative premise index (API), which was calculated as the number
of inferences endorsed on arguments with affirmative premises minus the
number of inferences endorsed on arguments with negative premises.
The instructions given were identical to those used by Evans et al. (1995).
An example item is shown in Figure 5.5.
Syllogisms. The Belief Bias Syllogisms task (presented in full in Appendix
C) was used as a measure of the ability to reason independently of prior be-
liefs (Evans et al., 1983; Markovits & Nantel, 1989; Sa´ et al., 1999). The
MP DA AC MT
Conditional Pr Con Pr Con Pr Con Pr Con
if p then q p q ¬p ¬q q p ¬q ¬p
if p then ¬q p ¬q ¬p q ¬q p q ¬p
if ¬p then q ¬p q p ¬q q ¬p ¬q p
if ¬p then ¬q ¬p ¬q p q ¬q ¬p q p
Table 5.3: The four inferences and conditional statement types with and without
negated premises (Pr) and conclusions (Con). The symbol ¬ should read ‘not’.
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If the letter is H then the number is 5
The letter is H
Conclusion: The number is 5
Yes
No
Figure 5.5: Example item from the Conditional Inference Task.
task consisted of 12 contextualised syllogisms, four congruent (believable-valid,
unbelievable-invalid), four incongruent (believable-invalid, unbelievable-valid)
and four neutral (example items are shown in Figure 5.1). Participants decided
whether each syllogism was logically valid or not after being instructed to ignore
their prior beliefs. Two measures were taken: a total score out of 12, indicating
syllogistic reasoning ability, and a Belief Bias Index. A Belief Bias Index is
calculated for each participant by subtracting the number of incongruent items
answered correctly from the number of congruent items answered correctly. The
resulting score indicates the degree to which a person’s answers are swayed by
believability or validity. The Belief Bias Index can range from -4 to +4 with
positive scores indicating some degree of belief bias.
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM). An 18 item subset of RAPM
(see Appendix A) with a 15 minute time limit (Sa´ et al., 1999) was used as
a measure of general intelligence (or algorithmic level processing, Stanovich,
2009a).
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). As suggested by Toplak et al. (2011) the
number of intuitive responses given to the three-item CRT (Frederick, 2005,
see Figure 2.10) was used as a performance measure of the tendency to use
Type 2 processing (at the reflective level). Scores were reversed so that higher
scores represented more normative performance, in line with the other measures.
The questions were randomly intermixed with three simple mathematical word
problems of a similar length from the Woodcock-Johnson III Applied Problems
subtest as described in Section 5.2.2.
Need for Cognition (NFC). The NFC scale (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein &
Jarvis, 1996, see Appendix D) was included as a self-report measure of thinking
disposition to compliment the performance based CRT measure. However, there
were no between-group differences at Time 1 (p = .616) or at Time 2 (p = .374)
nor a change over time in either group (both ps> .670), despite the measure
correlating significantly at Time 1 with RAPM scores r(122) = .19, p = .034,
Syllogisms scores, r(122) = .31, p = .001, Belief Bias Index, r(122) = −.30, p =
.001, correct answers to the CRT, r(122) = .19, p = .040, the MCI, r(120) =
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.21, p = .022, and the DCI, r(122) = .21, p = .021. Due to the lack of differences
between groups or changes over time, NFC scores are not discussed any further.
Mathematics Manipulation Check. A 15 item mathematics test was included
as a manipulation check. This was to ensure that the students who were study-
ing AS level mathematics were indeed learning more mathematics than those
studying AS level English literature and not mathematics. In the case of no
improvement in reasoning skills in the mathematics group, it would be useful
to be able to rule out the possibility that the reason they did not improve was
because they did not actually improve in mathematics.
Twelve items were taken from the Woodcock-Johnson III Calculation subtest.
Nine had shown an average accuracy of less than 55% and correlated with per-
formance on the whole test at .86 in a previous dataset with mixed-discipline
undergraduate students (Inglis, Attridge, Batchelor & Gilmore, 2011) and the
remaining three were taken from the lower range to prevent floor effects in the
English literature students.
The final three items were the most difficult questions on the Loughbor-
ough University diagnostic test for new mathematics undergraduates based on
performance in 2008 and 2009. The diagnostic test is designed to test incom-
ing students’ capability with A-level mathematics, and the three items were
included to prevent ceiling effects in the mathematics students at the second
time point whilst ensuring that the content was not inappropriately advanced.
Questions were presented in a set order that was intended to be progressive.
The full task is presented in Appendix E.
Procedure
Participants took part in groups (5-34) during the school day under examination
style conditions. All tasks were given in a single paper booklet. The RAPM
task was always completed first to allow the 15 minute time limit to be enforced,
and the order of the subsequent tasks was counterbalanced between-participants
following a Latin Square design. Participants were instructed to work at their
own pace until they had completed all tasks and the sessions lasted approxim-
ately 45 minutes. At four of the five schools, participants were entered into a
prize draw to win either a Nintendo DS Lite or a portable DVD player at Time
1. At Time 2 participants were each paid £4 for taking part. In the fifth school,
the teacher preferred the students to take part without external incentive.
5.3.2 Results
The results are reported in three sections: (i) preliminary analyses, (ii) devel-
opment of Conditional Inference and Syllogisms scores, and (iii) mechanisms of
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development.
Preliminary analyses
Data inclusion. Forty-four mathematics students and thirty-eight English liter-
ature students took part at both time points and were included in the analysis.
Those who dropped out had typically changed courses; there were no significant
differences in Time 1 scores on any of the measures between those who took
part at Time 2 and those who dropped out (ps>.15).
Reliability. The reliability of the Conditional Inference Task was assessed
with a large data set collated from several studies (including Inglis & Simpson,
2008, 2009a; Inglis, Attridge et al., 2011, and the studies reported in the current
chapter and Chapter 6 of this thesis). This resulted in a pool of 656 participants’
data from three universities and five schools and colleges. The Cronbach’s alpha,
.87, was found to be sufficiently high for the measure to be considered internally
reliable.
The reliability of the Belief Bias Syllogisms task was assessed using only the
data presented here. The Cronbach’s alpha was found to be lower, at .65, but
not unreasonably low. This may be due to the deliberately disparate nature of
two types of items – the belief/validity consistent and inconsistent thirds of the
task.
Covariates. The mathematics group scored significantly higher on the RAPM
(M = 9.57, SD = 3.26) than the English literature group at Time 1 (M =
7.03, SD = 3.45), t(80) = 3.43, p = .001, d = 0.76. The mathematics group
also scored significantly higher on the CRT (reversed number of intuitive an-
swers, M = 1.77, SD = 1.12) than the English literature group at Time 1
(M = 0.89, SD = 0.86), U(82) = 466.00, z = −4.29, p < .001, r = .39. Prior
academic attainment scores ranged from 30 to 99 (M = 64.10, SD = 11.94)
and were marginally higher in the mathematics group (M = 66.26, SD = 9.75)
than the English literature group (M = 61.66, SD = 13.45), t(79) = 1.75, p =
.084, d = 0.39.
MCI scores at Time 1 were significantly correlated with the RAPM, r(79) =
.41, p < .001, CRT, r(79) = .42, p < .001, and prior attainment scores, r(78) =
.30, p = .007. Consequently, RAPM, CRT and prior academic attainment scores
are used as covariates in subsequent analyses of Conditional Inference scores.
Syllogisms scores at Time 1 were also significantly correlated with RAPM,
r(82) = .43, p < .001, CRT, r(82) = .48, p < .001, and prior academic attain-
ment scores, r(81) = .38, p < .001, supporting the use of all three measures as
covariates in analyses of Syllogisms scores.
Finally, Belief Bias Index (BBI) scores at Time 1 were also correlated with
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RAPM, r(82) = −.28, p = .011, CRT, r(82) = −.26, p = .019, and prior aca-
demic attainment scores, r(81) = −.28, p = .010, so the covariates are used in
BBI analyses as well.
Although both groups improved their RAPM and CRT scores slightly over
the course of the year, neither Group × Time interaction effect approached
significance, ps > .20.
Manipulation Check. Change in mathematics test scores was analysed with
a 2 (Time: 1 and 2) × 2 (Group: mathematics, English) Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA). There was a significant interaction, F(1, 80) = 52.91, p < .001, ηp
2 =
.40, which suggested that the mathematics group improved to a greater extent
(Time 1 M = 4.82, SD = 1.56, Time 2 M = 6.95, SD = 1.94) than the English
group (Time 1 M = 3.47, SD = 0.95, Time 2 M = 3.12, SD = 0.59, see Figure
5.6). The mathematics group’s improvement over time was confirmed by a
planned comparison of Time 1 and 2 scores, t(43) = 7.37, p < .001, d = 1.21.
This suggests that as a group they engaged with and learned from their year of
studying mathematics and the quasi-manipulation was successful.
Development of reasoning skills
Conditional Inference analyses.
Endorsement rates. The endorsement rates of each group at Time 1 were ana-
lysed with a 2×4 ANOVA with one within-subjects factor: Inference Type (MP,
DA, AC, MT), and one between-subjects factor: Group (mathematics, English).
There was a significant main effect of Inference Type, F (3, 231) = 26.29, p <
.001, with MP inferences being most often endorsed (M = 7.01, SD = 1.27),
followed by MT inferences (M = 5.94, SD = 1.84), AC inferences (M =
5.82, SD = 2.10), and finally DA inferences (M = 4.76, SD = 2.54). There
was no interaction between Inference Type and Group, F (3, 231) < 1, indic-
ating the two groups responded similarly to the Conditional Inference task at
Time 1.
Next, change in endorsement rates of each inference type over time were
analysed with a 2×4×2 ANOVA with two within-subjects factors: Time (start
and end of the year) and Inference Type (MP, DA, AC, MT), and one between-
subjects factor: Group (mathematics and English literature). This revealed a
significant three-way interaction, F (3, 228) = 7.48, p < .001, ηp
2 = .09, which
remained significant after controlling for Time 1 RAPM, Time 1 CRT and prior
academic attainment, F (3, 216) = 5.10, p = .002, ηp
2 = .07 (see Figure 5.7). The
means and standard deviations for this interaction are displayed in Table 5.4.
At Time 2 the mathematics students endorsed more MP inferences, t(42) =
2.42, p = .020, d = 0.41, and fewer DA, t(42) = 3.98, p < .001, d = −0.67,
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Figure 5.7: Mean endorsement rates for each of the four inferences in each group
at Time 1 and Time 2 (error bars show ±1 standard error of the mean).
AC, t(42) = 3.06, p = .004, d = −0.47, and MT inferences, t(42) = 2.88, p =
.006, d = −0.45 compared to Time 1. In contrast, the English literature group
showed no significant differences between Time 1 and Time 2 scores for any
inference, although there was a marginally significant increase in the number of
DA inferences endorsed, t(34) = 1.80, p = .082, d = 0.31.
To summarise, the mathematics group showed an increase in MP endorse-
ment along with a decrease in DA, AC and MT endorsement, which is con-
sistent with a more defective interpretation of the conditional. To investigate
this formally, each interpretation index was analysed with a 2×2 ANOVA with
one within-subjects factor: Time (start and end of the year) and one between-
subjects factor: Group (mathematics, English). The mean index scores for each
group at each time point are shown in Figure 5.8.
For the material conditional index (MCI), there was a significant interaction
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between Time and Group, F (1, 76) = 11.86, p = .001, ηp
2 = .14, which remained
significant when Time 1 RAPM, Time 1 CRT, and prior academic attainment
scores were included as covariates, p = .007. The mathematics group became
more material, t(42) = 3.17, p = .003, d = 0.49, whereas the English literature
group did not change, p = .092, d = −0.17.
Time and Group also interacted for the biconditional index (BCI), F (1, 76) =
7.97, p = .006, ηp
2 = .10, although this was only marginally significant when
covariates were included, F (1, 72) = 3.70, p = .058, ηp
2 = .05. The mathematics
group became less biconditional, t(42) = 3.32, p = .002, d = −0.51, whereas the
English literature group did not change, p = .500, d = 0.07.
For the defective conditional index (DCI), Time and Group again inter-
acted, F (1, 76) = 17.65, p < .001, ηp
2 = .19, and this remained significant
with covariates, p = .002. The mathematics group became more defective,
t(42) = 5.76, p < .001, d = 0.88, whereas the English literature group did not
change, p = .767, d = −0.03.
Finally, for the conjunctive conditional index (CCI), Time and Group also
interacted, F (1, 76) = 8.53, p = .005, ηp
2 = .10, which remained significant
with covariates, p = .014. The mathematics group became more conjunctive,
t(42) = 3.53, p = .001, d = 0.55, whereas the English literature group did not
change, p = .69, d = −0.06.
Comparing the effect sizes of these analyses confirms that the change in the
mathematics group is best understood as an increased tendency to adopt the
defective interpretation of the conditional (d = 0.88 compared to ds< 0.55 for
the other interretations). Over time the mathematics group became more likely
to endorse the MP inference, but less likely to endorse the DA, AC and MT
inferences. The English literature group, on the other hand, did not change on
Inference Group Time 1 Time 2
MP Mathematics 7.12(1.29) 7.60(0.54)
English 6.91(1.22) 7.06(1.37)
DA Mathematics 5.00(2.72) 3.86(2.77)
English 4.49(2.37) 5.06(2.74)
AC Mathematics 5.76(2.22) 5.09(2.36)
English 5.83(2.02) 5.83(2.24)
MT Mathematics 6.19(1.73) 5.36(2.14)
English 5.66(1.97) 5.40(2.16)
Table 5.4: Mean number items endorsed by Inference type, Group and Time
point with standard deviations in parentheses.
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any of the interpretation indices.
NCI and API scores. NCI scores were subjected to a 2×2 ANOVA with
one within-subjects factor: Time (start and end of the year) and one between-
subjects factor: Group (mathematics, English literature), and three covariates:
prior academic attainment, Time 1 RAPM scores and Time 1 CRT scores. There
was a marginally significant interaction between Time and Group, F (1, 72) =
3.60, p = .062, ηp
2 = .05. Intriguingly, the mathematics students displayed a
marginally higher NCI at Time 2 (M = 2.86, SD = 2.48) than at Time 1
(M = 2.05, SD = 2.69), t(43) = 1.81, p = .078, d = 0.31, whilst the English
students’ scores did not change (Time 1 M = 2.09, SD = 3.08, Time 2 M =
1.91, SD = 3.21), t(35) = .33, p = .74, d = −0.06. This is the opposite of what
one would expect given the findings for overall scores – it appears that over
the course of the year the mathematics students became more biased towards
endorsing inferences with negative conclusions.
API scores were also subjected to a 2×2 ANOVA with one within-subjects
factor: Time (start and end of the year) and one between-subjects factor: Group
(mathematics, English literature), and three covariates: prior academic attain-
ment, Time 1 RAPM scores and Time 1 CRT scores. This did not show a
significant interaction, F < 1.
Reasoning competency and biases. In the analyses above studying math-
ematics was found to be associated with an increased defective and material
interpretation of the conditional and a marginally significant increase in NCI,
compared to studying English literature. This is somewhat counterintuitive. A
material or defective interpretation can be said to be an improvement on a bicon-
ditional interpretation (see the discussion in Section 2.3), and one would expect
that as overall reasoning competence increases there should be less susceptibility
to biases. However, it could be the case that a certain level of understanding of
the task is required before one is able to show systematic biases. If a reasoner
has little understanding of the logic of the conditional they may be responding
unsystematically to the task (effectively guessing) in which case no systematic
bias could be occurring and overall score will be not far above chance level.
Once a more sophisticated but not totally consistent understanding of the con-
ditional is reached, the reasoner may be systematic enough to show a higher
overall score and be able to show biases, but not competent enough to overcome
the biases every time. Of course, when a very high level of understanding is
achieved, both overall score and ability to avoid biases should increase. This
hypothetical relationship is demonstrated in Figure 5.9.
In order to test the proposed relationship, the data of 656 participants col-
lated from five separate studies (discussed above) was analysed. These data
were subjected to a curve fitting estimation, which confirmed that a quadratic
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Figure 5.9: Proposed relationship between overall score and a bias index on
a reasoning task based on the finding that over time mathematics students
showed a higher total score and marginally higher negative conclusion index on
the Conditional Inference Task.
curve provided a better fit to the relationship between MCI and NCI on the
Conditional Inference task, R2 = .09, F (2, 653) = 33.61, p < .001, than did
a linear relationship, R2 = .003, F (1, 654) = 2.18, p = .14. The relationship
between MCI and NCI is shown in Figure 5.10. This was also the case for the
relationship between the DCI and NCI: a quadratic curve provided a better fit
to the data, R2 = .19, F (2, 653) = 74.58, p < .001, than did a linear relationship,
R2 = .03, F (1, 654) = 18.78, p < .001. The relationship between DCI and NCI
is shown in Figure 5.11.
However, it is necessarily the case that a high NCI cannot exist when an
index score is close to the maximum possible – if the majority of inferences are
being categorised consistently then there is not much room for patterns to be
found in the inferences categorised inconsistently. Considering this limitation,
another way to test the proposed relationship is to look only at data where
the index score is below 75% and there is room for biases to occur. Within
this range, the hypothesis is that biases will increase alongside the index score
as participants become competent enough to think systematically about their
answers, whether they be right or wrong. To test this hypothesis, MCI scores
were correlated with NCIs for those participants’ whose MCI score was less
than or equal to 24 (out of 32). This revealed a significant positive relationship,
r(554) = .25, p < .001, as predicted. There was also a significant positive
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Figure 5.10: Relationship between the Material Conditional Index and Negative
Conclusion Index on the Conditional Inference Task when collating data from
five studies with a line of best fit. The area of each circle increases with the
number of people in that cell.
Ne
ga
tiv
e 
Co
nc
lus
ion
 In
de
x
−5
0
5
10
Conformity to Defective Conditional Index
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Figure 5.11: Relationship between the Defective Conditional Index and Negative
Conclusion Index on the Conditional Inference Task when collating data from
five studies with a line of best fit. The area of each circle increases with the
number of people in that cell.
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relationship between DCI and NCI for participants whose DCI was less than or
equal to 24, r(574) = .32, p < .001.
The curve fitting estimation and correlation analyses are consistent with
the hypothesis that as participants become more successful at thinking about
deductions from conditional statements overall, they also become more prone
to showing systematic biases in their errors. That is, until they become near-
experts. This may be a side-effect of a move from effectively random responding
that is absent of any reasoning to a more systematic style of reasoning.
Syllogisms analyses.
Total syllogisms scores. Total syllogisms scores were subjected to a 2×2 ANOVA
with one within-subjects factor: Time (start and end of the year) and one
between-subjects factor: Group (mathematics, English literature), and three
covariates: prior academic attainment, Time 1 RAPM scores and Time 1 CRT
scores. This revealed a significant interaction, F (1, 74) = 4.08, p = .047, ηp
2 =
.05. However, the mathematics group’s scores did not change between Time 1
(M = 8.98, SD = 2.26) and Time 2 (M = 9.32, SD = 2.25), t(44) = 1.06, p =
.295, d = 0.15, and the English literature students’ scores marginally decreased
between Time 1 (M = 8.75, SD = 2.13) and Time 2 (M = 8.14, SD = 2.21),
t(36) = 1.90, p = .066, d = −0.28, see Figure 5.12. The interaction was therefore
not in line with the TFD.
Belief Bias Index. Next, the same analysis was conducted with BBI scores.
There was no significant interaction between Time and Group, F (1, 74) < 1 (see
Figure 5.13).
Mechanisms of development
It has been demonstrated that the mathematics group developed a more de-
fective interpretation of the conditional over time. However, they did not sig-
nificantly improve in syllogistic reasoning ability or avoidance of belief bias
(although the English students did decrease in syllogistic reasoning ability, cre-
ating an interaction). In this section, Stanovich’s (2009a) algorithmic and re-
flective levels of cognition are evaluated as potential mechanisms of the change
in interpretation. RAPM scores were used as a measure of general intelligence
(the algorithmic level) and reversed intuitive scores on the CRT were used as a
measure of tendency to use Type 2 processing (the reflective level).
Below I present a regression model predicting Time 2 DCI scores from the
following blocks of variables:
1. Prior academic attainment, Time 1 DCI scores, Time 1 RAPM scores and
Time 1 CRT scores (all covariates);
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2. Change-in-RAPM score and Change-in-CRT score, to investigate whether
domain-general changes are responsible for Time 2 DCI scores over the
whole sample;
3. Group (mathematics or English), to evaluate whether the subject studied
predicted Time 2 performance over and above any domain-general changes
across the sample;
4. Two interaction terms – Change in RAPM × Group and Change in CRT
× Group – to investigate whether domain-general changes in the math-
ematics group specifically are responsible for Time 2 DCI scores.
If it were the case that studying mathematics increases DCI scores by im-
proving the domain-general processing skills, then the interaction terms in the
final block should explain a significant amount of variance – one would expect
the CRT and RAPM scores to change more in the mathematics group than the
English literature group, and for this to predict DCI development. If domain-
general changes were responsible for changes in DCI scores independently of
subject studied, then the Time 1 or Change scores on RAPM or CRT should be
significant predictors. If it were the case that studying mathematics increases
DCI scores by a mechanism other than intelligence or thinking disposition, then
the Group factor alone should explain a significant amount of variance.
The hierarchical regression model is presented in Table 5.5. The control
variables in the first block of predictors accounted for 65.6% of the variance in
Time 2 DCI scores, p < .001. Change-in-RAPM and Change-in-CRT scores
were added in the second block and accounted for an additional significant 3.2%
of the variance, p = .036. Group (mathematics = 1, English = 0) was entered in
the third block and accounted for an additional 2.1% of the variance, p = .032.
Adding the two interaction terms in the final block accounted for less than
0.5% of additional variance, p = .581. In the final model, the only significant
predictors were Time 1 DCI (p < .001) and Group (p = .024).
The regression model does not support the hypothesis that studying math-
ematics increases conformity to a defective interpretation of the conditional via
the domain-general factors of intelligence (at the algorithmic level) or thinking
disposition (at the reflective level). Instead, the mechanism of improvement
may be domain-specific ‘mindware’, heuristic level factors, or factors at the
algorithmic or reflective level of cognition that were not included here, such
as executive functions. The control variables included in Block 1 were, as ex-
pected, significant predictors. However, it was not the case that mathematics
influenced intelligence or thinking disposition in a way that predicted Time 2
DCI: the interaction terms in the final block explained almost zero variance.
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Model R2 ∆R2 Predictors β
1 .66 .66** Time 1 DCI .71**
Time 1 Ravens .03
Time 1 CRT .22**
Prior academic attainment .01
2 .69 .03* Time 1 DCI .72**
Time 1 Ravens .13
Time 1 CRT .18
Prior academic attainment .01
Change-in-RAPM .20*
Change-in-CRT .06
3 .71 .02* Time 1 DCI .76**
Time 1 Ravens .06
Time 1 CRT .13
Prior academic attainment −.01
Change-in-RAPM .15†
Change-in-CRT .04
Group (mathematics = 1, English = 0) .17*
4 .71 .01 Time 1 DCI .75**
Time 1 Ravens .07
Time 1 CRT .12
Prior academic attainment −.01
Change-in-RAPM .14
Change-in-CRT .09
Group (mathematics = 1, English = 0) .20*
RAPM Change × Group .02
CRT Change × Group −.09
Table 5.5: A hierarchical regression analysis predicting Time 2 Defective Con-
ditional Index scores. † p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .001.
Influence of other science subjects
At AS level, students tend to study four subjects, and those studying mathem-
atics are often studying science subjects as well. In England in 2009, for ex-
ample, 63% of students studying post-compulsory mathematics also studied one
or more of chemistry, biology and physics (Royal Society, 2011). To investigate
whether mathematics was unique as a formal discipline that predicted develop-
ment in Conditional Inference, the number of core science subjects each par-
ticipant was studying (physics, chemistry, biology) was correlated with change
in DCI score within the mathematics group. This revealed a non-significant
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relationship, Spearman’s r(43) = .16, p = .316, which remained non-significant
after controlling for participants’ Time 1 RAPM, CRT scores, and prior aca-
demic attainment scores, pr(37) = .22, p = .188. In the current data set there is
no evidence that studying non-mathematics science subjects is responsible for
the relationship between mathematics and change in DCI.
5.4 Discussion
This chapter aimed to shed light upon two questions that are central to this
thesis and the TFD: (a) is studying mathematics at advanced levels associated
with improvement in reasoning skills? and (b) if there is such improvement,
what might its mechanisms be? These questions were addressed with a lon-
gitudinal study that followed the development of conditional and syllogistic
reasoning ability in AS level mathematics and English literature students. The
results have shown that (a) the mathematics students changed in conditional
reasoning behaviour to a greater extent than the English literature students, (b)
the change was best characterised as the mathematics students becoming more
defective in their interpretation of the conditional, and (c) that the mechanism
for the development did not appear to be domain-general.
5.4.1 Development of reasoning skills
It was found here that mathematics students’ conditional reasoning behaviour
became more in line with the defective conditional interpretation over time,
whereas the English literature students’ reasoning behaviour did not change.
Inglis and Simpson (2009a) found that, compared to intelligence-matched com-
parison undergraduates, incoming mathematics undergraduates reasoned more
normatively on the Conditional Inference Task but that they did not change
over a year of mathematics study. The authors suggested that the initial
difference may have been due to one of three possibilities: post-compulsory
but pre-university study of mathematics developing reasoning skills; filtering of
more material reasoners into the study of mathematics; or between-group dif-
ferences unrelated to intelligence, such as in thinking disposition. The findings
are consistent with the first possibility, that post-compulsory but pre-university
study of mathematics develops conditional reasoning skills. At the start of post-
compulsory education, the students studying mathematics did not differ from
non-mathematics students on the Conditional Inference Task, but they did after
a year of study. This change was not due to between-groups differences in initial
or changed thinking disposition or intelligence scores.
The mathematics students’ reasoning did not become entirely more norm-
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ative as we might expect from an all-round improved understanding of logic.
There was increased rejection of DA, AC and MT inferences and increased ac-
ceptance of MP inferences, reflecting a move towards the so-called ‘defective’
interpretation of the conditional. This is not entirely surprising given the nature
of mathematics: Houston (2009) argued that most mathematical statements are
of the form ‘if statement A is true, then statement B is true’, even if they are
heavily disguised (p. 63). He also argued that in mathematics A is assumed
to be true, even if it is clearly not true, and the truth or falsity of B is then
deduced. Since the AS level curriculum does not include any explicit reference
to conditional logic or the material conditional, it is plausible that exposure to
implicit ‘if then’ statements, where the antecedent is assumed to be true, could
induce a defective interpretation of the conditional, where false antecedent cases
are considered irrelevant. In line with this hypothesis, Hoyles and Kuchemann
(2002) argued that the defective interpretation is actually more appropriate for
mathematics classrooms than the material interpretation for the same reasons
proposed by Houston. Furthermore, Inglis and Simpson (2009b) found that a
group of undergraduate mathematics students, who had of course been very suc-
cessful at A level mathematics, tended to have a more defective than material
interpretation of conditionals.
It seems somewhat surprising that studying mathematics was associated
with improved conditional reasoning skills given that Cheng et al. (1986) found
no improvement in conditional reasoning even after their participants studied
a course in formal logic. One possible account for this discrepancy is that the
measure used by Cheng et al. (1986) was not suitable for detecting improve-
ment. They used four Wason Selection Tasks, three of which were contextual-
ised, to measure conditional reasoning ability. Since then it has been suggested
that Wason Selection Tasks, in particular contextualised ones, may not measure
conditional reasoning at all (Sperber et al., 1995, 2002) and so it is possible that
Cheng et al. (1986) were simply not measuring improvement that did actually
occur.
It is also possible that if Cheng et al. (1986) had looked specifically at a
defective conditional index they may have found a change – in the current
study there was a shift towards a material interpretation, but a smaller one than
the shift towards a defective interpretation. If Cheng et al’s participants did
become more defective over time it would not have been reflected by performance
on a Selection Task – it would encourage participants to select only the true
antecedent card and no others, which would have been considered wrong in
Cheng et al’s analysis, along with a biconditional interpretation. Incidentally,
this was the pattern of responding found in Inglis and Simpson’s (2004) study
of undergraduate mathematics students. Compared to a control group, Inglis
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and Simpson’s (2004) mathematics students gave more true antecedent (p) only
answers and fewer true antecedent and true consequent (p and q) answers.
5.4.2 Competency and biases in the Conditional Inference
Task
An additional analysis using a large set of data collated from several studies
tested the hypothesis that the negative conclusion index increases as the ma-
terial and defective interpretations increase, up to the point of near-complete
consistency within inference type. In support of this, the relationships between
MCI and NCI and between DCI and NCI were better fit by quadratic curves
than by linear functions. This relationship suggests that as people become more
systematic in their reasoning, they also become more, not less, susceptible to
common biases. When people are responding unsystematically, either because
they do not understand the conditional or because they are not engaged with
the task, it is not possible for them to show negative conclusion bias because it
requires some understanding and consistency in responses to similar deductions.
Those people who do understand the conditional and respond with some con-
sistency to similar deductions are at least able to show negative conclusion bias,
and may or may not be able to overcome it. Finally, those who have a consist-
ent understanding of the conditional are able to overcome negative conclusion
bias and answer all or most items in line with their primary interpretation. In
sum, this pattern may reflect a developmental trajectory from unsystematic re-
sponding to more systematic but biased responding to completely systematic
reasoning.
5.4.3 Limitations
The students who were studying mathematics in the sample also tended to be
studying other core science subjects (physics, biology, chemistry). It was not
possible to separate out the potential relationships between change in condi-
tional reasoning behaviour and the study of mathematics, physics, chemistry
and biology in my sample, due to the small numbers of students studying only
one of the subjects. However, there was no evidence that the more science sub-
jects a person was studying, the more their reasoning behaviour changed, so
although this confound is not ideal it does not appear to be a severely limiting
factor. To investigate the potential confound issue, a much larger sample size
would be required to ensure that enough participants were studying one science
subject alone. However, the study reported in Chapter 6 investigated the role of
studying mathematics without science subjects in undergraduate students and
suggested that the relationship found here still holds.
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A substantial drawback to the design of this study is that it was a quasi-
experiment as opposed to a true experiment. Participants chose their AS level
subjects before the study began – it would not have been practical or eth-
ical to randomly assign students to studying mathematics or English literature.
Although there were no differences between groups in reasoning behaviour at
Time 1, the quasi-experimental design means that it is not possible to estab-
lish causal relationships between subject studied and improvement in reasoning
skills. As discussed in Chapter 3, non-random assignment to conditions means
that not all confounding variables can be prevented from influencing the rela-
tionships studied. Intelligence and thinking disposition, two likely confounds
in the relationship between subject studied and reasoning skills, were meas-
ured and statistically controlled for, but statistical control is not as effective as
random assignment to conditions (Christensen, 2000) and, more importantly,
there may have been other confounding variables that were not considered. The
most effective way to study causation in the TFD would be to randomly assign
participants to courses in mathematics or non-mathematical subjects and track
their development in reasoning over an extended period of time. However, this
is obviously neither practical nor ethical in high stakes assessment.
In terms of relevance to educational policy, the quasi-experimental design of
this study also means that the results may not apply to curricula where it is
compulsory to study mathematics until the age of 18. The participants in this
study had chosen to study mathematics and thus they likely enjoyed it and were
engaged with the course. Where students are required to study mathematics
until the age of 18 this may not be the case and it might be that only those
who do enjoy and engage with the course see the benefits to reasoning that were
found. A useful direction for future research would be to compare the reasoning
development of students studying mathematics in curriculums where it is and
is not compulsory.
5.4.4 Revised status of the Theory of Formal Discipline
The Theory of Formal Discipline suggests that studying mathematics improves
one’s ability to reason. Although the TFD makes big claims about the relation-
ship between mathematics and reasoning, it is silent on the issue of what the
mechanism for the relationship might be. To date, the TFD has been assumed
to be true with minimal scrutiny. Here, some evidence was presented that is
partly consistent with the TFD, and furthermore, some potential mechanisms
for the improvement in reasoning skills were investigated.
In the study presented here it was found that mathematics students’ con-
ditional reasoning behaviour changed to a greater extent than that of non-
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mathematics students’, but that mathematics students did not show any change
in their syllogistic reasoning nor susceptibility to belief bias. I also found no evid-
ence that the mechanism for change in conditional reasoning skills was a change
to the algorithmic or reflective level of cognition, as specified in Stanovich’s
(2009a) model. Here, RAPM was the only measure of algorithmic processing,
but executive function is a separable aspect of the algorithmic level. Executive
function refers to the efficiency of carrying out conscious information processing
– e.g. updating information in working memory, switching between tasks, and
inhibiting irrelevant information or responses, and it has been shown to be
separate from fluid intelligence (Ardila, Pineda & Rosselli, 2000; Arffa, 2007;
Friedman et al., 2006). The relationship between executive functions and con-
ditional reasoning behaviour is investigated in Chapter 9.
Another possibility is that mathematics students’ defective responding stems
from the heuristic level of cognition. This is investigated in Chapter 8, where
mathematics and non-mathematics students’ conditional reasoning behaviour is
measured under a strict time limit as well as under no time limit so see how
behaviour changes when processing is restricted to the heuristic level.
Chapter 7 presents evidence that mathematics students’ ability with condi-
tional reasoning is dependent on the linguistic form of the conditional statement,
supporting the hypothesis that exposure to ‘if then’ statements is responsible
for the change as opposed to a general understanding of conditional logic. Next,
however, a longitudinal study investigating changes in conditional reasoning be-
haviour in undergraduate students is presented.
5.4.5 Summary of novel findings
1. Mathematics students’ conditional reasoning behaviour conformed more
to the defective and material interpretations and less to the biconditional
interpretation of conditional statements after a year of AS level study,
compared to English literature students.
2. There was no evidence that mathematics students’ syllogistic reasoning
behaviour nor susceptibility to belief bias changed over time.
3. The mechanism of the change in mathematics students’ conditional reas-
oning behaviour did not appear to be baseline or changed scores on intel-
ligence or thinking dispositions measures.
4. The largest change in mathematics students’ conditional reasoning beha-
viour was in the form of greater adoption of the defective conditional -
this may reflect practice with implicit ‘if then’ statements in mathematics
where students are expected to assume p and reason about q.
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Chapter 6
The development of
reasoning skills in
undergraduate mathematics
students
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Testing the Theory of Formal Discipline
Chapter 5 presented a study that investigated the development of reasoning
skills in AS level mathematics and English students. It was found that the
mathematics students became increasingly defective in their reasoning beha-
viour, i.e. they became more likely to reject DA, AC and MT inferences, and
more likely to accept MP inferences. It was also found that mathematics stu-
dents did not improve in reasoning with thematic syllogisms. The discrepancy
between the abstract conditional reasoning improvement and lack of thematic
syllogisms improvement could either be due to the context/abstract aspect or to
the conditionals/syllogisms aspect. This will be clarified in the study reported
below.
The aim of the current chapter is to investigate the development of reasoning
skills in undergraduate mathematics students. Because the study and it’s mo-
tivations are very similar to the AS study, much of the relevant background and
description of materials has already appeared in Chapter 5. To avoid repetition
only a brief overview of the relevant background and justifications of the study
are provided below.
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The little amount of research that has previously investigated the develop-
ment of reasoning skills in association with the study of mathematics has all
focused on undergraduate students. Lehman and Nisbett (1990) tested US un-
dergraduates on various types of reasoning at the beginning and end of their
four years of study and found that the natural science students (who took the
most mathematics modules) reasoned more in line with the material conditional
at the end of their degrees. Furthermore, the number of mathematics modules
taken was correlated with the extent of change. In the UK, Inglis and Simpson
(2008) found that on entry to university, mathematics undergraduates reasoned
more normatively than a comparison group on a Conditional Inference task.
However, in a follow up study Inglis and Simpson (2009a) found that although
mathematics students again outperformed comparison undergraduates on entry
to university, their reasoning did not change over a year of study. The authors
suggested that studying mathematics at A level may have led to the initial differ-
ence between groups, and this was supported by the study presented in Chapter
5 of this thesis. However, the authors did not investigate differences or changes
in a defective interpretation of the conditional, and so it is possible that there
were changes that went undetected. Nevertheless, there is a discrepancy between
the findings of Lehman and Nisbett (1990) and Inglis and Simpson (2009a) for
the material interpretation of the conditional, and the current chapter will add
evidence that could clarify the discrepancy.
Aside from contributing to the limited base of evidence relating to the de-
velopment of reasoning skills in undergraduate mathematics students, the study
presented below will address two issues that arose in the AS study presented in
Chapter 5.
Firstly, in the AS sample, science and mathematics were confounded so it
was not possible to isolate the effect of studying mathematics on reasoning. In
the UK, students tend to study only one subject at degree level, and so the
study presented here allowed the effect of mathematics to be investigated in
isolation. This issue may also be a source of the discrepancy described above
– Lehman and Nisbett (1990) found their evidence for a relationship between
mathematics and conditional reasoning in students at a US university, where
it is common for students to study different subjects as their major and minor
degree components. There was no evidence of a relationship between studying
science subjects and changes in the DCI in the AS level students, but the mix of
subjects studied by Lehman and Nisbett’s (1990) participants could potentially
be a reason for their finding a change where Inglis and Simpson (2009a) did not.
Secondly, in the AS study mathematics students only changed in abstract
conditional reasoning, not in thematic syllogistic reasoning. The lack of improve-
ment in the syllogisms could be due to the use of context – perhaps studying
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mathematics only provides an advantage for thinking about abstract problems
– or it could be due to the syllogisms – perhaps studying mathematics only
provides an advantage for thinking about conditional statements (the increase
in the defective interpretation of the conditional is supportive of the latter ex-
planation). This issue will be clarified in the study presented here. Instead of
completing a thematic syllogisms task, participants will complete a thematic
conditional inference task which is very similar in form to the abstract condi-
tional reasoning task. If mathematics undergraduates change on the abstract
version but not the thematic version it would suggest that context interferes
with their reasoning. If they change on both the abstract and thematic versions
(in particular, if their reasoning becomes more defective in both), it could in-
dicate that studying mathematics only changes interpretations of ‘if’ and that
that’s why there was no change on the Syllogisms task in the AS level students.
However, an alternative possibility in the latter case would be that reasoning in
context is a skill that comes later in mathematical study than abstract reasoning
– at a point in between AS level and the first year of an undergraduate degree.
A further aim of this study, as with the AS study, is to identify potential
mechanisms for any improvement that occurs. As before, measures of intelli-
gence at the algorithmic level and reflective thinking disposition at the reflective
level of cognition in Stanovich’s (2009a) model will be included for this purpose.
6.1.2 Summary
In sum, there are three research questions that will be addressed in this chapter:
(a) is studying mathematics (and not science) at undergraduate level associated
with changes in abstract conditional reasoning skills, (b) is studying mathemat-
ics (and not science) at undergraduate level associated with changes in thematic
conditional reasoning skills and (c) can any improvement found be attributed to
changes in intelligence or reflective thinking disposition? Based on the findings
from the AS level study, it can be hypothesised that:
1. Studying mathematics at undergraduate level will be associated with more
defective, and to a lesser extent, more material abstract conditional reas-
oning,
2. The changes in abstract conditional reasoning will be predicted by the
Group factor over and above intelligence and/or thinking disposition.
It is unclear whether the mathematics students will improve in thematic
conditional reasoning, but if they do, the same hypotheses would likely apply
to the improvement.
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6.2 Method
6.2.1 Design
Undergraduate mathematics and psychology students took part at the begin-
ning and end of their first year of study. Participants had already self-selected
into degree courses and so the study took a quasi-experimental design. The
same set of tasks was administered at both time points to allow a longitudinal
investigation of development.
6.2.2 Participants
Eighty-three mathematics students and 64 psychology students took part at
Time 1. The mathematics group consisted only of students who were study-
ing the three year single honours mathematics course (N = 66) or the four
year mathematics undergraduate masters course (MMath, N = 17). All parti-
cipants were first year students at Loughborough University and took part on
a voluntary unpaid basis.
6.2.3 Mathematics Syllabus
In the first year of the single honours mathematics and MMath degrees students
take the following compulsory modules: Calculus, Linear algebra, Geometry,
Vectors and complex numbers, Mathematical thinking, Introduction to applied
mathematics, Computer applications in mathematics, Sequences and series, Dif-
ferential equations and Introductory probability and statistics. Contrary to the
A level syllabus discussed in Chapter 5, the undergraduate module ‘Mathemat-
ical thinking’ covers various aspects of logic, including conditional statements
and truth tables.
6.2.4 Measures
Abstract Conditional Inference. Participants completed the same Conditional
Inference task (Evans et al., 1995) used in Chapter 5, consisting of 32 abstract
items of four inference types: modus ponens (MP), denial of the antecedent
(DA), affirmation of the consequent (AC) and modus tollens (MT). Half of the
items used explicit negations (e.g. “not 5”) and half used implicit negations
(e.g. “not 5” represented as, for example, 6). Four interpretation indices were
taken: MCI, DCI, BCI and CCI. The instructions given were identical to those
used by Evans et al. (1995). An example item is shown in Figure 6.1.
Thematic Conditional Inference. A thematic version of the conditional in-
ference task (see Appendix F) was created based on Evans, Handley, Neilens
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If the letter is S then the number is 6
The number is not 6
Conclusion: The letter is not S
Yes
No
a) Modus tollens                                   b) Denial of the antecedent
If the letter is M then the number is 4
The letter is not M
Conclusion: The number is not 4
Yes
No
Figure 6.1: Example item from the Abstract Conditional Inference task.
and Over’s (2010) task. Participants decided whether a conclusion necessarily
followed from a rule and a premise in 16 items. There were four MP, four MT,
four DA and four AC items. Two of each inference type were presented in be-
lievable context and two in unbelievable context. An example unbelievable MT
item is shown in Figure 6.2.
All negations were represented explicitly: the lack of implicit negations is
the reason for there being 16 rather than 32 items. The measures taken were
MCI, DCI, BCI, CCI, and a belief bias index (BBI), as with the syllogisms
task in Chapter 5. The BBI was calculated as number of consistent items
accepted (believable/valid, unbelievable/invalid) minus number of inconsistent
items accepted (believable/invalid, unbelievable/valid). The possible range for
BBI scores was -8 to +8, with positive scores indicating a degree of belief bias
(being more persuaded by belief than validity in the inconsistent items).
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices. An 18 item subset of Raven’s Ad-
vanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM) with a 15 minute time limit (Sa´ et al.,
1999) was used as a measure of general intelligence (at the algorithmic level of
processing, Stanovich, 2009a, see Appendix A).
Assume the following is true:
If third world debt is cancelled then poverty will worsen.
Given that the following premise is also true:
Third world poverty does not worsen.
Is it necessary that:
Third world debt is not cancelled.
Yes
No
Figure 6.2: Example item from the Thematic Conditional Inference task.
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Cognitive Reflection Test. Number of intuitive responses given to the three-
item CRT (Frederick, 2005) was used as a performance measure of the tendency
to use Type 2 processing (at the reflective level, Toplak et al., 2011; Stanovich,
2009a). Scores were reversed so that higher scores represented more normative
performance, in line with the other measures. The questions were randomly in-
termixed with three simple mathematical word problems of a similar length from
the Woodcock-Johnson III Applied Problems subtest as described in Chapter
5.
Mathematics Manipulation Check. To confirm that the mathematics group
learnt mathematics during the year and that the psychology students did not, a
mathematics test was included. This consisted of 11 questions, seven of which
were taken from the Woodcock-Johnson III Calculation subtest, two of which
were the most difficult questions on the Loughborough University diagnostic
test for new mathematics undergraduates based on performance in 2008 and
2009, and a final two of which were based on the first year mathematics degree
syllabus. The full task is presented in Appendix G.
6.2.5 Procedure
Participants took part during lectures: the mathematics students in one group
and the psychology students in another. RAPM was always completed first
with a 15 minute time limit. The rest of the tasks followed in one of four Latin
square counterbalanced orders to which participants were randomly assigned:
1. Mathematics test, Abstract Conditional Inference task, Thematic Condi-
tional Inference task, CRT
2. CRT, Mathematics test, Abstract Conditional Inference task, Thematic
Conditional Inference task
3. Thematic Conditional Inference task, CRT, Mathematics test, Abstract
Conditional Inference task
4. Abstract Conditional Inference task, Thematic Conditional Inference task,
CRT, Mathematics test
6.3 Results
Of the 147 participants who took part at Time 1, 59 mathematics and 30 psy-
chology students took part again at Time 2 and were included in the analysis.
The high drop out rate may have been due to the second testing sessions taking
place shortly before the exam period, particularly so in the psychology group.
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Task Mathematics Psychology
RAPM 59 30
CRT 47 29
Abstract Conditional Inference 53 27
Thematic Conditional Inference 49 28
Mathematics test 51 30
Table 6.1: Number of participants in each group who completed each task at
Time 2.
Furthermore, not all participants completed all tasks. Table 6.1 shows the num-
ber of participants in each group who completed each task at Time 2. In all
analyses presented below, missing data is excluded pairwise to maximise stat-
istical power.
The participants who returned at Time 2 had significantly higher scores on
Time 1 RAPM, t(145) = 2.34, p = .021, Time 1 mathematics test, t(138) =
2.49, p = .014, Time 1 Abstract MCI scores, t(114) = 2.78, p = .006, and Time
1 Thematic MCI scores, t(116) = 2.19, p = .031 than those who did not return.
The sample was therefore biased towards the more able students, but there will
always be some degree of bias when the sample is self-selected. There was no
difference between those who returned and those who did not in Time 1 CRT
scores, t(145) = .17, p = .862. Importantly, there were no significant interactions
between Group and Return for RAPM, mathematics test or Thematic MCI
scores (all ps> .250), indicating the bias was not significantly greater in one
group or the other. However, there was a significant interaction between Group
and Return for Time 1 Abstract MCI scores, F (1, 112) = 4.13, p = .044, ηp
2 =
.04. In the mathematics group, those who returned had scored marginally higher
than those who did not return, t(65) = 1.89, p = .063, whereas there was no
difference between returnees and non-returnees in the psychology group, t(47) =
.99, p = .327. The mean scores on each task at Time 1 for those who returned
at Time 2 and those who did not are displayed in Table 6.2.
The results are reported in two sections: (i) preliminary analyses and (ii)
development of Abstract and Thematic conditional interpretation scores.
6.3.1 Preliminary analyses
Covariates. The mathematics group scored significantly higher on the RAPM
at Time 1 (M = 11.1, SD = 2.97) than the psychology group (M = 8.63, SD =
3.40), t(87) = 3.56, p = .001, d = 0.77. The mathematics group also scored
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significantly higher on the CRT at Time 1 (reversed number of intuitive answers,
M = 2.12, SD = 0.86) than the psychology group (M = 1.30, SD = 1.11),
U(72) = 327.50, z = −2.98, p = .003, r = .35.
Abstract MCI scores at Time 1 were significantly correlated with Time 1
RAPM scores, r(63) = .33, p = .009, and Time 1 CRT scores, r(63) = .26, p =
.038. Consequently, both Time 1 RAPM and CRT scores are used as covariates
in subsequent analyses of Abstract Conditional Interpretation indices.
Time 1 Thematic MCI scores were significantly correlated with both Time
1 RAPM, r(66) = .36, p = .003, and Time 1 CRT scores, r(66) = .43, p < .001,
supporting the use of Time 1 RAPM and CRT scores as covariates in analyses
of Thematic Conditional Interpretation scores.
Finally, BBI scores at Time 1 were significantly correlated with Time 1
RAPM scores, r(66) = −.26, p = .038, and marginally significantly correlated
with Time 1 CRT scores, r(66) = −.24, p = .058. The BBI analysis is reported
below with Time 1 RAPM scores as a covariate and both with and without
Time 1 CRT scores as a covariate.
Although both groups improved their RAPM scores slightly over the course
of the year, the Group × Time interaction effect did not approach significance,
F (1, 80) < 1. Again, both groups improved their CRT scores slightly over the
year but the Group × Time interaction effect did not approach significance,
F (1, 62) = 1.95, p = .167, ηp
2 = .031 (shown in Figure 6.3).
Manipulation Check. Change in mathematics test scores were analysed with
a 2×2 ANOVA with one within-subjects factor: Time (start and end of the year)
and one between-subjects factor: Group (mathematics, psychology). There was
a significant interaction, F(1, 76) = 8.24, p = .005, which suggested that the
mathematics group improved to a greater extent than the psychology group,
shown in Figure 6.4. The mathematics group’s improvement over time was
confirmed by a planned comparison of Time 1 and 2 scores, t(48) = 3.70, p =
.001, d = .70. This suggests that as a group they engaged with and learned from
Task (maximum) Returned at Time 2 Absent at Time 2
RAPM (18) 10.27 (3.29) 8.91 (3.64)
CRT (3) 2.06 (1.02) 2.07 (1.03)
Abstract MCI (32) 20.58 (4.51) 18.43 (3.43)
Thematic MCI (16) 11.16 (2.91) 9.93 (3.02)
Mathematics test (11) 6.23 (2.94) 4.98 (2.82)
Table 6.2: Mean scores on each task at Time 1 for those who did and did not
return to take part at Time 2 with standard deviations in parentheses.
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Figure 6.3: Interaction between Group and Time on the (reversed) number
of intuitive answers given to the CRT (where higher scores represent better
performance, error bars show ±1 standard error of the mean).
their year of studying mathematics and the quasi-manipulation was successful.
6.3.2 Development of reasoning skills
Abstract Conditional Inference.
Endorsement rates. Endorsement rates of each inference type were analysed
with a 2×4×2 ANOVA with two within-subjects factors: Time (start and end
of the year) and Inference Type (MP, DA, AC, MT), one between-subjects
factor: Group (mathematics and psychology), and two covariates: Time 1
RAPM and Time 1 CRT. This revealed a marginally significant three-way in-
teraction, F (3, 177) = 2.58, p = .055, ηp
2 = .04, (see Figure 6.5). The means
and standard deviations for this interaction are displayed in Table 6.3. At Time
2 the mathematics students endorsed more MP inferences, t(43) = 2.33, p =
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Figure 6.4: Interaction between Group and Time on mathematics test scores
(error bars show ±1 standard error of the mean).
.025, d = 0.50, and fewer DA, t(43) = 3.37, p = .002, d = −0.40 and AC
inferences, t(43) = 3.30, p = .002, d = −0.42 compared to Time 1. Math-
ematics students did not change in their endorsement rate of MT inferences,
t(43) = 1.19, p = .243, d = −0.16. In contrast, the psychology group showed no
significant differences between Time 1 and Time 2 scores for any inference (all
ps>.160), although there was a marginally significant decrease in the number of
MT inferences endorsed, t(18) = 1.97, p = .065, d = −0.54.
An increase in MP endorsement along with a decrease in DA and AC en-
dorsement is consistent with a more material or defective interpretation of the
conditional. To investigate this formally, each interpretation index was analysed
with a 2×2 ANOVA with one within-subjects factor: Time (start and end of
the year) and one between-subjects factor: Group (mathematics, psychology).
The mean index scores for each group at each time point are shown in Figure
6.6.
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Figure 6.5: Mean endorsement rates for each of the four inferences in each group
at Time 1 and Time 2 on the Abstract Conditional Inference Task (error bars
show ±1 standard error of the mean).
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Inference Group Time 1 Time 2
MP Mathematics 7.39(0.89) 7.75(0.49)
Psychology 7.11(1.15) 7.53(0.77)
DA Mathematics 2.68(2.52) 1.75(2.18)
Psychology 5.84(2.34) 5.32(2.33)
AC Mathematics 3.70(2.31) 2.70(2.41)
Psychology 6.37(1.26) 5.58(2.46)
MT Mathematics 5.16(2.05) 4.80(2.32)
Psychology 6.63(1.21) 5.47(2.78)
Table 6.3: Mean number items endorsed on the Abstract Conditional Inference
Task by Inference type, Group and Time point with standard deviations in
parentheses.
Interpretations. To evaluate changes in each group’s inclination towards the
four interpretations of the abstract conditional, four 2×2 ANOVAs were carried
out, one for each interpretation, each with one within-subjects factor: Time
(start and end of the year), one between-subjects factor: Group (mathematics,
psychology) and two covariates: RAPM and CRT. The means for each group’s
interpretation indices at each time point are presented in Table 6.4 and Figure
6.6.
For the MCI, there was no significant interaction, F (1, 59) = 2.20, p =
.143, ηp
2 = .04, but there was a trend in the direction predicted by the TFD.
Paired samples t-tests demonstrated that the mathematics group’s MCI was
significantly higher at Time 2 (M=24.09, SD=4.10) than at Time 1 (M=22.16,
SD=4.24), t(43) = 3.68, p = .001, d = 0.55, whereas the psychology group’s
MCI did not change over time, t(18) = .70, p = .495, d = 0.18 (Time 1:
M=17.53, SD=3.61, Time 2: M=18.11, SD=2.69). Furthermore, the mathem-
atics group’s MCI was significantly higher than the psychology group’s at Time
Group Time Material Defective Biconditional Conjunctive
Maths Time 1 22.16 (4.24) 19.84 (5.58) 18.93 (5.67) 19.25 (2.92)
Time 2 24.09 (4.10) 22.50 (5.98) 17.00 (5.61) 19.91 (2.76)
Control Time 1 17.53 (3.61) 12.26 (4.07) 25.95 (3.88) 17.00 (2.87)
Time 2 18.11 (2.69) 15.16 (7.34) 23.89 (7.20) 18.32 (3.16)
Table 6.4: Mean index scores for each interpretation of the abstract conditional
statement at Time 1 and Time 2 in each group (standard deviations in paren-
theses).
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Figure 6.6: Interaction between Group and Time on Abstract Conditional In-
ference indices (error bars show ±1 standard error of the mean).
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1, t(67) = 4.23, p < .001, d = 1.17, and at Time 2, t(78) = 6.71, p < .001, d =
1.72.
A similar pattern of results emerged for the DCI. Although there was no sig-
nificant interaction, F < 1, paired samples t-tests demonstrated that the math-
ematics group’s DCI was significantly higher at Time 2 (M=22.50, SD=5.98)
than at Time 1 (M=19.84, SD=5.58), t(43) = 4.35, p < .001, d = 0.66, whereas
the psychology group’s DCI was only marginally higher at Time 2 (M=15.16,
SD=7.34), than at Time 1 (M=12.26, SD=4.07), t(18) = 2.05, p = .056, d =
0.49. The mathematics group’s DCI was significantly higher than the psycho-
logy group’s both at Time 1, t(67) = 5.28, p < .001, d = 1.55, and Time 2,
t(78) = 4.98, p < .001, d = 1.09.
For the CCI, there was no significant interaction between Time and Group,
F (1, 59) = 1.50, p = .225, ηp
2 = .025. The mathematics group’s scores did not
change over time, t(43) = 1.45, p = .155, d = .23, while the psychology group’s
CCI increased marginally over time, t(18) = 1.99, p = .062, d = .44, (Time 1:
M=17.00, SD=2.87, Time 2: M=18.32, SD=3.16).
The analysis on BCI scores also showed no significant interaction, F (1, 59) <
1, but paired samples t-tests showed that the mathematics group’s BCI de-
creased over time, t(43) = 3.07, p = .004, d = −0.46, (Time 1: M=18.93,
SD=5.67, Time 2: M=17.00, SD=5.61), while the psychology group’s BCI did
not change, t(18) = 1.46, p = .161, d = −0.36.
The power for theses analyses was low due to the unexpectedly high drop
out rate in the psychology group (resulting in only 19 psychology participants
who completed the abstract Conditional Inference task and covariates at both
time points4). The t-tests presented above suggested that there were trends
in the direction predicted by the AS level results in the mathematics group.
However, the means presented in Table 6.4 suggest that the psychology group
showed a similar pattern of changes, although not significantly and with smaller
effect sizes.
Thematic Conditional Inference.
Endorsement rates. Endorsement rates of each inference type were analysed
with a 2×4×2 ANOVA with two within-subjects factors: Time (start and end of
the year) and Inference Type (MP, DA, AC, MT), one between-subjects factor:
Group (mathematics and psychology), and two covariates: Time 1 RAPM and
Time 1 CRT. There was no significant three-way interaction, F < 1, (see Figure
6.7). The means and standard deviations for this interaction are displayed in
Table 6.5. Neither group changed in their endorsement rates of any of the
4A second cohort of students are currently taking part in the study and a more powerful
analysis will be carried out after May 2013.
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Figure 6.7: Mean endorsement rates for each of the four inferences in each group
at Time 1 and Time 2 on the Thematic Conditional Inference Task (error bars
show ±1 standard error of the mean).
inference types over time (all ps>.25).
Interpretations. Next, each group’s inclination towards the four interpreta-
tions of the thematic conditional were investigated.
Four 2×2 ANOVAs were carried out, each with one within-subjects factor:
Time (start and end of the year), one between-subjects factor: Group (math-
ematics, psychology) and two covariates: RAPM and CRT. The means for each
groups’ interpretation indices at each time point are presented in Table 6.6 and
Figure 6.8. There were no significant interactions between Time and Group for
any of the interpretation indices, all ps>.330. Furthermore, unlike on the Ab-
stract Conditional Inference task, the mathematics students’ four index scores
did not change over time on the thematic version, all ps>.235, and neither did
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Inference Group Time 1 Time 2
MP Mathematics 3.78(0.64) 3.84(0.64)
Psychology 3.57(0.98) 3.81(0.60)
DA Mathematics 0.69(1.02) 0.67(1.15)
Psychology 2.38(1.75) 2.29(1.82)
AC Mathematics 0.80(1.14) 0.60(1.16)
Psychology 2.29(1.68) 2.33(1.80)
MT Mathematics 1.93(1.57) 2.07(1.63)
Psychology 2.57(1.63) 3.00(1.58)
Table 6.5: Mean number of items endorsed on the Thematic Conditional Infer-
ence Task by Inference type, Group and Time point with standard deviations
in parentheses.
the psychology students’ scores, all ps>.175.
As with the Abstract Conditional Inference task, the power for the analyses
of the Thematic Conditional Inference task was low due to the high drop out
rate in the psychology group. However, in this case not even the paired t-tests
comparing the mathematics group’s interpretation indices across the two time
points were significant.
Finally, the BBI scores for each group at each time point were analysed with a
2×2 ANOVA with one within-subjects factor: Time (start and end of the year)
and one between-subjects factor: Group (mathematics, psychology), and two
covariates, RAPM and CRT. This showed no main effect of Group, F (1, 62) < 1,
no main effect of Time F (1, 62) < 1, and no interaction, F (1, 62) < 1 (which
remained non-significant without CRT as a covariate, p =.482, see Table 6.7
for means and standard deviations). Paired t-tests showed that neither group’s
BBI changed significantly over time (both ps>.290).
Because there were no significant interactions between Group and Time for
Group Time Material Defective Biconditional Conjunctive
Maths Time 1 12.22 (2.79) 12.36 (2.66) 7.20 (2.64) 9.56 (1.59)
Time 2 12.64 (2.78) 12.51 (2.76) 7.18 (2.38) 9.71 (1.80)
Control Time 1 9.48 (2.06) 8.33 (4.61) 10.81 (5.16) 8.90 (1.97)
Time 2 10.19 (3.19) 8.19 (4.69) 11.43 (4.65) 8.86 (1.68)
Table 6.6: Mean index scores for each interpretation of the thematic condi-
tional statement at Time 1 and Time 2 in each group (standard deviations in
parentheses).
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ference interpretation indices (error bars show ±1 standard error of the mean).
Mathematics Psychology
Time 1 .31 (1.47) .62 (1.24)
Time 2 -.02 (1.20) .38 (1.02)
Table 6.7: Mean belief bias index scores for each group at Time 1 and Time 2
(standard deviations in parentheses).
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any of the outcome measures, there was no need for regression analyses predict-
ing change from RAPM, CRT and Group.
6.4 Discussion
This chapter aimed to investigate the development of reasoning skills in un-
dergraduate mathematics students. Mathematics students were compared to
psychology students in a longitudinal investigation of abstract and thematic
conditional reasoning behaviour.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that mathematics students would become more de-
fective, and to a lesser extent more material, in their interpretation of abstract
conditional statements. This hypothesis was not supported by a series of AN-
OVA analyses, but paired t-tests showed that the mathematics students’ ab-
stract conditional reasoning became more defective (d = 0.66, which is similar
to the change in the AS level mathematics students, d = 0.88), more material
(d = 0.55, compared to d = 0.49 in the AS level mathematics students), and
less biconditional over time (d = −0.46, compared to d = −0.51 in the AS
level mathematics students), whereas the psychology students’ behaviour did
not change. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and with the results from AS
level students in Chapter 5, but the lack of statistical significance in the inter-
action analyses prevents any firm conclusions from being drawn. The analyses
suffered from low statistical power due to the small sample size in the psycho-
logy group, and this may have prevented the ANOVA analyses from reaching
significance.
There were no clear predictions for the Thematic Conditional Inference task.
Chapter 5 showed no change in a Thematic Syllogisms task in AS mathematics
students, and it was unclear whether the discrepancy with abstract conditional
inference change in that study was due to the thematic aspect of the task or the
syllogistic aspect. In the present study, the mathematics students’ reasoning
with abstract conditionals showed a trend in the predicted direction, but did
not show any trend in a Thematic Conditional Inference task, despite the items
having the same structure. This suggests that context may be the issue. It may
be the case that studying mathematics only influences one’s ability to think
about abstract conditional statements, which is plausible given that much of
mathematics itself is abstract in nature. If this is the case there are important
implications for the Theory of Formal Discipline. Statements such as that made
by Oakley, that “the study of mathematics cannot be replaced by any other
activity that will train and develop mans purely logical faculties to the same
level of rationality” (1949, p.19), and Plato, that “we must endeavor to persuade
those who are to be the principal men of our state to go and learn arithmetic”
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(375B.C/2003, p. 256), seem to imply a more general influence of studying
mathematics on reasoning skills, an influence that would extend to rational day-
to-day reasoning. If mathematics actually only influences abstract conditional
reasoning behaviour, then the impact on everyday reasoning is surely quite
limited.
Another issue that was raised in Chapter 5 was the confound between study-
ing mathematics and science subjects at A level. It was not possible to invest-
igate the influence of studying mathematics independently of science subjects,
but there was no correlation between number of science subjects studied and
changes in DCI within the mathematics group. The undergraduate participants
in this study were all taking single-honours degrees, meaning that the mathem-
atics students were studying only mathematics, and they still showed a trend
towards becoming more material and defective in their reasoning. This suggests
that mathematics alone is associated with changes in conditional reasoning, al-
though the effect may still be exaggerated by studying other science subjects in
conjunction.
A final issue that this study aimed to resolve was the discrepancy in findings
between Lehman and Nisbett (1990) and Inglis and Simpson (2009a). Lehman
and Nisbett (1990) found that the number of mathematics modules taken by
undergraduates at a US university was correlated with the extent of their im-
provement on a conditional reasoning task. Inglis and Simpson (2009a), how-
ever, failed to find any improvement on an abstract conditional inference task
in mathematics undergraduates at a UK university. The data presented here
adds (a small amount of) weight to the findings of Lehman and Nisbett (1990),
suggesting that there is a relationship between undergraduate level mathematics
and development of conditional reasoning skills. The reason for no change or
trends being found in Inglis and Simpson’s (2009a) study is unclear – their de-
pendent measure and participants’ level of study was the same as in this study.
Perhaps the modules studied by our participants and theirs were different and
are differentially related to reasoning skills. Another possibility is that there
were changes in the defective interpretation, which Inglis and Simpson (2009a)
did not investigate. Further research which compares the influence of studying
different mathematics curriculums, both at undergraduate and other levels of
education, on development in conditional reasoning skills would be useful for
clarifying this issue.
Concerning the potential mechanisms of the mathematics students’ improve-
ment in abstract conditional reasoning skills, the data presented in this chapter
is unfortunately of little help. The trends reported are consistent with the hy-
pothesis laid out in Chapter 5, that studying mathematics teaches students to
assume p and reason about q, thereby making their reasoning from conditional
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statements more defective. However, the lack of significant interactions between
Time and Group for the DCI or any of the other indices means that the results
are only suggestive, and it was not possible to examine the influence of changes
to RAPM and CRT on changes to reasoning behaviour.
6.4.1 Summary of novel findings
The study presented here has made three tentative contributions to our under-
standing of the Theory of Formal Discipline:
1. Studying mathematics at undergraduate level is associated with a trend
towards more defective, more material, and less biconditional reasoning.
2. Studying mathematics in isolation from science subjects is associated with
similar changes to those found in the AS level students who were studying
mathematics in conjunction with science subjects.
3. The changes may only apply to abstract conditional reasoning problems,
not thematic ones.
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Chapter 7
Linguistic factors in
mathematics students’
conditional reasoning: ‘if
then’ versus ‘only if’
7.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to establish whether or not mathematics students
hold a deep understanding of conditional logic, i.e. do they reason based on the
logical structure of the conditional, or are they influenced by surface features?
Chapters 5 and 6 suggested that mathematics students’ development in reas-
oning was limited to abstract conditional inference, not extending to thematic
conditional inference or thematic syllogisms. The question raised here is the
extent to which mathematics students’ reasoning is generalised within abstract
conditional inference. The conditional inference task used in the other studies
of this thesis presented participants with conditional statements of the form ‘if
p then q ’. A logically equivalent way to phrase this statement is ‘p only if q’
(Evans, 1977), as demonstrated in truth table form in Table 7.1. If mathematics
students hold a deep understanding of conditional logic, then they should treat
‘if then’ (IT) and ‘only if’ (OI) statements in the same way. This was not the
case with non-mathematics students in a study by Evans (1977).
Evans (1977) presented undergraduate students, who were not specifically
from mathematics courses, with a 16 item version of the conditional inference
task. Half of his participants saw the items phrased ‘if p then q’ and the other
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p q p only if q if p then q
T T T T
T F F F
F T T T
F F T T
Table 7.1: Truth table for the conditional statements ‘p only if q ’ and ‘if p then
q ’.
half saw them as ‘p only if q’. Evans hypothesised an interpretational difference
between IT and OI rules, based on the principles of necessity and sufficiency.
In material implication, the antecedent is sufficient for the consequent and the
consequent is necessary for the antecedent. However, these two principles are
differentially emphasised in IT and OI rules. Using Evans’s example, the IT
rule ‘If he is a policeman then he is over 5ft 9in in height’ seems to emphasise
the sufficiency of the antecedent. On the other hand, the equivalent OI rule ‘He
is a policeman only if he is over 5ft 9in in height’, seems to emphasise the ne-
cessity of the consequent (Evans, 1977, p. 300). Based on this difference, Evans
hypothesised two things: firstly, that more MP inferences would be made on IT
rules than OI rules, because the minor premise in MP affirms the antecedent,
whose sufficiency is emphasised in IT rules, and secondly, that more MT infer-
ences would be made on OI rules than IT rules, because the minor premise in
MT negates the consequent, whose necessity is emphasised in OI rules (when
the necessary consequent is negated it is more obvious from OI rules that the
antecedent must also be negated).
These hypotheses were supported by the data. MP inferences were endorsed
100% of the time in the IT condition, compared to 76% in the OI condition.
MT inferences, on the other hand, were endorsed 42% of the time in the IT
condition compared to 59% of the time in the OI condition. An unpredicted
difference found by Evans (1977) was in AC inferences. Evans did not predict
a difference between IT and OI interpretations of AC inferences, but found a
higher endorsement rate in the OI condition, of 84%, than in the IT condition,
of 67%. Evans conjectured that this could be due to participants making a
conversion, where they take ‘p only if q’ to mean ‘if q then p’; an IT reading with
the antecedent and consequent reversed. In this case, an OI AC inference would
be equivalent to an IT MP inference, which could explain the high endorsement
rate of the invalid AC inference in the OI condition. An OI MP would become
an IT AC, an OI DA an IT MT, and an OI MT would become an IT DA. When
reclassified in this way, the OI endorsement rates became more similar to the IT
endorsement rates on all but OI MT/IT DA (see Table 7.2), so the conversion
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IT inference IT endorsements OI endorsements OI inference
MP 100 84 AC
DA 38 59 MT
AC 67 76 MP
MT 42 38 DA
Table 7.2: Percentage endorsement rates for each IT inference and the equivalent
converted OI inference in Evans’s (1977) study.
hypothesis may go some of the way to explaining the interpretational difference.
In the study presented below, the aim was to see whether advanced mathem-
atics students would show the same interpretational difference found by Evans
(1977), or whether they would respond simply to the logic of the conditional
and interpret IT and OI statements in the same way, given that they are logic-
ally equivalent. The TFD would predict the second scenario; it suggests that
studying mathematics “develop[s] mans purely logical faculties” (Oakley, 1949,
p. 19), which is taken here to mean that they gain a deep understanding of logic
free from the influence of surface-level interference.
However, if mathematics students do simply become familiar with forward
inferences, such as ‘if p then q’, and learn to assume p, they will respond dif-
ferently to the seemingly ‘backwards’ inference ‘p only if q’. In this case, the
invitation is not to assume p but rather to question it. It is not clear what
the preferred interpretation of an OI statement would be in this case, but the
defective interpretation would presumably be significantly lower in the OI con-
dition than in the IT condition. It might be expected that AC inferences would
be endorsed significantly more in the OI condition than in the IT condition; an
OI conditional emphasises the uncertainty of q, but the necessity of p when q
is true. Therefore an AC inference, in which q is confirmed, would presumably
lead to high endorsement rates. This was the pattern found by Evans (1977)
with non-mathematics students (explained as a conversion from OI AC to IT
MP). If mathematics students do reason defectively because they have become
familiar with ‘forward’ IT inferences, then in the case of ‘backward’ inferences
(OI) we would expect them to reason in the same way as non-mathematics
students: with higher endorsement of AC.
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7.2 Method
7.2.1 Participants
Participants were 61 third year mathematics undergraduate students at Lough-
borough University. They took part on a voluntary unpaid basis during a lecture
course on Applied Statistics and later analysed the anonymised data as part of
an SPSS lab session.
7.2.2 Design
The study followed a between-subjects experimental design with two conditions:
‘if then’ and ‘only if’ phrasing of the conditional inference task. Thirty parti-
cipants were assigned to the ‘if then’ condition and 31 to the ‘only if’ condition.
7.2.3 Measures
Participants completed the 32 item conditional inference task with the condi-
tional statement phrased as either ‘if p then q’ (IT condition) or as ‘p only if
q’ (OI condition). The letters and numbers used in the problem were identical
across conditions, as were the task instructions. The order of items was ran-
domised between participants.
7.2.4 Procedure
Participants took part during a lecture. They were informed that they would
be given a reasoning task and that they would analyse the data in a subsequent
SPSS lab session. Participants were asked to work alone and in silence and
were not informed that there were two versions of the task. Task booklets were
handed out to the participants with the conditions in an alternating order so
that the condition a participant received depended only on the order in which
they sat in the lecture hall.
7.3 Results
The results are presented in two parts. First, an analysis of endorsement rates
for each inference is presented for comparison to Evans’s (1977) study. Second,
an analysis of the interpretation indices in each condition is presented.
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If then Only if
Modus Ponens 7.20 (1.00) 6.10 (1.90)
Denial of the antecedent 2.90 (2.43) 3.97 (2.17)
Affirmation of the consequent 3.43 (2.52) 6.65 (1.96)
Modus Tollens 4.67 (2.26) 5.74 (1.73)
Table 7.3: Mean number of items endorsed (out of 8) for each of the four
inferences by condition. Standard deviations in parentheses.
7.3.1 Endorsement rates
Mean endorsement rates were subjected to a 2 (condition: IT, OI) × 4 (inference
type: MP, DA, AC, MT) analysis of variance (ANOVA). This revealed a signi-
ficant main effect of inference type, F (3, 177) = 35.81, p < .001, ηp
2 = .38, with
MP items being endorsed most often (M = 6.64, SD = 1.61), followed by MT
items (M = 5.21, SD = 2.07), followed by AC items (M = 5.07, SD = 2.76),
with DA items being endorsed least often (M = 3.44, SD = 2.34). There was
also a significant main effect of condition, F (1, 59) = 8.74, p = .004, ηp
2 = .13,
with more items being endorsed in the OI condition (M = 22.45, SD = 5.27)
than the IT condition (M = 18.20, SD = 5.95). Finally, there was a signific-
ant interaction between condition and inference type, F (3, 177) = 16.07, p <
.001, ηp
2 = .21. The means for this interaction are shown in Table 7.3. Sig-
nificantly more MP inferences were endorsed in the IT condition than the OI
condition, t(59) = 2.82, p = .007, d = 0.72. Conversely, significantly fewer
AC inferences, t(59) = 5.58, p < .001, d = −1.43, and MT inferences t(59) =
2.09, p = .041, d = −0.53, were endorsed in the IT condition. There were also
marginally fewer DA inferences endorsed in the IT condition than the OI con-
dition, t(59) = 1.81, p = .075, d = −0.46. These data are displayed in Figure
7.1.
To investigate the plausibility of Evans’s (1977) conversion hypothesis for
explaining the different endorsement rates across conditions, the IT endorsement
rates are compared to the converted OI endorsement rates in the same manner
(summarised in Table 7.4). This gives 6.09 OI MP inferences endorsed compared
to 3.43 IT AC inferences, 3.97 OI DA inferences endorsed compared to 4.67
IT MT inferences, 6.65 OI AC inferences endorsed compared to 7.20 IT MP
inferences, and 5.74 OI MT inferences endorsed compared to 2.90 DA inferences.
The match provided here is not as close as in Evans’s data.
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Figure 7.1: Mean endorsement rates for each inference type in the IT and OI
conditions (error bars represent ±1 SE of the mean).
IT inference IT endorsements OI endorsements OI inference
MP 7.20 6.65 AC
DA 2.90 5.74 MT
AC 3.43 6.09 MP
MT 4.67 3.97 DA
Table 7.4: Mean endorsement rates for each IT inference and the equivalent
converted OI inference.
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7.3.2 Interpretations of the conditional
Next, the four interpretation indices were compared across conditions. A 2×4
ANOVA with one between-subjects factor: Conditional Type (IT, OI) and one
within-subjects factor: Interpretation (MCI, DCI, BCI, CCI) revealed a signific-
ant main effect of Interpretation, F (3, 177) = 5.067, p = .002, ηp
2 = .08, a signi-
ficant main effect of Conditional Type, F (1, 59) = 14.29, p < .001, ηp
2 = .20, and
a significant interaction, F (3, 177) = 14.27, p < .001, ηp
2 = .20 (see Figure 7.2).
The interaction was followed up with an independent samples t-test for each of
the four interpretations comparing the means in the IT and OI conditions. The
MCI was significantly higher in the IT condition (M=21.53, SD=4.19) than in
the OI condition (M=17.23, SD=3.62), t(59) = 4.30, p < .001, d = 1.10. The
DCI was also higher in the IT condition (M=20.20, SD=5.87) than in the OI
condition (M=13.74, SD=4.40), t(59) = 4.87, p < .001, d = 1.25. Conversely,
the BCI was significantly lower in the IT condition (M=18.20, SD=5.95) than
in the OI condition (M=22.45, SD=5.27), t(59) = 2.96, p = .004, d = −0.76.
There was no difference between the CCI in the IT (M=19.07, SD=3.27) and
OI conditions (M=19.03, SD=3.07), t(59) = .04, p = .966, d = 0.01.
7.4 Discussion
In this thesis, mathematics students have been shown to become more defect-
ive in abstract conditional reasoning (see Chapters 5 and 6). Here, the nature
of mathematics students’ conditional reasoning behaviour was investigated; do
they respond to the underlying logical structure of a conditional inference prob-
lem, as predicted by the TFD, or are they swayed by the linguistic phrasing, as
was the case for Evans’s (1977) non-mathematics participants?
A group of third year undergraduate mathematics students completed the
32 item conditional inference task in one of two conditions: with IT phrasing or
with OI phrasing. The results were largely in line with those of Evans (1977) who
studied non-mathematics students. Participants endorsed more MP inferences
in the IT condition, and more AC and MT inferences in the OI condition. This
suggests two things: firstly that mathematics students do not treat conditional
statements based on the underlying logic, and secondly that Evans’s unpredicted
finding of higher endorsement rates of AC inferences in the OI condition than
the IT condition was replicated.
Mathematics students did not appear to respond to conditional inference
problems based on the underlying logical structure. Rather, they interpreted
the conditional statements differently depending on the phrasing. There were
main effects of condition for both endorsement rates and interpretation indices,
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Figure 7.2: Mean interpretation indices in the IT and OI conditions (error bars
represent ±1 SE of the mean).
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with the students reasoning more in line with the material and defective inter-
pretations in the IT condition than in the OI condition and more in line with
the biconditional interpretation in the OI condition than in the IT condition.
This is contrary to the TFD, which posits that “the study of mathematics
cannot be replaced by any other activity that will train and develop man’s
purely logical faculties to the same level of rationality” (Oakley, 1949, p. 19),
that “through mathematics we also wish to teach logical thinking” (Amitsur
in Sfard, 1998, p. 453), and that mathematics “disciplines the mind, develops
logical and critical reasoning, and develops analytical and problem-solving skills
to a high degree (Smith, 2004, p. 11). It seems clear that these quotes support
the hypothesis of mathematics students holding an abstract understanding of
logic and being able to avoid the influence of phrasing or context with their
‘disciplined minds’. Instead, they were very much swayed by the phrasing of
the problems, with the IT and OI groups responding significantly differently to
three of the four inference types (MP, AC, MT) and marginally differently to
the fourth (DA).
This is inconsistent with the TFD but consistent with the hypothesis that
mathematics students learn to assume p and reason about q, i.e. to become
more defective in their conditional reasoning. While it is possible that students
do become more defective with OI statements over time, the present study sug-
gests that they are not as defective with OI statements as they are with IT
statements by the third year of an undergraduate mathematics degree. The ex-
planation proposed for this finding, as in Chapters 5 and 6 is that mathematics
exposes students to statements of the IT form more often than the OI form, and
that this familiarity with, practice with, and feedback on problems including IT
statements fosters students’ competency with them. A lack of exposure to OI
statements could mean that mathematics students treat them in same way as
non-mathematicians do. Indeed, Houston (2009) argued that most mathem-
atical statements are of the form ‘if statement A is true, then statement B is
true’, even if they are heavily disguised (p. 63). Furthermore, he argued that in
mathematics A is assumed to be true, even if it is clearly not true, and the truth
or falsity of B is then deduced. This is a forward moving deduction, whereas ‘A
only if B’ can be seen a backwards deduction where A is in question. As Hou-
ston points out, it can be difficult to see this as being equivalent to ‘if A then
B’. We return to this idea below. First, Evans’s (1977) conversion hypothesis
is considered, which we shall see points to the same conclusion.
The data supported Evans’s (1977) unpredicted finding of more AC infer-
ences being endorsed in the OI condition than in the IT condition. Evans
suggested that this was due to participants making an illicit conversion from
‘p only if q’ to ‘if q then p’. In this case, an OI AC inference is equivalent to
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Maths IT Evans’s IT Maths OI Evans’s OI
Modus Ponens 90.0% 100% 76.2% 87.5%
Denial of the antecedent 36.3% 68.8% 49.6% 50.0%
Affirmation of the consequent 42.9% 75.0% 83.1% 81.3%
Modus Tollens 58.3% 75.0% 71.8% 81.3%
Table 7.5: Percentage of items endorsed for each inference type across par-
ticipants in four groups: the current maths IT group, the current maths OI
group, Evans’s (1977) IT non-maths group and Evans’s OI non-maths group.
an IT MP inference, which would explain the high endorsement rate. However,
although the conversion hypothesis seemed to provide a good fit to Evans’s data
in most cases, it did not seem so well suited to this data. There are fairly large
differences between both MP and MT endorsement rates from IT problems and
the equivalent converted OI endorsement rates.
This may be because, as suggested above, mathematics students perform
similarly to non-mathematicians on OI statements but in a more material and
defective way than non-mathematicians on IT statements, so performance in
the two conditions cannot be compared as if they were a product of the same
process. In other words, the mathematicians’ IT performance is qualitatively
different to their OI performance and to non-mathematicians’ performance on
both phrasings. An inspection of the endorsement rates in Table 7.5 shows that
the mathematics students in the IT group endorsed considerably fewer DA,
AC and MT inferences than the non-mathematics IT group in Evans’s study.
The endorsement rates for the mathematics OI group, however, do not differ
drastically from Evans’s non-mathematics OI group.
Taken together, the differential performance in the IT group compared to the
OI group, and the informal similarity of mathematicians and non-mathematicians
OI performance, suggests that mathematics students’ advantage in conditional
reasoning is limited to IT statements, while their performance on OI statements
is similar to that of non-mathematicians. An explanation for this could be that
mathematics students become very used to assessing IT statements but don’t
have so much exposure to OI statements (Houston, 2009). Contrary to the TFD,
this leads them to behave more defectively (and materially) on IT conditional
statements but it doesn’t change their interpretation of conditionals per se.
7.4.1 Summary of novel findings
1. It appears as though the mathematics advantage in conditional reason-
ing that has been found previously is not due to better understanding of
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the underlying logic. Instead, mathematics students only appear to be
successful with conditional statements phrased ‘if p then q’ and not with
those phrased ‘p only if q’.
2. In the case of OI statements, mathematicians may well behave in much
the same way as non-mathematicians.
3. What this means for the TFD is that grand claims about mathematics
improving the ‘purely logical faculties’ are in fact overstated. The re-
lationship between mathematics and logical reasoning skills may be far
narrower than previously thought.
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Chapter 8
The role of the heuristic
level in mathematics
students’ conditional
reasoning
8.1 Introduction
According to Stanovich’s (2009a) tri-process model of cognition, reasoning oc-
curs through three levels: the heuristic level, the algorithmic level and the
reflective level. Heuristic, or Type 1 processing, is fast, automatic, and un-
demanding of working memory resources. Type 2 processing is deliberate and
demanding of working memory, being implemented at the algorithmic level and
prompted by the reflective level (see Section 2.6). It is possible that the math-
ematics students’ increased defective reasoning found in Chapter 5 comes about
via one or more of these three levels. The aim of this chapter is to investigate
the potential of the heuristic level to be the source of the change. Is it the case
that mathematics students’ increased tendency for defective reasoning stems
from the heuristic level of cognition?
The heuristic level of cognition is characterised by fast and automatic pro-
cessing that is largely obscured from conscious reflection. The output of heuristic
processing and an associated feeling of the rightness of the output are available
to introspection (Thompson, 2010; Thompson, Prowse Turner & Pennycook,
2011), but can quickly be influenced by Type 2 reflection. This means that the
best way to measure a heuristic-level response is with speeded accuracy (Evans
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& Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Gillard, Van Dooren, Schaeken & Verschaffel, 2009b;
Heit & Rotello, 2010) and reaction time methods (Gillard, 2009). On the as-
sumption that heuristic processing is fast and automatic and Type 2 processing
is slower, it can be assumed that responses given under short time limits have
been produced with little or no Type 2 input.
Several studies have previously used speeded accuracy methods to investigate
heuristic level processing in reasoning tasks. Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005)
gave participants 10 seconds to respond to each item on a belief bias syllogisms
task and found that the number of logical responses decreased while belief bias
increased, relative to a free-time condition. This suggests that the influence
of prior beliefs on reasoning behaviour is a heuristic process and that Type 2
processing is required to override it in order to give normatively logical answers.
Similarly, when Gillard et al. (2009b) limited their participants to 17 seconds for
responding to problems that induced a proportionality heuristic, the number of
proportional responses increased and the number of correct answers decreased.
This suggests that proportional reasoning is also heuristic based and that Type 2
processing is required to override it in cases where it leads to incorrect responses.
I am aware of only one study that has investigated conditional reasoning
under time restraints. Evans et al. (2009) gave their participants 48 conditional
reasoning problems which differed in believability and validity, and had them
respond either within 5 seconds of the conclusion being shown or without time
pressure. The problems consisted of the four usual inferences, modus ponens
(MP), denial of the antecedent (DA), affirmation of the consequent (AC) and
modus tollens (MT), and participants responded with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to indicate
whether they thought the conclusion necessarily followed from the premises.
Under time pressure participants were less inclined to accept inferences overall,
and although an analysis of inference type was not reported, an inspection of
means suggests that the decline in acceptance did not differ by inference type.
The mathematics students investigated in Chapter 5 became less inclined to
accept MT, DA and AC inferences over time, thereby becoming more defective
in their reasoning. It seems possible from Evans et al.’s (2009) findings that this
could be due to a heuristic process: if greater reliance on heuristic processing
leads to higher rejection rates of conditional inferences, it could be the case
that mathematics students become more inclined to rely on their intuitions
over time and that this leads to their increased rejection rates. Alternatively,
it could be the case that exposure to ‘if then’ statements leads to a change
in the heuristic level whereby practice in assuming p to be true leads to the
assumption becoming automatic. The study reported below will investigate
these possibilities. Mathematics undergraduate students and a sample of non-
mathematicians completed the standard Conditional Inference task under two
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conditions: one in which they were forced to respond quickly and one in which
they could spend as long as they liked thinking. Several hypotheses can be
derived based on previous research:
1. The non-mathematicians will accept fewer inferences overall in the fast
condition than in the slow condition, in line with Evans et al.’s (2009)
findings from a subject-general sample.
2. Mathematics students will respond more defectively in the slow condition
than will the non-mathematicians, in line with the findings reported in
Chapter 5.
3. If the heuristic level is responsible for the mathematics students’ defective
reasoning, then the mathematics students will remain more defective than
the non-mathematics students in the fast condition, and will be no less
defective in the fast condition than in the slow condition.
4. If the heuristic level is not responsible for mathematics students’ defect-
ive reasoning, then they will respond no more defectively than the non-
mathematicians in the fast condition, and less defectively in the fast con-
dition than in the slow condition.
If the heuristic level is responsible for mathematics students’ defective reas-
oning, the two explanations proposed above will need to be differentiated. The
explanations were that mathematics students either become more reliant on
heuristic level outputs, or that their heuristic level changes in a way that makes
them focus more on assuming p. These hypotheses can be differentiated by
comparing the groups’ reaction times (RTs) in the slow condition: if math-
ematicians rely more on their heuristic level processing, then even in the slow
condition they should respond faster than non-mathematicians.
8.2 Method
8.2.1 Design
Mathematics and non-mathematics students completed Evans et al.’s (1995)
Conditional Inference task twice: first under speeded conditions and second
with as much time as they wanted. The fast version was always completed first:
in a within-subjects design there was a risk that completing the slow condition
first could allow participants to memorise some items or remember which types
of inference they considered valid and invalid, and that this could subsequently
influence their performance in the fast condition. Participants also completed a
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subset of Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM) after the Conditional
Inference Task to control for between-groups differences in intelligence.
8.2.2 Participants
Participants were 16 undergraduate and postgraduate mathematics students
and 16 undergraduate and postgraduate non-mathematics students and staff
from Loughborough University. There were 16 females and 16 males and the
ages ranged from 18 to 51 (M =23.90, SD=8.09). Each was paid £5 for their
time.
8.2.3 Procedure
The experiment was administered on a computer using E-prime 2.0 (Schneider,
Eschman & Zuccolotto, 2002). First, participants completed an unrelated study
involving the Cognitive Reflection Test. For the present study the first task they
completed was the fast version of the Conditional Inference task. They saw in-
structions, 4 practice items, and 32 real items. In each trial, the conditional
premise was presented alone for 1.5 seconds before the minor premise and con-
clusion were added simultaneously for an additional 2.5 seconds, in which time
the participant was required to respond. The time limit was based on pilot
testing which suggested that these timings prevented participants from being
able to consciously reflect on the questions while preserving a heuristic level
response (matching bias allows MP items to be readily accepted without con-
scious processing, see more below). In the slow version, participants again saw
the conditional premise alone for 1.5 seconds, but when the minor premise and
conclusion were added participants were not allowed to respond for the first 5
seconds, after which they could take as long as they wanted to respond. This
restriction prevented the fast version from influencing the participants into re-
sponding quickly in the slow version.
Finally, participants completed a subset of items from RAPM (Stanovich &
West, 1998), composed of 18 items with a 10 minute time limit. Participants
were then thanked, paid and dismissed.
8.3 Results
8.3.1 Manipulation check and covariate assessment
As a manipulation check, endorsement rates on Modus Ponens items in the fast
condition were compared to chance level with a one sample t-test. Because MP
can be easily endorsed through matching bias, a heuristic response, we would
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expect to find high endorsement rates even when participants are restricted
to heuristic level processing, as long as the time limit wasn’t too short. The
time limit used here (which was based on pilot testing) was somewhat shorter
than had been used in previous studies. Nevertheless, participants endorsed
MP inferences at above chance levels (M=5.78, SD=1.58, maximum possible
= 8), t(31) = 6.37, p < .001, suggesting that the time limit was sufficient for the
heuristic level to generate a response.
Responses to the Conditional Inference task were coded into four variables to
reflect consistency with each of the four interpretations of the conditional state-
ment: Material Conditional Index, Defective Conditional Index, Biconditional
Index and Conjunctive Index. Each variable was a score out of 32, with higher
scores indicating that responding was more consistent with that interpretation
of the conditional statement.
Scores on the RAPM were significantly higher in the mathematics group
(M =10.31, SD=2.21) than the non-mathematics group (M =6.19, SD=2.10),
t(30) = 5.40, p < .001, d = 1.91, and were significantly positively correlated with
the Material Conditional Index in the slow condition, r(32) = .63, p < .001,
the Defective Conditional Index in the slow condition, r(32) = .59, p < .001,
and significantly negatively correlated with the Biconditional Index in the slow
condition, r(32) = −.53, p = .002. RAPM and Conjunctive responding in the
slow condition did not correlate significantly (p=.223).
Responses to the Conditional Inference task in the fast condition were not
expected to correlate with the RAPM, since the fast condition was designed to
reduce algorithmic level (measured by the RAPM) responding. This was indeed
the case for the Defective Conditional, Biconditional and Conjunctive Indexes
(all ps>.130). The significant correlation between RAPM and the slow Defective
Conditional Index and the non-significant correlation between the RAPM and
fast Defective Conditional Index were significantly different, t(29) = 2.17, p =
.019, r = .48. This was also the case for the significant correlation between
RAPM and the slow Biconditional Index and the non-significant correlation
between RAPM and the fast Biconditional Index, t(29) = 2.04, p = .025, r = .46.
This serves as a second manipulation check, suggesting that the time limit in
the fast condition was not so long as to allow the algorithmic level to interfere.
However, the Material Conditional Index in the fast condition was posit-
ively correlated with the RAPM, r(32) = .39, p = .029. This may be due
to the fact that the mathematics group had higher intelligence scores, and as
shown in previous chapters, are more likely to respond in line with the mater-
ial conditional than non-mathematicians. This explanation was supported by
correlations performed on each group separately, which revealed no significant
correlations between RAPM scores and the Material Conditional Index in the
157
fast condition within either group (both ps>.400).
8.3.2 Main analyses
Hypothesis 1: Endorsement rates in the non-mathematics group
Evans et al. (2009) found that a non-mathematics sample of participants ac-
cepted fewer inferences overall when forced to respond quickly to a Conditional
Inference task. To investigate whether this was also the case here, the non-
mathematics group’s endorsement rates of each of the four inferences was sub-
jected to a 2×2 ANOVA with two within-subjects factors: Time (fast, slow) and
Inference (MP, DA, AC, MT). The mean endorsement rates under each condi-
tion are presented in Figure 8.1. The mathematics students were not included
in this analysis because of the assumption that they reason in a qualitatively
different manner to non-mathematicians (as elaborated on in Chapter 7).
Contrary to Evans et al.’s (2009) findings, there was no main effect of Time,
F (1, 45) = 1.41, p = .254, ηp
2 = .09, but there was a significant interaction
between Time and Inference, F (1, 45) = 8.20, p < .001, ηp
2 = .35. In the
fast condition participants accepted fewer MP inferences, t(15) = 4.65, p <
.001, d − 1.46, fewer MT inferences, t(15) = 2.44, p = .028, d = −0.64, and
marginally more DA inferences, t(15) = 2.03, p = .061, d = 0.58, than in the slow
condition. Whereas Evans et al. (2009) found an overall decline in endorsement
rates when participants were forced to respond quickly, here it appears that only
the valid inferences were significantly less likely to be endorsed.
This was further investigated with a 2×2 ANOVA with two within-subjects
factors: Time (fast, slow) and Validity (valid, invalid), which revealed a signi-
ficant interaction, F (1, 15) = 24.94, p < .001, ηp
2 = .62. T-tests with Bonfer-
roni corrections revealed that participants did indeed accept fewer valid infer-
ences in the fast condition (M=8.25, SD=2.27) compared to the slow condi-
tion (M=11.38, SD=2.75), t(15) = 5.17, p < .001, d = −1.24, whereas there
was no significant difference between the number of invalid inferences endorsed
in the fast (M=8.25, SD=4.37) and slow (M=9.81, SD=3.33) conditions,
t(15) = 1.61, p = .128, d = −0.40, see Figure 8.2. Hypothesis 1, that non-
mathematicians would endorse fewer inferences in the fast condition than in the
slow condition, is therefore partially supported.
Hypothesis 2: Interpretations of the conditional without time pres-
sure
Hypothesis 2 stated that mathematics students would respond more defectively
than the non-mathematics group in the slow condition, in line with the results of
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Figure 8.1: Mean endorsement rates for each inference type (out of a maximum
of 8 items) in the fast and slow conditions for the non-mathematics group (error
bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean.).
Chapter 5. The mean interpretation indices in the slow condition are presented
in Figure 8.3.
The interpretation indices in the slow condition were subjected to a 2×4
ANOVA with one within-subjects factor: Interpretation (Material, Defective,
Biconditional, Conjunctive) and one between-subjects factor: Group (mathem-
atics, non-mathematics). Because the indices are derived from the same set of
responses and are therefore not independent, it was expected that this analysis
would show a main effect of interpretation. There was in fact a marginally signi-
ficant main effect of Interpretation, F (3, 90) = 2.68, p = .052, ηp
2 = .082, where
the Material Conditional Index had the highest mean (M=22.09, SD=5.06),
followed by the Defective Conditional Index (M=20.66, SD=5.76), then the
Conjunctive Index (M=19.91, SD=3.48), and finally the Biconditional Index
(M=18.34, SD=5.59).
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Figure 8.2: Endorsement rates for valid and invalid inferences in the fast and
slow conditions for the non-mathematics group (error bars show ±1 standard
error of the mean).
There was also a significant interaction between Group and Interpretation,
F (3, 90) = 5.02, p = .003, ηp
2 = .143. Planned t-tests revealed that the math-
ematics group had a significantly higher Material Conditional Index (M=25.06,
SD=5.85) than the non-mathematics group (M=19.13, SD=3.38), t(30) =
3.52, p = .001, d = 1.24. The mathematics group also had a marginally higher
Defective Conditional Index (M=22.56, SD=1.19) than the non-mathematics
group (M=18.75, SD=1.55), t(30) = 1.96, p = .060, d = 0.69. A post hoc power
analysis calculated the achieved power for this analysis as 0.61, suggesting that
the sample size was too small despite the effect size being reasonably large. A
sample of 94 participants would have been necessary to find a significant effect
of this size with a power of 0.95. The mathematics group also had a margin-
ally lower Conjunctive Index (M=18.81, SD=3.66) than the non-mathematics
group (M=21.00, SD=3.01), t(30) = 1.85, p = .075, d = −0.65. There was no
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Figure 8.3: Mean interpretation indices in each group in the slow condition
(error bars show ±1 standard error of the mean).
difference between the groups in the Biconditional Index.
Although this pattern of results reflects those of Chapter 5, the interaction
between Group and Interpretation lost significance once RAPM was included as
a covariate, F (3, 87) = 1.26, p = .293, ηp
2 = .04. Hypothesis 2 is therefore par-
tially supported; the mathematics group did have a marginally higher Defective
Conditional Index than the non-mathematics group when RAPM was not ac-
counted for, but they also had a significantly higher Material Conditional Index
than the non-mathematics group, and with an effect size nearly twice as large
(d = 1.24 versus d = 0.69). Moreover, the initial interaction lost significance
once RAPM scores were accounted for, suggesting that the group differences in
interpretation could not be disaggregated from the effect of differences in gen-
eral cognitive ability. However, this analysis had lower power than the analyses
in the AS level study.
One possible reason for the high rate of MCI in the mathematics students in
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Group Time Material Defective Biconditional Conjunctive
Maths Fast 18.44 (4.11) 19.94 (4.91) 16.44 (3.95) 20.31 (2.82)
Slow 25.06 (5.85) 22.56 (4.75) 17.06 (4.36) 18.81 (3.66)
Control Fast 14.44 (3.97) 16.69 (4.19) 18.06 (4.09) 19.69 (3.28)
Slow 19.13 (3.38) 18.75 (6.19) 19.63 (6.48) 21.00 (3.01)
Table 8.1: Mean index scores for each interpretation of the conditional state-
ment in the fast and slow condition for the mathematics and non-mathematics
(control) group (standard deviations in parentheses).
this study could be that they had a higher mean intelligence level than those in
the other studies reported in this thesis. In the current group of mathematics
students, the mean RAPM score was 10.31 with a 10 minute time limit, whereas
in the undergraduate study the mean score at Time 1 was 11.10 with a 15 minute
time limit (roughly equivalent to 7.40 under a 10 minute time limit). In the AS
level students, there was again a 15 minute time limit and the mean RAPM
score at Time 1 was 9.29 (roughly equivalent to 6.19 under a 10 minute time
limit). These means suggest that the group of mathematics students in the
current study may indeed have been more intelligent, and this in turn could
account for their high MCI scores.
Hypotheses 3 and 4: Interpretations of the conditional under time
pressure
Hypothesis 3 stated that if the heuristic level was responsible for the mathemat-
ics group’s more defective reasoning compared to the non-mathematics group,
then the difference would remain in the fast condition, and the mathematics
group’s Defective Conditional Index would not differ between the fast and slow
conditions. Hypothesis 4 alternatively stated that if the heuristic level was not
responsible, then the mathematics group would respond no more defectively
than the non-mathematicians in the fast condition, and less defectively in the
fast condition than in the slow condition.
To distinguish between these hypotheses, conditional inference scores were
subjected to a 2×4×2 ANOVA with two within-subjects factors: Time (slow,
fast) and Interpretation (Material, Defective, Biconditional, Conjunctive), one
between-subjects factor: Group (mathematics, non-mathematics) and one co-
variate: RAPM score. The means for each group’s interpretation index under
the fast and slow conditions are presented in Table 8.1. As expected, due to the
non-independence of the interpretation scores, there was a main effect of inter-
pretation, F (3, 87) = 3.38, p = .022, ηp
2 = .104. Surprisingly, there was no main
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Figure 8.4: Consistency with each of the four interpretations for the mathem-
atics and control group under the fast and slow conditions. Error bars show ±1
s.e.m.
effect of Time, F < 1. However, there was a significant three-way interaction
between Group, Time and Interpretation, F (3, 87) = 2.89, p = .040, ηp
2 = .09,
as depicted in Figure 8.4.
This interaction was further investigated with 2×2 ANOVAs for each of the
four interpretations, with one within-subjects factor: Time (fast, slow), and one
between-subjects factor: Group (mathematics, non-mathematics). RAPM was
also included as a covariate in the analyses of Material, Defective and Bicondi-
tional responding, given the correlations reported above. For the Material Con-
ditional Index, there was no significant interaction between Time and Group,
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F < 1. For the Defective Conditional Index, there was a marginally signifiant
interaction between Time and Group, F (1, 29) = 4.06, p = .053, ηp
2 = .12, as
was the case for the Biconditional Index, F (1, 29) = 3.22, p = .083, ηp
2 = .10,
and the Conjunctive Index, F (1, 30) = 3.91, p = .057, ηp
2 = .12.
Given that the Defective Conditional Index is of most interest here (it
increased alongside mathematical study in the AS level students in Chapter
5) and that it produced the smallest p-value (p=.053) and largest effect size
(ηp
2 = .12) of the 2×2 ANOVA interactions reported above, the nature of the
marginally significant interaction was investigated with t-tests. For the De-
fective Conditional Index, the mathematics group’s scores were significantly
higher in the slow condition (M=22.56, SD=4.75) than in the fast condition
(M=19.94, SD=4.91), t(16) = 2.49, p = .025, d = 0.54, whereas the non-
mathematics group’s scores did not differ by Time (p=.21). The mathematics
group’s Defective Conditional Index remained marginally higher than the non-
mathematics group’s under both the fast, t(30) = 2.02, p = .053, d = 0.71, and
slow, t(30) = 1.96, p = .060, d = 0.69, conditions. Hypotheses 3 and 4 were pro-
posed as alternatives to each other, yet it seems that neither can be conclusively
rejected.
Finally, each group’s RTs in the slow condition were compared to test the
hypothesis that mathematics students may rely more heavily on Type 1 pro-
cessing than non-mathematicians. An independent samples t-test showed no
significant difference between groups in RTs, t(29) = .41, p = .685, d = 0.15.
8.4 Discussion
The aim of this Chapter was to investigate whether the heuristic level of cog-
nition, as described by Stanovich (2009a), could potentially be the source of
the change found in mathematics students’ reasoning behaviour described in
Chapter 5. Mathematics students at A level were found to become more de-
fective in their reasoning over time. This was characterised by a reduction in
their endorsement of DA, AC and MT inferences. Evans et al. (2009) found
that when participants were forced to rely on heuristic level processing, their
endorsement of all four inferences decreased. It therefore seemed plausible that
greater reliance on the heuristic level could be the source of mathematicians’
defective reasoning.
A group of mathematics undergraduates and postgraduates and a group of
non-mathematics undergraduates and staff at Loughborough University com-
pleted the Conditional Inference task twice: first with a total of 4 seconds to
read and respond to each item, and second with a minimum of 6.5 seconds to
read the problem before being allowed to respond. The fast time limit was shown
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to be long enough for the heuristic level to process the problems (demonstrated
by above-chance acceptance of MP inferences) and short enough to prevent the
algorithmic level from influencing the response (demonstrated by a lack of cor-
relation between RAPM and responding to the Conditional Inference task in
the fast condition).
Hypothesis 1 stated that non-mathematicians would endorse fewer inferences
in the fast condition than in the slow condition, as was the case with Evans et
al.’s (2009) participants. This was partially supported: rather than a general
decrease in endorsement rates, only valid items were endorsed less in the fast
condition. This suggests that Type 2 processing is responsible for correctly en-
dorsing MP and MT inferences when non-mathematicians reason without time
pressure, while the heuristic level is responsible for incorrectly endorsing DA and
AC inferences. This is also supported by the marginally higher endorsement of
DA inferences in the fast condition.
Hypothesis 2 stated that mathematics students would respond more de-
fectively than non-mathematicians in the slow condition. The mathematics
students’ Defective Conditional Index was marginally higher than the non-
mathematicians’, and the effect size was medium-large (d = 0.69). However,
this difference was accounted for by the mathematics group’s higher RAPM
scores. The same was true for the Material Conditional Index, which was sig-
nificantly higher in the mathematics group than in the non-mathematics group
with a large effect size (d = 1.24), although only before RAPM had been taken
into account. A comparison of RAPM scores in the mathematics group from
this study and from the undergraduate and AS level studies suggested that
the mathematics students investigated here had a higher mean level of intel-
ligence, which could account for their high level of conformity to the material
conditional.
In Chapter 5, mathematics AS level students were found to become increas-
ingly defective in their reasoning over time compared to a control group, and
to a lesser extent they conformed more to a Material Conditional interpretation
over time. Here, this trend seems to have changed. It may be the case that at
the start of post-compulsory mathematics study (i.e. AS level) students become
less biconditional and more defective in their reasoning. In other words, they
begin to endorse fewer DA, AC and MT inferences. Later in their mathematical
study (i.e. at undergraduate level), it may be that students move more towards
a material interpretation of the conditional, whereby they still endorse fewer DA
and AC inferences, but revert back to correctly accepting more MT inferences.
In line with this suggestion, the data presented in Chapter 6 showed that first
year mathematics undergraduates became more material in their interpretation
of the conditional over time, although the interaction between Time and Group
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was not significant. Furthermore, the third year undergraduate mathematics
students in Chapter 7 had a slightly higher MCI than DCI in the ‘if then’
condition (see Figure 7.2). Alternatively, the contradiction between the AS
students in Chapter 5 and the undergraduate students here could be due to a
selection effect, whereby (on the whole) only the most intelligent A level students
go on to study at degree level. These hypotheses would be best tested with a
longitudinal study of a much longer duration than those presented in this thesis,
for example, from the beginning of AS level until the end of undergraduate
degree level, or even into postgraduate study.
Hypothesis 3 stated that if the heuristic level was responsible for the math-
ematics group’s more defective reasoning compared to the non-mathematics
group, then the difference would remain in the fast condition, and the mathem-
atics group’s Defective Conditional Index would not differ between the fast and
slow conditions. Hypothesis 4 alternatively stated that if the heuristic level was
not responsible, then the mathematics group would respond no more defectively
than the non-mathematicians in the fast condition, and less defectively in the
fast condition than in the slow condition.
Neither of these hypotheses could be conclusively ruled out based on the
data presented here. On the one hand, mathematics students responded less
defectively under time pressure than they did without time pressure, suggesting
that the algorithmic level is at least partly responsible for this tendency, in
support of Hypothesis 4. On the other hand, mathematics students responded
marginally more defectively than the non-mathematics group under the fast
condition as well as under the slow condition, suggesting that the heuristic
level is in some part responsible for their tendency to respond defectively in
line with Hypothesis 3. However, the mathematics group was only marginally
more defective than the non-mathematics group under both time limits, and
this may suggest that Hypothesis 4 has more support: the difference between
the mathematics students’ Defective Conditional Index under the fast and slow
conditions was significantly different with an effect size of d = 0.54, indicating
that defective responding was half of a standard deviation higher in the slow
condition. This could reflect the influence of Type 2 processing in the slow
condition, either stemming from the algorithmic or reflective level.
Perhaps the mixed results indicate that the heuristic level is partly, but not
entirely, responsible for mathematics students’ defective reasoning behaviour.
The tendency to consider not-p cases irrelevant (the trademark of defective
conditional reasoning) may begin as a conscious process and gradually become
ingrained into the heuristic level, similar to the skill of driving (Lewin, 1982;
Newstead, 2000). Alternatively, it could be that repeated exposure to forward
inferences (as discussed in Chapter 5) creates an unconscious habit to consider
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not-p cases irrelevant. This tendency could be reinforced by Type 2 thinking
through a justification process as described by Evans (2006, 2011), which could
in turn foster the defective tendency in subsequent problems, leading to the
higher Defective Conditional Index in the slow condition. If this is the case,
it could be that increasing conscious reflection eventually triggers mathematics
students to move more towards material conditional responding later in their
mathematics education.
It was suggested based on the findings of Evans et al. (2009) that mathem-
atics students’ defective reasoning could be due to greater reliance on heuristic
level processing as opposed to a change in the nature of heuristic level pro-
cessing. If this were the case, we would expect mathematicians to respond
faster than non-mathematicians even without time pressure. This was not the
case: there was no significant difference between the two groups’ mean RTs in
the slow condition. This is consistent with the hypothesis that any heuristic
level differences between groups was due to the nature of the processing rather
than on choosing Type 1 over Type 2 processing.
8.4.1 Summary of novel findings
1. The heuristic level is not entirely responsible for mathematics undergradu-
ates’ defective reasoning compared to a control group: mathematics stu-
dents responded significantly less defectively when restricted to heuristic
level processing.
2. The heuristic level is not entirely redundant either: the mathematics stu-
dents were marginally more defective than the control group even when
restricted to heuristic level processing.
3. It seems that both Type 1 and Type 2 processing play roles in mathematics
students’ conditional reasoning behaviour.
In some sense it is necessarily the case that Type 1 and Type 2 processing
play roles in mathematics students’ reasoning behaviour; the heuristic level is
continually working to direct our attention to relevant aspects of our environ-
ment, and when time is not restricted Type 2 processing is also always engaged
to some extent, even if only to approve the heuristically-generated response
(Evans, 2011).
The next chapter investigates the potential for executive functions, i.e., the
efficiency of algorithmic level processing, to be responsible for the differences
between mathematics and non-mathematics students’ reasoning behaviour. A
group of non-mathematics undergraduates’ executive function skills were meas-
ured, along with their Conditional Inference behaviour, in order to see whether
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different interpretations of the conditional statement are associated with better
or worse working memory, inhibition, or shifting skills.
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Chapter 9
The role of executive
functions in conditional
reasoning ability
9.1 Introduction
It was established in Chapters 5 and (to a lesser extent) 6 that studying math-
ematics at advanced levels is associated with changes in logical reasoning skills,
as the TFD suggests. However, rather than reasoning more normatively, it was
found that participants studying mathematics increasingly rejected DA, AC and
MT inferences and increasingly accepted MP inferences, making their reasoning
more defective. A remaining question is what the mechanism of these changes
might be. In Chapter 2 Stanovich’s (2009a) tri-process model of cognition was
identified as a useful starting point for narrowing the possibilities down. The
tri-process model proposed that cognition happens via three levels: the heuristic
level, the algorithmic level and the reflective level. The focus of this chapter will
be on the algorithmic level: the computational capacity and efficiency available
for effortful, conscious thinking.
It was argued in the literature review that general intelligence and executive
functions are constructs that form part of the algorithmic level. The longitudinal
study reported in Chapter 5 suggested that intelligence was not a mechanism
of the increased defective reasoning, but the aim of this chapter is to assess the
potential of executive functions to be a mechanism.
Executive functions regulate how we use our cognitive resources in order to
complete a task (Banich, 2009; Stanovich, 2009a). There are thought to be
three executive functions: working memory, inhibition, and shifting (Banich,
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2009; Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis & Evans, 2004; Gilhooly & Fioratou,
2009; Miyake et al., 2000). Working memory is the ability to hold and update
information in the conscious mind. Individuals vary in how much information
they can hold in mind, how accurately they can monitor this information and
how effectively they can remove information no longer needed and replace it with
new information. Inhibition is the ability to refrain from making unwanted re-
sponses and can be physical or cognitive. An example of physical inhibition
would be not looking at a distraction when asked to focus your vision on a set
point. An example of cognitive inhibition would be reciting your new phone
number soon after changing it from a long-standing old one. Shifting refers to
the ability to shift attention between different tasks being carried out simul-
taneously, for example, safely changing a CD whilst driving, or cooking whilst
watching a film without losing track of either task.
The three executive functions have been shown to be clearly separable from
each other and from intelligence (Ardila et al., 2000; Arffa, 2007; Friedman et
al., 2006; Handley et al., 2004; Miyake et al., 2000). The study reported here
investigated the contribution of each executive function to conditional reasoning
behaviour in a group of non-mathematics undergraduates. If any relationships
were found, it would indicate a potential mechanism via which studying math-
ematics might change reasoning behaviour. In particular, it might be the case
that studying mathematics improves one’s working memory, inhibition or shift-
ing ability, and that this in turn leads to changed reasoning ability. For this to
the be the case, it is necessary that individual differences in executive functions
are related to individual differences in reasoning behaviour. The study reported
here will not test whether executive functions are the mechanism behind the
TFD, only whether it is possible that they are.
Previous research has shown that working memory capacity is implicated
in various forms of reasoning, including conditional reasoning (De Neys, 2006;
Garcia-Madruga, Gutierrez, Carriedo, Luzon & Vila, 2007; Verschueren et al.,
2005). Early research investigated conditional reasoning from the view of Bad-
deley & Hitch’s (1974, 1986) model of working memory. According to the model,
working memory consists of three components: the central executive, the phon-
ological loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad. The latter two components are
short-term storage systems for verbal and visuo-spatial information, respect-
ively, while the central executive controls attention and moderates the flow of
information to and from the slave systems. Toms, Morris and Ward (1993)
found that only the central executive component was recruited for conditional
reasoning, while the visuo-spatial sketch pad and phonological loop were unre-
lated. They suggested that conditional reasoning requires an abstract working
memory medium as opposed to a verbal or visuo-spatial one. This finding of
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a relationship between conditional reasoning and working memory has been
conceptually replicated in various studies. De Neys, Schaeken and d’Ydewalle
(2005) found that participants with high working memory spans reasoned more
in line with the material conditional than participants with low working memory
spans. Furthermore, Verschueren et al. (2005) found that working memory capa-
city was not only related to reasoning performance, but it determined whether a
reasoner would use a probabilistic (low capacity) or counterexample (high capa-
city) strategy to solve problems. However, the relationship may not be straight-
forward: Handley, Capon, Copp and Harper (2002) found that performance on
a conditional reasoning task was only related to verbal working memory, not
spatial working memory. It appeared from their findings as though successful
conditional reasoning was dependent on the simultaneous processing and storage
of verbal representations, which contradicts Toms et al.’s (1993) findings.
While it is well established that working memory is in some way import-
ant for reasoning, research on the inhibition and shifting aspects of executive
functions and their relation to reasoning ability is more sparse. To the best
of my knowledge, the relationship between conditional reasoning and shifting
ability has not yet been investigated and few studies have investigated the role
of inhibition in reasoning. In a study of 10-year-old children’s reasoning ability,
Handley et al. (2004) found that while reasoning with belief-based problems
was related to both working memory and inhibition skills, belief-neutral reas-
oning was only related to working memory. Similarly, Markovits and Doyon
(2004) found that ability to inhibit irrelevant information was related to success
in solving thematic conditional reasoning problems, as well as, and separately
from, working memory. Inhibition, then, may only be a necessary cognitive tool
when a reasoner needs to decontextualise a problem in order to solve it, i.e.
when they need to inhibit their prior beliefs. If this is the case then the ab-
stract Conditional Inference task used throughout this thesis, and in the study
reported in this chapter, may not require inhibition skills, but it seems likely
that performance will be related to working memory.
Moving beyond overall Conditional Inference task performance, the study
presented here offers an opportunity to investigate the Negative Conclusion and
Affirmative Premise biases, and several hypotheses can be formulated. Negative
Conclusion Bias (NCB) is the tendency to draw more inferences with negative
conclusions than with positive conclusions and is most often observed on DA
and MT inferences (Schroyens et al., 2001). NCB has been explained in two
ways which can be tested here. One suggestion is that NCB is a heuristic bias,
whereby reasoners assume that ‘not p’ is more likely to be true than ‘p’ (there
are more non-human things than there are humans, and more non-tables than
there are tables, for example) and so are more willing to accept it (Pollard &
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Evans, 1980; Oaksford et al., 2000). Alternatively, NCB may be a bias at the
level of Type 2 processing. Evans et al. (1995) has proposed that the problem
lies with the double negation inherent in DA and MT inferences with affirmative
conclusions. When making an MT inference from the conditional ‘If A then 3’,
the premise ‘not 3’ leads to the negative conclusion ‘not A’. However, when
making the same inference from the conditional ‘If not A then 3’, an extra step
is involved to reach the affirmative conclusion that is necessary: ‘not 3’ implies
‘not (not A)’, which needs to be converted into ‘A’. Evans et al. (1995) argued
that reasoners do not easily see the equivalence of ‘not (not p)’ and ‘p’, and
that this is the source of difficulty. The quadratic relationship found between
NCI and DCI in Chapter 5 suggests that the latter explanation is more likely to
be the case - NCI appeared to be a by-product of systematic reasoning rather
than a heuristic process.
These two competing hypotheses make different predictions for the relation-
ship between NCB and executive functions. If NCB stems from a heuristic level
process, then better inhibition may be related to greater success at avoiding it.
If, on the other hand, NCB stems from a struggle to complete the extra logical
step necessary to make MT and DA inferences with negative conclusions, then
we might expect better working memory to be associated with a lower rate of
the bias.
The Affirmative Premise Bias (APB) is the tendency to accept more infer-
ences from affirmative premises than from negative premises, particularly when
the negative premise is implicit. For example, the inference ‘if not-A then 3;
A; therefore not-3’ is accepted more often than the inference ‘if A then 3; D;
therefore not-3’, even though they are both invalid DA inferences. This may be
due to a matching bias in Type 1 processing, whereby the premise ‘A’ is more
obviously related to the conditional than is the premise ‘D’ (Evans & Handley,
1999). As with NCB, if APB is indeed due to a Type 1 processing error, then
the ability to avoid it may be related to inhibition.
To summarise, there are several predictions for the current study:
1. The three components of executive function will be unrelated.
2. Working memory will be positively correlated with the MCI.
3. Given the abstract nature of the task, inhibition will not be related to
reasoning behaviour.
4. NCB will be related to inhibition OR working memory scores.
5. APB will be related to inhibition scores.
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There is no suggestion from previous research that shifting scores will (or
will not) be related to performance on an abstract Conditional Inference task,
so this aspect is exploratory.
9.2 Method
9.2.1 Participants
Ninety-four undergraduate students from various engineering courses took part
unpaid during a lab session for a second year introductory statistics module.
They later analysed the data for their coursework assignment. All participants
gave informed consent for their data to be used for research purposes.
9.2.2 Measures
There were four measures, one for each of working memory, inhibition, shifting,
and conditional reasoning. All tasks were programmed and administered in
E-Prime version 2.0 (Schneider et al., 2002).
Working memory
Working memory was measured using a 2-back task. Participants saw a string of
letters presented sequentially and were instructed to press a ‘Target’ key when
the letter on screen matched the one presented two letters back. For all other
letters, they pressed a ‘Not a target’ key. An example sequence of trials is shown
in Figure 9.1. There were 90 trials, 30 of which were targets, and the task was
preceded by a practice session of 20 trials. Letters were presented for 500ms
with 1000ms gaps between letters. The measure taken was mean accuracy.
Inhibition
A version of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) was used as a measure of cognitive
inhibition. In a no conflict condition, participants saw strings of @ symbols
presented in coloured fonts and were instructed to identify the colour of the
font. In a conflict condition, participants saw colour names presented in a
different coloured font, for example, the word ‘blue’ presented in a red font, and
were again instructed to identify the colour of the font, ignoring the conflicting
word. Conditions were blocked and each consisted of 40 trials preceded by 10
practice trials. Five colours were used - red, blue, green, yellow and purple.
Participants responded to each trial by pressing one of five keys which were
identified with coloured stickers. Participants were instructed to respond as
quickly and accurately as possible and the stimuli was displayed until response.
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Figure 9.1: Example sequence of trials from the 2-back task
Inhibition ability was calculated as total time taken to complete the conflict list
minus total time taken to complete the no conflict list (Gilhooly & Fioratou,
2009; Miyake et al., 2000). Higher scores therefore reflect a greater cost of
dealing with conflict, and hence poorer inhibition ability.
Shifting
Shifting ability was measured with a letter-number categorisation task. Parti-
cipants saw letter-number pairs and in one list identified whether the letter was
a vowel or consonant, in another list identified whether the number was odd or
even, and in a third list switched between the two tasks. Each list consisted
of 64 trials preceded by 5 practice trials. Each stimulus was displayed until
response with a gap of 500ms between trials. A measure of shifting ability was
calculated as mean response time (RT) on switching trials minus mean RT on
non-switching trials. Higher scores therefore reflect less efficient shifting ability.
Conditional Reasoning
The Conditional Inference task (Evans et al., 1995; Inglis & Simpson, 2009a)
was used as a measure of reasoning ability for consistency with the longitud-
inal studies in which development alongside mathematical study was found (see
Section 4.3.2 for details of the task). In this study, the task was administered
by computer as opposed to pen and paper. Items were presented sequentially
and the order was randomised between participants. Each item remained on
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screen until response with 500ms gaps between trials. Participants responded
by pressing the ‘S’ or ‘L’ key on a standard keyboard, labelled as ‘No’ and ‘Yes’
respectively. Four interpretation indices, MCI, DCI, BCI and CCI, and two
bias indices, NCI (the measure of NCB) and API (the measure of APB), were
calculated from the task as in previous chapters.
9.2.3 Procedure
Participants took part in a computer lab in groups of approximately 30. They
worked alone and in silence. The reasoning task was always completed first so
that the speeded nature of the executive function tasks would not interfere with
performance on the non-speeded reasoning task. The executive function tasks
were presented in a set order: working memory, inhibition, then shifting. The
sessions lasted approximately 35 minutes.
9.3 Results
9.3.1 Data cleaning
One participant’s score on the inhibition task was deleted for being more than
three standard deviations above the mean (representing unusually poor perform-
ance). All other data fell between the task mean and ± 3 standard deviations.
9.3.2 Task performance
Performance across all tasks was as expected. Note that on the working memory
task higher scores reflect better performance, whereas with the inhibition and
shifting tasks higher scores reflect a greater cost of conflict/shifting, and hence
poorer skills. Shifting scores, M = 712.09ms, SD = 350.30, were significantly
above zero, t(93) = 19.76, p < .001, indicating that on average participants
were slower on the switching trials that the non-switching trials, as expected
(Figure 9.2). Inhibition scores, M = 4829.10ms, SD = 6009.47, were also sig-
nificantly above zero, t(92) = 7.75, p < .001, demonstrating that the word/font
colour conflict slowed participants’ responses down, again as expected (Fig-
ure 9.3). Lastly, working memory scores (proportion of items correctly cat-
egorised), M = 0.81, SD = 0.08, were also significantly above the 50% level,
t(93) = 39.02, p < .001 (Figure 9.4). This set of results demonstrates that par-
ticipants were engaging with the tasks and showing the patterns of performance
expected from the literature.
On the conditional inference task, the interpretation index with the highest
mean was the BCI (M = 20.28, SD = 5.99), followed by the CCI (M =
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Figure 9.2: Distribution of scores on the shifting task.
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Figure 9.3: Distribution of scores on the inhibition (Stroop) task.
176
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0
5
10
15
20
25
Working memory score
0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05
Figure 9.4: Distribution of scores on the working memory (2-back) task.
19.81, SD = 3.13), then the MCI (M = 19.47, SD = 3.37), and lastly the
DCI (M = 18.04, SD = 5.61). This is not surprising given previous findings in
this thesis that non-mathematics students tend to show a more biconditional
interpretation than either a defective or material interpretation.
9.3.3 Relationships between executive functions
The relationships between the three executive function measures were analysed
with Pearson correlations and are summarised in Table 9.1. Hypothesis 1 stated
that the three components of executive function would not be related to each
other. Working memory was not significantly correlated with inhibition ability,
r(93) = .02, p = .827, nor with shifting ability, r(94) = −.11, p = .294. Inhibi-
tion and shifting scores were also not significantly correlated, r(93) = .17, p =
.104. This is consistent with previous findings that the three components of ex-
ecutive function are separable skills (Ardila et al., 2000; Arffa, 2007; Friedman
et al., 2006; Handley et al., 2004; Miyake et al., 2000).
Inhibition Shifting
Working Memory .02 -.11
Inhibition - .17
Table 9.1: Correlations between Executive Functions. All ps> .1.
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Inhibition Shifting Working Memory
MCI -.13 -.12 .34**
DCI -.18† -.18† .12
CCI -.13 .01 -.12
BCI .21* .22* -.08
Table 9.2: Correlations between Executive Functions and interpretation indices.
†p < .1, *p <.05, **p <.01.
9.3.4 Executive functions and Conditional Reasoning
Interpretation Indices
The relationships between the three executive function measures and four in-
terpretation indices were investigated with Pearson correlations and are sum-
marised in Table 9.2. Hypothesis 2 stated that working memory scores would
be positively correlated with the MCI, and this was supported by the data,
r(94) = .34, p = .001. Those with better working memory had higher MCI
scores (Figure 9.5).
Hypothesis 3 stated that inhibition scores would not be related to the inter-
pretation indices due to the abstract nature. Contrary to this, inhibition scores
were significantly positively correlated with the BCI, r(93) = .21, p = .041, and
marginally negatively correlated with the DCI, r(93) = −.18, p = .083, suggest-
ing that better inhibition (represented by a lower score) was associated with
a lower BCI and a marginally higher DCI. These two correlation coefficients
were marginally different, t(91) = 1.93, p = .056. This could be because in
non-mathematicians the biconditional interpretation stems from the heuristic
level of cognition, and when inhibited it is replaced with a defective conditional
interpretation. In previous studies there was no indication of a relationship
between inhibition and abstract conditional reasoning behaviour, but this may
be because previous studies only looked at consistency with the material inter-
pretation and didn’t consider a BCI or DCI. It may be the case that taking a
material interpretation depends on other factors (e.g. working memory) whereas
the BCI and DCI are related to inhibition in the manner suggested above.
There were no firm predictions about the relationship between shifting and
conditional reasoning, but shifting was found to be significantly positively cor-
related with the BCI, r(94) = .22, p = .036, and marginally negatively correlated
with the DCI, r(94) = −.18, p = .077. This suggests that better shifting ability
(represented by a lower score) was associated with a less biconditional inter-
pretation of the conditional, and a marginally more defective interpretation,
mirroring the relationships found for inhibition.
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Figure 9.5: Correlation between MCI and working memory scores.
Biases in Conditional Reasoning
Lastly, the relationships between participants’ three executive functions and
their NCI and API were examined, again with Pearson correlations. Hypothesis
4 stated that NCB would be related to inhibition or working memory scores,
and Hypothesis 5 stated that APB would be related to inhibition scores.
NCIs were significantly negatively correlated with shifting scores, r(93) =
−.26, p = .013, indicating, rather counterintuitively, that those with better shift-
ing ability had higher NCIs. An intriguing possibility is that the quadratic re-
lationship between DCI and NCI found in Chapter 5 was driven in some part
by shifting skills, i.e. better shifting ability is associated with higher NCIs and
a more defective interpretation of the conditional (marginally significant here)
meaning that NCIs tend to be higher in people with a more defective interpret-
ation of the conditional, at least up to a point.
NCIs were not correlated with working memory scores, r(93) = .08, p = .472,
nor with inhibition scores, r(92) = −.07, p = .493, contrary to Hypothesis
4. APIs were significantly negatively correlated with shifting ability, r(94) =
−.21, p = .043, where those with better shifting ability showed higher APIs,
similarly to NCIs. APIs were marginally negatively correlated with inhibition,
r(92) = .19, p = .066, suggesting that those with better inhibition ability tend
to show a greater API, contrary to prediction. Lastly, APIs were not correlated
with working memory scores, r(93) = .07, p = .485.
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9.4 Discussion
The aim of this chapter was to investigate the potential for the algorithmic level
of cognition to be a source of change in conditional reasoning behaviour. It was
suggested that the algorithmic level might be a mechanism via which the TFD
could operate, but for this to be the case it would be necessary for there to be a
relationship between measures of the algorithmic level and measures of reason-
ing behaviour. The study presented in Chapter 5 suggested that intelligence, at
the algorithmic level, was not a mechanism for the changes found in the math-
ematics students’ reasoning behaviour. Here, the three executive functions of
working memory, inhibition and shifting were used as further measures of the
algorithmic level. The Conditional Inference task used in Chapters 5 and 6,
which mathematics students were found to significantly change on during AS
level, was used as a measure of reasoning ability. Performance on the executive
function tasks was as expected: the distributions of scores were in line with pre-
vious studies and the three skills were found to be clearly separable (Hypothesis
1).
Hypothesis 2 predicted that working memory would be positively correlated
with the MCI, and this was the case. Better working memory was associated
with a more material interpretation of the conditional, confirming the findings
of previous studies (e.g. De Neys et al., 2005; Verschueren et al., 2005). The
other interpretations did not appear to be related to working memory and MCI
was not correlated with inhibition or shifting skills. This could reflect that,
rather than relying on the inhibition of intuitive responses in favour of an avail-
able alternative interpretation, a material interpretation relies on having the
necessary working memory capacity to apply or calculate the alternative.
Inhibition and shifting were found to be positively correlated with the BCI
and marginally negatively correlated with the DCI. This could indicate that
the BCI is the intuitive interpretation of the conditional statement, and that
those with better inhibition and shifting ability are more able to inhibit this
response in favour of a defective interpretation. This has implications for the
TFD: it is possible that when mathematics students become less biconditional
and more defective in their reasoning patterns (as found in the AS level students
in Chapter 5), it is because their inhibition and shifting skills have improved.
This is not incompatible with the hypothesis put forward in Chapter 5 which
suggested that exposure to forward (‘if then’) inferences encourages students
to consider not-p cases irrelevant. Perhaps it is this exposure which trains
mathematics students to inhibit a biconditional interpretation.
The results related to the NCI and API scores were surprising. For NCI it
was hypothesised that either inhibition (if NCB is a Type 1 bias) or working
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memory scores (if NCB is a Type 2 bias) would be correlated, yet neither was.
For API it was hypothesised that inhibition scores would be correlated, and they
were not. However, it may be the case that the type of inhibition measured here
is not the same type of inhibition required to avoid NCB and APB. In executive
function tasks participants are told how to perform optimally and the measure
reflects how well they can do so (Stanovich, 2009a). In the case of the inhibition
task used here, participants were told to inhibit the interference of font colour on
their responses and the measure was the RT cost of doing so. The spontaneous
inhibition of Type 1 errors by Type 2 processing intervention when solving a
reasoning task may have an altogether different nature. This likely depends
on the thinking dispositions of the reasoner at the reflective level of cognition
rather than the efficiency of implementing inhibition at the algorithmic level
(Stanovich, 2009a). A more effective way to test for the relationship between
inhibition and NCB and APB would be to use a measure of reflective-level
inhibition such as the Cognitive Reflection Test (Toplak et al., 2011).
Such an analysis is possible in the data presented in Chapter 6 where another
set of undergraduate participants completed the CRT and the Conditional Infer-
ence Task. A reanalysis of this data showed that reversed intuitive scores on the
CRT were significantly negatively correlated with APB, r(55) = −.30, p = .028,
indicating that those with better inhibition of intuitive responses to the CRT had
lower APB scores. Conversely, there was not a significant correlation between
reversed intuitive scores to the CRT and NCB scores, r(55) = −.18, p = .187.
These additional analyses suggest that APB is indeed a heuristic bias, while
there is no evidence of this being the case for NCB.
It is important to note that the results of this chapter do not support the idea
that executive functions are responsible for changes to mathematics students’
reasoning behaviour, simply that they could be. The longitudinal study reported
in Chapter 5 suggested that thinking disposition (measured by CRT scores) was
not a factor in changes to reasoning behaviour, but that it was a predictor of
starting reasoning ability. It may be the case that shifting and inhibition play a
similar role, influencing a person’s baseline reasoning ability but not playing a
role in development alongside mathematical study. In order to investigate this
further, another longitudinal study would be required in which mathematics
and non-mathematics students’ executive functions are measured at the start
and end of a period of study. Nevertheless, the results of this chapter do put
forth some evidence that executive functions could be an interesting place to
look for the mechanisms of reasoning change.
181
9.4.1 Summary of novel findings
1. Inhibition and shifting were positively correlated with conformity to a
biconditional interpretation and marginally negatively correlated with con-
formity to the defective conditional interpretation of conditional state-
ments.
2. Affirmative premise bias was not related to an executive function measure
of inhibition, but it was related to a reflective-level measure of inhibition,
the CRT, in a reanalysis of a previous dataset.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions
10.1 Introduction
For millenia it has been assumed that studying mathematics improves general
reasoning skills (Plato, 2003/375B.C; Locke, 1971/1706; Smith, 2004; Walport,
2010; Oakley, 1949). This idea is known as the Theory of Formal Discipline
(TFD). Previous research suggested that there may be a relationship between
advanced mathematics and conditional reasoning skills (Lehman & Nisbett,
1990; Inglis & Simpson, 2008), although it remained unclear whether the re-
lationship was developmental (Inglis & Simpson, 2009a). This thesis aimed to
do two things: establish whether studying mathematics at advanced levels is
associated with changes to reasoning skills, and if so, to investigate some po-
tential mechanisms for the changes found. The findings of my studies suggest
that studying mathematics is associated with a less biconditional and a more
material, and in particular, more defective, interpretation of conditional state-
ments. This appeared to be limited to abstract ‘if then’ conditional reasoning.
The source of the change is discussed further below, after a summary of each
study’s findings.
10.2 Overview of findings and interpretations
Chapter 5 documented a one-year longitudinal study with students taking math-
ematics and English literature AS levels. In the UK, AS level is the first stage of
post-compulsory study, and students can choose which subjects they would like
to study (typically four). The students who had chosen to study mathematics
and those who had chosen English literature did not differ on a Conditional
Inference task (validating deductions from statements of the form ‘if p then
q’) at the start of their studies. By the end of their year of study, however,
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the mathematics students had become significantly less biconditional and sig-
nificantly more material and defective in their interpretation of the conditional
statement, while the English literature students did not change. An examin-
ation of the effect sizes revealed that the change in the defective conditional
index (d = .880) was notably greater than either of the other changes. Because
general intelligence and thinking disposition were controlled for, it seems prob-
able that these changes were driven by the participants’ mathematical study. It
seems that studying mathematics teaches students to assume p, and to therefore
consider not-p cases irrelevant. As discussed in Section 2.3 on rationality, the
material conditional interpretation is the normative standard (considered cor-
rect by logicians), and the defective interpretation, while not being the normat-
ive model, could be considered as ‘better’ than the biconditional interpretation.
In this sense it could be said that the mathematics students improved in their
reasoning with conditional statements. They did not, however, change in their
reasoning with thematic syllogisms, which further supports the idea that the
change was in the students’ interpretation of ‘if’.
The explanation proposed for this finding was that mathematics regularly
exposes students to implicit conditional statements (the AS level syllabus con-
tains no explicit reference to conditional logic) where they are expected to as-
sume p and reason about q. Houston (2009) argued that most mathematical
statements are of the form ‘if statement A is true, then statement B is true’,
even if they are heavily disguised (p. 63). He also argued that in mathematics
A is assumed to be true, even when it is clearly not true (for example, in the
case of contradiction proofs), and the truth or falsity of B is then deduced. For
this reason, Hoyles and Kuchemann (2002) argued that the defective interpreta-
tion is actually more appropriate for mathematics classrooms than the material
interpretation. In line with this idea, Inglis and Simpson (2009b) found that a
group of successful undergraduate mathematics students tended to have a more
defective than material interpretation of conditionals.
The AS study was modified and repeated with first year undergraduate
students in Chapter 6, and the pattern of change was replicated. Mathematics
students’ interpretation of the conditional became more material (d = .55),
more defective (d = .66), and less biconditional (d = −.46) over time. However,
psychology undergraduates showed a similar pattern of change and there was
also an issue of low statistical power. As a result, the pattern of change from
the AS level students could only be detected in the undergraduate students with
t-tests comparing each interpretation index across time.
Rather than a thematic syllogisms task, the participants in Chapter 6 com-
pleted a thematic Conditional Inference task. This allowed the breadth of the
change in a defective interpretation to be investigated. Intriguingly, the math-
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ematics students showed no changes in any of the interpretation indices over
time. Although statistical power was again a problem, there were not even
trends for change. This suggests that studying mathematics may only change
students’ interpretation of abstract conditional statements.
In Chapter 7, third year undergraduate mathematics students completed the
Conditional Inference task with the conditional phrased as either ‘if p then q’
or as ‘p only if q’. These two forms of the conditional are logically equivalent,
but previous research had shown non-mathematics students to treat them dif-
ferently (Evans, 1977). Chapters 5 and 6 suggested that the effect of studying
mathematics on reasoning skills may be limited to abstract conditional state-
ments. It was hypothesised that this could be because students are repeatedly
exposed to (implicit) ‘if p then q’ statements where they are to assume that p is
true and reason about q. Evans (1977) argued that ‘if then’ and ‘only if’ state-
ments are treated differently because necessity and sufficiency are differentially
emphasised in each. While ‘if p then q’ statements emphasise the sufficiency of
p, ‘p only if q’ emphasises the necessity of q. If mathematics students do learn
to assume that ‘if p then q’ means that p is true and they need to reason about
q, as opposed to holding a general defective interpretation of conditional state-
ments, then the necessity of q emphasised in ‘only if’ statements could disrupt
their reasoning and cause them to respond less defectively. This was the effect
found. The students who completed the ‘only if’ version of the task responded
more biconditionally and less defectively and materially then their peers in the
‘if then’ condition. The mathematics students’ endorsement rates in the ‘only
if’ condition appeared to be similar to the non-mathematics students’ endorse-
ment rates in Evans’s (1977) study. This suggests that mathematics students’
defective interpretation of the conditional is limited to ‘if then’ statements, and
may indeed stem from exposure rather than from a general change in their
understanding of conditionals.
The potential of the heuristic level of cognition to be the mechanism of the
change in mathematics students’ reasoning skills was investigated in Chapter
8. Mathematics and non-mathematics undergraduate students completed the
standard abstract Conditional Inference task twice: once with a very short time
limit for each item and once with as much time as they liked. The time limit
was shown to be long enough for the heuristic level to generate a response but
short enough to prevent Type 2 thinking from interfering. Under this restric-
tion, mathematics students responded significantly less in line with a defective
interpretation of the conditional than under the free time condition, but they
were still marginally more defective than the non-mathematics students. This
suggests that the defective interpretation does stem, in part, from the heuristic
level, but that Type 2 thinking plays a significant role in encouraging it.
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These findings fit with the hypothesis proposed above, that mathematics
students are exposed to implicit ‘if then’ statements which means they learn to
assume p and as a consequence hold a defective understanding of the conditional.
Repeated exposure to an implicit stimulus could over time bring about changes
in the heuristic level, in the same way that word and meaning comprehension in
general becomes automatic when we learn to read (LaBerge & Samuels, 1974).
An unconscious habit to consider not-p cases irrelevant could be reinforced by
Type 2 thinking through a justification process (Evans, 2006, 2011), whereby
the output of the heuristic level is justified rather than scrutinised. This in turn
could foster the defective tendency in subsequent problems (“I responded like
this before so I probably think the same about this question”), leading to the
higher Defective Conditional Index in the slow condition.
This leaves open the possibility that increasing conscious reflection or added
‘rules’ (such as the material definition of the conditional) eventually cause the
mathematics students to move more towards material conditional responding
later in their mathematics education. An alternative explanation is that the
material mathematicians actually have a defective interpretation but are able
to use a contradiction proof to endorse MT inferences, making their responding
conform to the material conditional.
Finally, Chapter 9 investigated the role of executive functions (at the al-
gorithmic level of cognition) in conditional reasoning. Although the participants
were non-mathematics students, this allowed an indication of whether there was
any potential for executive functions (shown by a relationship with conditional
reasoning behaviour) to be the mechanism of change. Firstly, it was shown
that working memory was related to the material conditional index, which rep-
licates previous findings. The novel findings were that better inhibition and
shifting were related to less biconditional responding and marginally more de-
fective responding. It was suggested that this could be because the biconditional
interpretation is the intuitive one, and when this can be inhibited it tends to be
replaced by the defective interpretation.
This seems to contradict the findings from Chapter 8, by suggesting that the
defective interpretation is implemented at the level of Type 2 thinking rather
than at the heuristic level. However, the proposal outlined above was that
studying mathematics drives the defective interpretation into the heuristic level,
and the participants in the executive function study were from non-mathematics
degree courses. It could be that in the general population the biconditional
interpretation is the intuitive one, and that high IQ participants are able to
respond more defectively (Evans et al., 2007) because they are more successful
at inhibiting the heuristic response and implementing a Type 2 level response. In
mathematicians, the biconditional interpretation might gradually be replaced by
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a defective interpretation as the intuitive standard, and this is simply reinforced
at the level of Type 2 thinking.
The findings of the executive function study suggest that the change in math-
ematicians might initially come about through greater inhibition of the bicon-
ditional interpretation. Perhaps exposure to ‘if then’ statements encourages
students to inhibit a biconditional interpretation because it is proved inappro-
priate through the examples they are exposed to. The repeated experience of
assuming p and reasoning about q also begins to replace the biconditional in-
terpretation held in the heuristic mind. Eventually, the defective interpretation
becomes intuitive and is further reinforced with Type 2 thinking through a jus-
tification process. At some point, explicit instruction in conditional logic may
provide students with the knowledge necessary for a material interpretation,
and inhibition may again play a role in inhibiting the defective interpretation
in favour of the newly learned material interpretation.
10.3 Future research
The research presented here has opened up several questions that require further
research. Firstly, there was no evidence that studying mathematics has any im-
pact on reasoning beyond abstract ‘if then’ conditional reasoning. Nevertheless,
it would be worthwhile to investigate further types of deductive reasoning skills,
such as disjunctive reasoning, and informal reasoning skills, such as application
of the law of large numbers and other skills described in Chapter 4. It is pos-
sible that different areas of mathematics impact on different types of reasoning
skills, and some of the skills affected were not measured by the conditional and
syllogisms tasks used here.
In a similar vein, it would also be worthwhile to isolate the impact of different
areas of mathematics on abstract conditional reasoning skills. It might be the
case that, for example, geometry learning is not related to changes in conditional
reasoning behaviour while calculus learning is. A first attempt at this difficult
task could be to examine the development of conditional reasoning skills across
different curriculums, for example, in Cyprus where there is a large emphasis
on geometry-based mathematics.
An important avenue of investigation for future work is to see whether the
findings from the AS level study would replicate in an educational system where
it is compulsory for students to study some form of mathematics until the age
of 18. The students in the AS level (and undergraduate) study had chosen to
stay in education and had chosen which subjects to study. It could be that
this disposition is essential for the the effects found. This results from the
quasi-experimental design of the study, which was unavoidable in this case.
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However, replicating the study in a compulsory-mathematics cohort would help
to alleviate the confound of the desire to study mathematics.
Based on the findings from this thesis it was suggested that there may be
a developmental trend in the relationship between studying mathematics and
changes in conditional reasoning behaviour, whereby students go from having
a biconditional view of the conditional to a defective view, and finally to a
material view. This trend, along with the proposed mechanisms (changes to
the heuristic level of cognition which are reinforced at the algorithmic level of
cognition), should be tested. This could be done either with a longitudinal
study following students from AS level up to the end of degree level, and where
possible, into postgraduate study. Alternatively, and far more economically,
the trend could be investigated with a cross-sectional study comparing groups
of mathematicians and non-mathematicians from every stage between AS level
and academic staff level. This would allow us to see whether, and at which stage,
mathematicians change from having a defective interpretation of the conditional
to a material interpretation of the conditional.
10.4 The Theory of Formal Discipline revisited
This thesis was prompted by the TFD, which has claimed, without evidence,
that studying mathematics improves a person’s general reasoning skills. The
evidence found here is very limited in its support of the TFD. While mathem-
atics students did ‘improve’ in abstract conditional reasoning based on ‘if then’
statements, they did not become straightforwardly more normative, and they
were not found to improve on thematic ‘if then’ reasoning, abstract conditional
reasoning of the form ‘only if’, or on thematic syllogisms. Based on this evid-
ence the TFD appears to have been greatly overstated in the past. Such quotes
as “Through mathematics we also wish to teach logical thinking – no better
tool for that has been found so far” from Amitsur (Sfard, 1998, p. 453) and
“The study of mathematics cannot be replaced by any other activity that will
train and develop man’s purely logical faculties to the same level of rationality”
from Oakley (1949, p. 19) are not supported by the research presented here: the
terms ‘logical thinking’ and ‘rationality’ are surely meant to refer to behaviour
beyond abstract ‘if then’ reasoning. This also has implications for mathematics
education policy. The TFD has been used as an argument for mathematics to
be prioritised in the UK National Curriculum in several ways, for example by
Smith (2004), who said that studying mathematics “disciplines the mind, devel-
ops logical and critical reasoning, and develops analytical and problem-solving
skills to a high degree” (p. 11). Further claims of this nature might best be
withheld until they can be supported by evidence.
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Appendix A
Ravens Advanced
Progressive Matrices
The Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices subset used throughout this thesis
consisted of items 12 and 14-30 from Set II. The instructions used are presented
below. Participants were given 15 minutes to complete the task in Chapters 5
and 6 and 10 minutes in Chapter 8.
Pattern completion
In this section you will see grids and each one will have a pattern with a
piece missing. Your task is to decide which of the numbered pieces correctly
completes the grid. In each problem, circle the piece that you think is correct.
There are 18 items and you will have 15 (10) minutes to do as many as you
can. First, take a look at the example problem below. The piece labelled 8 is
correct because it fits the pattern both down and across the grid.
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Appendix B
Conditional Inference Task
On the following pages is the full conditional inference task, including instruc-
tions, as it was presented to participants (but without randomisation of the
items).
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Logic
Please read the following instructions carefully.
This section is concerned with peoples ability to reason logically with sentences
in various forms. You will be presented with a total of 32 problems on the
following pages. In each case you are given two statements together with a
conclusion which may or may not follow from these statements.
Your task in each case is to decide whether or not the conclusion necessarily
follows from the statements. A conclusion is necessary if it must be true,
given that the statements are true.
Each problem concerns an imaginary letter-number pair and contains an initial
statement or rule which determines which letters may be paired with which
numbers. An example of a rule of similar form to those used would be:
© If the letter is B then the number is not 7.
In each case you must assume that the rule holds and then combine it with the
information given in the second statement. This will concern either the letter
or the number of an imaginary pair, for example:
© The letter is Y.
© The number is not 4.
If the information concerns the letter the conclusion will concern the number
and vice-versa.
A full problem looks something like:
If the letter is X then the number is 1.
The letter is X.
Conclusion: The number is 1.
© YES
© NO
If you think the conclusion necessarily follows then please tick the YES box,
otherwise tick the NO box. Please work through the problems in order and
make sure you do not miss any. Do not return to a problem once you have
finished and moved on to another.
205
If you think the conclusion necessarily follows please tick YES, otherwise
tick NO. Do not return to a problem once you have finished and moved on to
another. Answer all questions.
1. If the letter is A then the number is 3.
The letter is A.
Conclusion: The number is 3.
© YES
© NO
2. If the letter is T then the number is 5.
The letter is not T.
Conclusion: The number is not 5.
© YES
© NO
3. If the letter is F then the number is 8.
The number is 8.
Conclusion: The letter is F.
© YES
© NO
4. If the letter is D then the number is 4.
The number is not 4.
Conclusion: The letter is not D.
© YES
© NO
5. If the letter is G then the number is not 6.
The letter is G.
Conclusion: The number is not 6.
© YES
© NO
6. If the letter is R then the number is not 1.
The letter is not R.
Conclusion: The number is 1.
© YES
© NO
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7. If the letter is K then the number is not 3.
The number is not 3.
Conclusion: The letter is K.
© YES
© NO
8. If the letter is U then the number is not 9.
The number is 9.
Conclusion: The letter is not U.
© YES
© NO
9. If the letter is not B then the number is 5.
The letter is not B.
Conclusion: The number is 5.
© YES
© NO
10. If the letter is not S then the number is 6.
The letter is S.
Conclusion: The number is not 6.
© YES
© NO
11. If the letter is not V then the number is 8.
The number is 8.
Conclusion: The letter is not V.
© YES
© NO
12. If the letter is not H then the number is 1.
The number is not 1.
Conclusion: The letter is H.
© YES
© NO
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13. If the letter is not F then the number is not 3.
The letter is not F.
Conclusion: The number is not 3.
© YES
© NO
14. If the letter is not L then the number is not 9.
The letter is L.
Conclusion: The number is 9.
© YES
© NO
15. If the letter is not J then the number is not 8.
The number is not 8.
Conclusion: The letter is not J.
© YES
© NO
16. If the letter is not V then the number is not 7.
The number is 7.
Conclusion: The letter is V.
© YES
© NO
17. If the letter is D then the number is 2.
The letter is D.
Conclusion: The number is 2.
© YES
© NO
18. If the letter is Q then the number is 1.
The letter is K.
Conclusion: The number is not 1.
© YES
© NO
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19. If the letter is M then the number is 4.
The number is 4.
Conclusion: The letter is M.
© YES
© NO
10. If the letter is V then the number is 5.
The number is 2.
Conclusion: The letter is not V.
© YES
© NO
21. If the letter is S then the number is not 8.
The letter is S.
Conclusion: The number is not 8.
© YES
© NO
22. If the letter is B then the number is not 3.
The letter is H.
Conclusion: The number is 3.
© YES
© NO
23. If the letter is J then the number is not 2.
The number is 7.
Conclusion: The letter is J.
© YES
© NO
24. If the letter is U then the number is not 7.
The number is 7.
Conclusion: The letter is not U.
© YES
© NO
25. If the letter is not E then the number is 2.
The letter is R.
Conclusion: The number is 2.
© YES
© NO
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26. If the letter is not A then the number is 6.
The letter is A.
Conclusion: The number is not 6.
© YES
© NO
27. If the letter is not C then the number is 9.
The number is 9.
Conclusion: The letter is not C.
© YES
© NO
28. If the letter is not N then the number is 3.
The number is 5.
Conclusion: The letter is N.
© YES
© NO
29. If the letter is not A then the number is not 1.
The letter is N.
Conclusion: The number is not 1.
© YES
© NO
30. If the letter is not C then the number is not 2.
The letter is C.
Conclusion: The number is 2.
© YES
© NO
31. If the letter is not W then the number is not 8.
The number is 3.
Conclusion: The letter is not W.
© YES
© NO
32. If the letter is not K then the number is not 1.
The number is 1.
Conclusion: The letter is K.
© YES
© NO
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Appendix C
Belief Bias Syllogisms Task
On the following pages is the belief bias syllogisms task and its instructions as
presented to participants. The task is divided into two parts as described in
Chapter 5. Part 1 is questions 1-12 and part 2 is questions 13-24.
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Reasoning with information
Please read the following instructions carefully.
In the following problems, you will be given two premises, which you must as-
sume are true. A conclusion from the premises then follows. You must decide
whether the conclusion follows logically from the premises or not. You must
suppose that the premises are all true and limit yourself only to the information
contained in the premises. This is very important. Decide if the conclusion
follows logically from the premises, assuming the premises are true, and tick
your response.
If you think the conclusion logically follows, assuming that the premises are
true, please tick YES, otherwise tick NO. Answer all questions.
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Part 1:
1. Premises: All things that are smoked are good for the health.
Cigarettes are smoked.
Conclusion: Cigarettes are good for the health.
© YES
© NO
2. Premises: All things made of wood can be used as fuel.
Gasoline is not made of wood.
Conclusion: Gasoline cannot be used as fuel.
© YES
© NO
3. Premises: All lapitars wear clothes.
Podips wear clothes.
Conclusion: Podips are lapitars.
© YES
© NO
4. Premises: All nuts can be eaten.
Rocks cannot be eaten.
Conclusion: Rocks are not nuts.
© YES
© NO
5. Premises: All poor people are unemployed.
Rockefeller is not poor.
Conclusion: Rockefeller is not unemployed.
© YES
© NO
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6. Premises: All guns are dangerous.
Rattlesnakes are dangerous.
Conclusion: Rattlesnakes are guns.
© YES
© NO
7. Premises: All things with four legs are dangerous.
Poodles are not dangerous.
Conclusion: Poodles do not have four legs.
© YES
© NO
8. Premises: All ramadions taste delicious.
Gumthorps are ramadions.
Conclusion: Gumthorps taste delicious.
© YES
© NO
9. Premises: All living things need water.
Roses need water.
Conclusion: Roses are living things.
© YES
© NO
10. Premises: All selacians have sharp teeth.
Snorlups do not have sharp teeth.
Conclusion: Snorlups are not selacians.
© YES
© NO
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11. Premises: All fish can swim.
Tuna are fish.
Conclusion: Tuna can swim.
© YES
© NO
12. Premises: All hudon are ferocious.
Wampets are not hudon.
Conclusion: Wampets are not ferocious.
© YES
© NO
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Part 2:
13. Premises: All opprobines run on electricity.
Jamtops run on electricity.
Conclusion: Jamtops are opprobines.
© YES
© NO
14. Premises: All things that are alive drink water.
Televisions do not drink water.
Conclusion: Televisions are not alive.
© YES
© NO
15. Premises: All bats have wings.
Hawks are not bats.
Conclusion: Hawks do not have wings.
© YES
© NO
16. Premises: All mammals walk.
Whales are mammals.
Conclusion: Whales walk.
© YES
© NO
17. Premises: All large things need oxygen.
Mice need oxygen.
Conclusion: Mice are large things.
© YES
© NO
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18. Premises: All African countries are hot.
Canada is not an African country.
Conclusion: Canada is not hot.
© YES
© NO
19. Premises: All things that move love water.
Cats do not love water.
Conclusion: Cats do not move.
© YES
© NO
20. Premises: All tumpers lay eggs.
Sampets are tumpers.
Conclusion: Sampets lay eggs.
© YES
© NO
21. Premises: All things that have a motor need oil.
Automobiles need oil.
Conclusion: Automobiles have motors.
© YES
© NO
22. Premises: All snapples run fast.
Alcomas do not run fast.
Conclusion: Alcomas are not snapples.
© YES
© NO
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23. Premises: All birds have feathers.
Robins are birds.
Conclusion: Robins have feathers.
© YES
© NO
24. Premises: All argomelles are kind.
Magsums are not argomelles.
Conclusion: Magsums are not kind.
© YES
© NO
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Appendix D
Need for Cognition Scale
Thinking style
Please rate the following statements according to this scale:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
very moderately neither agree moderately very
strongly disagree nor disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
I would prefer complex to simple
problems.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I like to have the responsibility of
handling a situation that requires a
lot of thinking.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Thinking is not my idea of fun. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I would rather do something that re-
quires little thought than something
that is sure to challenge my thinking
abilities.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I try to anticipate and avoid situ-
ations where there is likely a chance
I will have to think in depth about
something.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I find satisfaction in deliberating
hard and for long hours.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I only think as hard as I have to. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I prefer to think about small, daily
projects to long-term ones.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I like tasks that require little
thought once Ive learned them.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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The idea of relying on thought to
make my way to the top appeals to
me.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I really enjoy a task that involves
coming up with new solutions to
problems.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Learning new ways to think doesnt
excite me very much.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I prefer my life to be filled with
puzzles that I must solve.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
The notion of thinking abstractly is
appealing to me.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I would prefer a task that is intel-
lectual, difficult, and important to
one that is somewhat important but
does not require much thought.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I feel relief rather than satisfac-
tion after completing a task that re-
quired a lot of mental effort.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Its enough for me that something
gets the job done; I dont care how
or why it works.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I usually end up deliberating about
issues even when they do not affect
me personally.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Appendix E
AS level Mathematics Test
The mathematics manipulation check given to the AS level students in Chapter
5 is presented below along with the instructions.
Questions 1-12 were taken from the Woodcock-Johnson III Calculation subtest.
Nine of them had shown an average accuracy of less than 55% and correlated
with performance on the whole test at .86 in a previous dataset with mixed-
discipline undergraduate students (Inglis, Attridge et al., 2011) and the remain-
ing three were taken from the lower range to prevent floor effects in the English
literature students.
Questions 13-15 were the most difficult questions on the Loughborough Uni-
versity diagnostic test for new mathematics undergraduates based on perform-
ance in 2008 and 2009. The diagnostic test is designed to assess students’ capab-
ility with material covered in AS level mathematics, and these three items were
included to prevent ceiling effects in the mathematics students at the second
time point whilst ensuring that the content was not inappropriately advanced.
Questions were presented in a set order that was intended to be progressive.
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Calculation
Some of the questions in this section are very difficult, and some you will
never even have come across before. We do not expect you to be able to
attempt all of the questions, please just answer as many as you can. If you get
stuck, do not worry, just move on to the next section.
1. 9 + 7 =
2. 8× 5 =
3. 48− 19 =
4. 1.05× .2 =
5.
(
4b
3y
)(−4y
12b2
)
=
6. logb 81 = 4
b =
7. f(x) = 6x3
f ′(x) =
8. cos θ =
√
3
2
θ =
9. 2y = 6x+ 8
Slope=
y-intercept=
10. Evaluate:
8 2
-4 1
11.
∫ 3
1
3x2 dx =
12. tan θ = 1
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sin θ =
13. When expressing
x
(x+ 1)2(x2 + 2)
in partial fractions, the appropriate form
is
© A
x+ 1
+
Bx+ C
x2 + 2
© A
x+ 1
+
B
x2 + 2
© A
(x+ 1)2
+
B
x+ 1
+
C
x2 + 2
© A
(x+ 1)2
+
B
x+ 1
+
Cx+D
x2 + 2
14.
∫
xex dxis
© x2ex + c
© xex − ex + c
© x
2
2
ex + c
© x
2
2
ex+1 + c
15. If the substitution u = 5x− 7 is used to find the integral
∫
1
(5x− 7)2 dx the
result is
© − 1
5(5x− 7) + c
© 1
5x− 7 + c
© − 1
5x− 7 + c
© − 5
5x− 7 + c
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Appendix F
Thematic Conditional
Inference Task
Here, the thematic conditional inference task that was given to the undergradu-
ate students in Chapter 6 is presented with its instructions. There was no time
limit.
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Real world logic
Please read the following instructions carefully:
This study is concerned with people’s ability to reason logically with everyday
sentences. You will be presented with a total of 16 problems on the following
pages. In each case you are given two statements together with a conclusion
which may or may not follow from these statements.
Your task in each case is to evaluate the logic of the sentences, independently
of the content, and decide whether or not the conclusion necessarily follows
from the statements. A conclusion is necessary if it must be true, given
that the statements are true.
The problems look something like this:
Assume the following is true:
If the material is wood, then it is hard.
Given that the following premise is also true:
The material is wood.
is it necessary that:
The material is hard.
© YES
© NO
In each case you must assume that the rule holds and combine it with the in-
formation in the second statement in order to decide whether the conclusion
necessarily follows.
If you think the conclusion does necessarily follow then please tick the YES
box, otherwise tick the NO box. Please work through the problems in order
and make sure you do not miss any. Do not return to a problem once you have
finished and moved on to another.
225
If you think the conclusion necessarily follows please tick YES, otherwise tick
NO. Do not return to a problem once you have finished and moved on to an-
other. Answer all questions.
1. Assume the following is true:
If oil prices continue to rise then UK petrol prices will rise.
Given that the following premise is also true:
Oil prices continue to rise.
is it necessary that:
UK petrol prices rise.
© YES
© NO
2. Assume the following is true:
If car ownership increases then traffic congestion will get worse.
Given that the following premise is also true:
Traffic congestion does not get worse.
is it necessary that:
Car ownership does not increase.
© YES
© NO
3. Assume the following is true:
If more people use protective sun cream then cases of skin cancer will be reduced.
Given that the following premise is also true:
Cases of skin cancer are not reduced.
is it necessary that:
More people do not use protective sun cream.
© YES
© NO
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4. Assume the following is true:
If Sony release a PlayStation 4 then their company profits will rise.
Given that the following premise is also true:
Sony release a PlayStation 4.
is it necessary that:
The company profits rise.
© YES
© NO
5. Assume the following is true:
If oil prices continue to rise then UK petrol prices will rise.
Given that the following premise is also true:
Oil prices do not continue to rise.
is it necessary that:
UK petrol prices do not rise.
© YES
© NO
6. Assume the following is true:
If car ownership increases then traffic congestion will get worse.
Given that the following premise is also true:
Traffic congestion gets worse.
is it necessary that:
Car ownership increases.
© YES
© NO
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7. Assume the following is true:
If more people use protective sun cream then cases of skin cancer will be reduced.
Given that the following premise is also true:
Cases of skin cancer are reduced.
is it necessary that:
More people use protective sun cream.
© YES
© NO
8. Assume the following is true:
If Sony release a PlayStation 4 then their company profits will rise.
Given that the following premise is also true:
Sony do not release a Playstation 4.
is it necessary that:
The company profits do not rise.
© YES
© NO
9. Assume the following is true:
If more new houses are built then the amount of homeless people will increase.
Given that the following premise is also true:
More new houses are built.
is it necessary that:
The amount of homeless people increases.
© YES
© NO
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10. Assume the following is true:
If third world debt is cancelled then world poverty will worsen.
Given that the following premise is also true:
World poverty does not worsen.
is it necessary that:
Third world debt is not cancelled.
© YES
© NO
11. Assume the following is true:
If fast food is taxed then childhood obesity will increase.
Given that the following premise is also true:
Childhood obesity does not increase.
is it necessary that:
Fast food is not taxed.
© YES
© NO
12. Assume the following is true:
If EU quarantine laws are strengthened then rabies will spread to the UK.
Given that the following premise is also true:
EU quarantine laws are strengthened.
is it necessary that:
Rabies spreads to the UK.
© YES
© NO
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13. Assume the following is true:
If more new houses are built then the amount of homeless people will increase.
Given that the following premise is also true:
More new houses are not built.
is it necessary that:
The amount of homeless people does not increase.
© YES
© NO
14. Assume the following is true:
If third world debt is cancelled then world poverty will worsen.
Given that the following premise is also true:
World poverty worsens.
is it necessary that:
Third world debt is cancelled.
© YES
© NO
15. Assume the following is true:
If fast food is taxed then childhood obesity will increase.
Given that the following premise is also true:
Childhood obesity increases.
is it necessary that:
Fast food is taxed.
© YES
© NO
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16. Assume the following is true:
If EU quarantine laws are strengthened then rabies will spread to the UK.
Given that the following premise is also true:
EU quarantine laws are not strengthened.
is it necessary that:
Rabies does not spread to the UK.
© YES
© NO
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Appendix G
Undergraduate
Mathematics Test
The mathematics test given to undergraduate students in Chapter 6 consisted
of 11 questions. Seven of these were taken from the Woodcock-Johnson III
Calculation subtest, two were the most difficult questions on the Loughbor-
ough University diagnostic test for new mathematics undergraduates based on
performance in 2008 and 2009, and the final two were based on the first year
mathematics degree syllabus.
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Calculation
Some of the questions in this section are very difficult, and some you will
never even have come across before. We do not expect you to be able to
attempt all of the questions, please just answer as many as you can. If you get
stuck, do not worry, just move on to the next section. You may make notes but
please do not use a calculator.
1. 8× 5 =
2. 48− 19 =
3. 1.05× .2 =
4.
(
4b
3y
)(−4y
12b2
)
=
5. f(x) = 6x3
f ′(x) =
6. 2y = 6x+ 8
Slope=
y-intercept=
7.
∫ 3
1
3x2 dx =
8. When expressing
x
(x+ 1)2(x2 + 2)
in partial fractions, the appropriate form
is
© A
x+ 1
+
Bx+ C
x2 + 2
© A
x+ 1
+
B
x2 + 2
© A
(x+ 1)2
+
B
x+ 1
+
C
x2 + 2
© A
(x+ 1)2
+
B
x+ 1
+
Cx+D
x2 + 2
9.
∫
xex dx is
233
© x2ex + c
© xex − ex + c
© x
2
2
ex + c
© x
2
2
ex+1 + c
10. Given f(x, y) = exy find
∂2f
∂x2
11. Express the complex number 11+i in the form x + iy where i
2 = −1, and x
and y are real numbers.
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List of Abbreviations
A level Advanced level. An optional two year qualification that is usually
taken after school but before university in the UK.
AC Affirmation of the consequent. An inference of the structure ‘if p then q;
q; therefore p’.
ANOVA Analysis of Variance. A statistical test for comparing means across
groups.
ANCOVA Analysis of Covariance. A statistical test for comparing means
across groups while controlling for a covariate.
APB Affirmative premise bias. The conditional inference bias towards endors-
ing more inferences with affirmative minor premises than with negative
minor premises.
API Affirmative premise index. A behavioural measure of the affirmative
premise bias.
AS level Advanced subsidiary level. The first year of an A level course.
BCI Biconditional index. A behavioural measure of the tendency to assume a
biconditional interpretation of conditional statements.
CCI Conjunctive conditional index. A behavioural measure of the tendency to
assume a conjunctive interpretation of conditional statements.
CRT Cognitive Reflection Test. A measure of thinking disposition.
DA Denial of the antecedent. An inference of the structure ‘if p then q; not p;
therefore not q’.
DCI Defective conditional index. A behavioural measure of the tendency to
assume a defective interpretation of conditional statements.
IT If then. A phrasing of conditional statements, for example, ‘If the letter is
G then the number is 5’.
MCI Material conditional index. A behavioural measure of the tendency to
assume a material interpretation of conditional statements.
MP Modus Ponens. An inference of the structure ‘if p then q; p; therefore q’.
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MT Modus Tollens. An inference of the structure ‘if p then q; not q; therefore
not p’.
NCB Negative conclusion bias. The conditional inference bias towards en-
dorsing more inferences with negative conclusions than with affirmative
conclusions.
NCI Negative conclusion index. A behavioural measure of the negative con-
clusion bias.
NFC Need for Cognition. A measure of thinking disposition.
OI Only if. A phrasing of conditional statements, for example, ‘The letter is G
only if the number is 5’.
RAPM Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices. A measure of intelligence.
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